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In rural China, when approaching the end of nine-year compulsory schooling, students face four 
equally popular post-compulsory education decisions (PCED): dropout, work after graduation, 
vocational high school, and academic high school. The literature tends to simply treat PCED as 
dichotomous (continue vs. leave school), and there is a geographical research imbalance favoring 
inner China. An increasing volume of studies also suggest that traditionally recognized factors like 
socioeconomic status and academic performance are not as influential as before in advancing the 
schooling. People have started to look at socio-emotional support, such as the promotion of 
self-discipline and confidence. At present, it is grassroots NGOs (GNGO) who take the major 
responsibility for providing this type of support in rural China, and there is rare discussion of 
achievements, let alone evaluation of practical impact.  
Given the existing problems, the key research questions of this study are: (1) What are the 
current PCED determinants for China’s rural students? More specifically, what are the PCED 
determinants for lower secondary students in rural Guangdong, a coastal province? (2) How can 
GNGO intervention affect PCED by boosting certain subjective factor(s)? The tested treatment is the 
Lighthouse program, whose one-month summer camp aims to improve student attitudes towards 
their life, such as making them more confident, organized, and social.  
The key to answering the first question is to explore a comprehensive list of variables applying to 
local populations, which cannot be achieved simply through a literature review. When answering the 
 
 
second question, since Lighthouse participation is voluntary, it is important to deal with selection 
bias, to ensure that any identified Lighthouse impact results from its activities rather than the 
student characteristics that lead to their participation.  
To overcome these methodological challenges, I first employed the Delphi approach. Delphi is an 
iterative process used to collect and distill the judgments of experts using a series of questionnaires 
interspersed with feedback. It is used to identify possible PCED determinants that are missing in the 
literature, to determine factors that lead to Lighthouse participation, and to collect discussions about 
both PCED determinants and GNGO intervention. Based on the Delphi results and literature, I then 
designed five questionnaires for students, households, teachers, principals, and Lighthouse 
volunteers. In Jun-Oct 2012, I led seven research assistants in conducting two waves of surveys in 
eight towns, building a firsthand dataset of 6298 valid observations with imputations. Multinomial 
logit was used to investigate PCED determinants. It predicted the PCED probabilities, given nine 
groups of independent variables. Propensity score matching was used to evaluate the program 
impact. It calculates the treatment propensity for each student based on their characteristics, so the 
Lighthouse impact can be compared between treated and untreated students of similar treatment 
propensity. Tests of robustness and heterogeneity were conducted after both methods. Qualitative 
materials collected from Delphi and on-site interviews were used to explore the causal mechanism.  
I use relative risk ratios to report the findings of PCED determinants. The findings challenge the 
existing literature regarding the roles of gender and parental background, further extend knowledge 
of monetary reward/cost and subjective factors, and confirm new possible determinants that have 
seldom been investigated in literature. The main model passes the robustness check, and there exist 
explainable heterogeneity effects. It is notable that education aspiration stands out as a strong PCED 
determinant, ceteris paribus. 
Propensity score matching shows that the Lighthouse program mainly affects PCED by boosting 
educational aspiration for students with high academic performance, although that impact fades 
gradually if there is no follow-up service. The novelty of the program to local people, volunteer team 
 
 
morale, and volunteer acceptance of Lighthouse training could help explain why increases in 
aspiration varied across sites. The role-model effect might explain why the increase in aspiration 
exists, as there are signs that the students tried to copy the volunteer’s schooling decision once trust 
was built.  
This study makes three major contributions. It can be translated into comprehensive advocacy 
for education policies related to PCED, such as dropout prevention and the promotion of VHS. It may 
also suggest the value of, or at least the required improvement to, China’s educational GNGOs, which 
are young and remain confined by governmental regulations. Last but not least, this is a unique 
showcase of how qualitative-quantitative sequential mixed-method works better in exploratory 
analyses. The study has limitations in timing, missing data, external validity, implementation of 
research methods, and heavy rely on self-reported questionnaires, but they can be largely eliminated 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................................ iv 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................... vi 
Chapter 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Context and Motivation ................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................................................ 5 
1.3 Key Research Questions................................................................................................................................ 7 
1.4 Structure of Dissertation .............................................................................................................................. 7 
1.5 Definition of Key Terms............................................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 2 Determinants of Post-Compulsory Education Decision: A Review .................................................. 13 
2.1 Theoretical Explanation .............................................................................................................................. 13 
2.1.1 The Basic Neoclassical Model of Schooling Decisions ......................................................................... 13 
2.1.2 Extensions of the Basic Model ............................................................................................................. 15 
2.2 Methodology .............................................................................................................................................. 22 
2.2.1 Data ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 
2.2.2 Analytical Approaches ......................................................................................................................... 27 
2.3 Evidence regarding the Determinants of Post-Compulsory Education Decision ........................................ 36 
2.3.1 Case-Specific Determinants ................................................................................................................. 40 
2.3.2 Alternative-Specific Determinants ....................................................................................................... 53 
2.4 Summary .................................................................................................................................................... 64 
2.4.1 Major Findings from the Literature ..................................................................................................... 64 
2.4.2 Gaps in the Knowledge ........................................................................................................................ 66 
Chapter 3 China’s GNGOs in Education and the Case of Lighthouse ............................................................... 68 
3.1 Theories about NGOs ................................................................................................................................. 69 
3.1.1 Market Failure, Government Failure, and Voluntary Failure ............................................................... 69 
3.1.2 Pluralism, Civil Society, and Corporatism ............................................................................................ 71 
3.1.3 NGO Theory Studies in China ............................................................................................................... 72 
3.2 NGOs in China ............................................................................................................................................. 74 
3.2.1 Classifying NGOs in China .................................................................................................................... 74 
3.2.2 Regulations Regarding NGOs .............................................................................................................. 76 
3.2.3 The State of NGOs in China.................................................................................................................. 78 
3.3 Educational NGOs (ENGOs) ........................................................................................................................ 82 
3.3.1 NGO Functions in Education ................................................................................................................ 82 
3.3.2 Educational NGOs in the World ........................................................................................................... 83 
3.3.3 Educational GNGOs in China ............................................................................................................... 83 
3.4 Grassroots NGOs for China’s Rural Education: Lighthouse ......................................................................... 87 
3.4.1 Origin and Theme ................................................................................................................................ 88 
3.4.2 Operation ............................................................................................................................................ 89 
ii 
 
3.4.3 The Growth of Lighthouse ................................................................................................................... 92 
3.4.4 Developmental Issues .......................................................................................................................... 95 
3.4.5 Synthesis of Theory and State .............................................................................................................. 97 
Chapter 4 Research Design and Data Collection ............................................................................................. 99 
4.1 Theoretical Framework and Methodological Challenges ........................................................................... 99 
4.2 Delphi Survey as Qualitative Input to the Quantitative Design ................................................................ 102 
4.2.1 The Delphi Process ............................................................................................................................. 102 
4.2.2 Delphi Results .................................................................................................................................... 104 
4.2.3 (In)accuracy of the Delphi Results ..................................................................................................... 107 
4.3 Answering Question 1: Multinomial Logit ................................................................................................ 108 
4.4 Answering Question 2: Propensity Score Matching ................................................................................. 111 
4.5 Survey Design and Data Collection ........................................................................................................... 116 
4.5.1 Sampling Strategy ............................................................................................................................. 117 
4.5.2 Questionnaire Design ........................................................................................................................ 119 
4.5.3 Data Collection .................................................................................................................................. 120 
4.6 Missing data.............................................................................................................................................. 124 
4.7 Variable Construction ............................................................................................................................... 126 
4.8 Synthesis of Research Components .......................................................................................................... 132 
Chapter 5 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................................... 134 
5.1 Expected PCED and Actual PCED .............................................................................................................. 134 
5.2 Independent Variables and Treatment-Related Variables ........................................................................ 139 
5.2.1 Gender, Age and Ethnicity ................................................................................................................. 139 
5.2.2 Parental Background ......................................................................................................................... 140 
5.2.3 Number of Siblings and Birth Order ................................................................................................... 141 
5.2.4 Peer, Teacher, and School Factors ...................................................................................................... 142 
5.2.5 Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints .......................................................................... 144 
5.2.6 Subjective Factors .............................................................................................................................. 145 
5.2.7 Health ................................................................................................................................................ 147 
5.2.8 Monetary Costs and Rewards ............................................................................................................ 147 
5.2.9 Academic Performance and Other Variables ..................................................................................... 148 
5.2.10 Additional Variables for Treatment Outcomes or Determinants ..................................................... 150 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results for PCED Determinants ..................................................................................... 151 
6.1 Determinants of PCED .............................................................................................................................. 153 
6.1.1 Gender, Age and Ethnicity ................................................................................................................. 153 
6.1.2 Parental Background ......................................................................................................................... 154 
6.1.3 Number of Siblings and Birth Order ................................................................................................... 155 
6.1.4 Peer, Teacher and School Factors....................................................................................................... 155 
6.1.5 Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints .......................................................................... 157 
6.1.6 Subjective Factors .............................................................................................................................. 158 
6.1.7 Health ................................................................................................................................................ 160 
6.1.8 Monetary Costs and Rewards ............................................................................................................ 160 
6.1.9 Academic Performance and Other Variables ..................................................................................... 161 
iii 
 
6.2 Robustness................................................................................................................................................ 162 
6.3 Heterogeneity ........................................................................................................................................... 174 
6.4 Synthesis: Subjective vs. Traditional vs. Localized Determinants ............................................................. 177 
6.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings Regarding PCED Determinants ...................................................... 179 
6.5.1 Summary of Findings Regarding PCED Determinants ....................................................................... 179 
6.5.2 Comparison with the Literature ......................................................................................................... 182 
Chapter 7 Empirical Findings Regarding Lighthouse Impact ......................................................................... 185 
7.1 Determinants of Lighthouse Participation ................................................................................................ 185 
7.2 Effect of Lighthouse Participation ............................................................................................................. 189 
7.2.1 Impact of the Most Recent Participation ........................................................................................... 189 
7.2.2 Impact of Any Participation ............................................................................................................... 192 
7.2.3 Educational Aspiration as the Key Outcome ...................................................................................... 195 
7.3 Heterogeneous Effect, School Engagement and Program Quality............................................................ 199 
7.3.1 Impact by Student Characteristics ..................................................................................................... 199 
7.3.2 Impact by Lighthouse Site .................................................................................................................. 201 
7.4 Causal Mechanisms .................................................................................................................................. 205 
7.4.1 Delphi-Based Discussion .................................................................................................................... 205 
7.4.2 Interview/Diary-Based Discussion ..................................................................................................... 206 
7.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings Regarding Lighthouse Impact ........................................................ 207 
7.5.1 Summary of Findings Regarding Lighthouse Impact ......................................................................... 207 
7.5.2 Untestable Elements across the PSM Implementation ...................................................................... 209 
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Policy Implications ............................................................................................. 211 
8.1 Summary of Key Findings ......................................................................................................................... 211 
8.1.1 PCED Determinants ........................................................................................................................... 211 
8.1.2 Impact of Lighthouse Intervention .................................................................................................... 213 
8.2 Significance and Implications ................................................................................................................... 214 
8.2.1 Education Policy ................................................................................................................................. 214 
8.2.2 Educational Grassroots NGO ............................................................................................................. 216 
8.2.3 Sequential Mixed-Methods ................................................................................................................ 218 
8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Studies ...................................................................................... 220 
References ................................................................................................................................................... 224 
Appendix ..................................................................................................................................................... 238 
Appendix A: Lighthouse Intervention: From Volunteer Recruitment to Revisit ............................................. 238 
Appendix B: Questionnaires (Students/Households/Teachers/Principals/Volunteers) .................................. 241 
Appendix C: Delphi Ratings for Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 .............................................................................. 261 
Appendix D: Summary Statistics for the Six Lighthouse School Sample ......................................................... 263 
Appendix E: Output for Multinomial Logit with Multiple Imputations .......................................................... 265 
Appendix F: Propensity Score Matching with Adjusted Specification ............................................................ 278 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2-1 Shortlisted Post-2000 Studies on the Determinants of PCED in Rural China........................................ 23 
Table 2-2 Determinants Suggested by the Shortlisted Studies in Table 2-1 ......................................................... 38 
 
Table 3-1 Example of Volunteer Roles in a Lighthouse Team............................................................................... 89 
 
Table 4-1 Determinants of PCED and Program Participation Suggested by Delphi ............................................ 105 
Table 4-2 Instruments Related to Lighthouse Intervention................................................................................ 113 
Table 4-3 Survey Log ........................................................................................................................................... 123 
Table 4-4 Variable Construction ......................................................................................................................... 127 
 
Table 5-1 Sample Distribution by Expected PCED and Student Background ...................................................... 135 
Table 5-2 Expected PCED by Grade: Whole Sample vs. Treated Sample ............................................................ 135 
Table 5-3 Changeable Expected PCED (Qingyuan Panel Sample) ....................................................................... 137 
Table 5-4 Change from Expected to Actual PCED (Qingyuan Panel Sample) ..................................................... 137 
Table 5-5 Summary Statistics_ Gender, Age and Ethnicity ................................................................................. 140 
Table 5-6 Summary Statistics_ Parental Background ......................................................................................... 141 
Table 5-7 Summary Statistics_ Siblings and Birth Order .................................................................................... 142 
Table 5-8 Summary Statistics_ Peer ................................................................................................................... 142 
Table 5-9 Summary Statistics_ Teacher .............................................................................................................. 143 
Table 5-10 Summary Statistics_ School .............................................................................................................. 144 
Table 5-11 Summary Statistics_ Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints ....................................... 145 
Table 5-12 Summary Statistics_ Subjective Factors ........................................................................................... 146 
Table 5-13 Summary Statistics_ Health .............................................................................................................. 147 
Table 5-14 Summary Statistics_ Monetary Costs and Rewards ......................................................................... 147 
Table 5-15 Summary Statistics_ Academic Performance and Other Variables .................................................. 149 
Table 5-16 Summary Statistics_ Additional Variables Related to Treatment ..................................................... 150 
 
Table 6-1 Relative Risk Ratios_ Gender, Age and Ethnicity ................................................................................ 154 
Table 6-2 Relative Risk Ratios_ Parental Background ......................................................................................... 154 
Table 6-3 Relative Risk Ratios_ Siblings and Birth Order .................................................................................... 155 
Table 6-4 Relative Risk Ratios_ Peer, Teacher and School Factors ..................................................................... 156 
Table 6-5 Relative Risk Ratios_ Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints ........................................ 157 
Table 6-6 Relative Risk Ratios_ Subjective Factors ............................................................................................. 159 
Table 6-7 Relative Risk Ratios_ Health ............................................................................................................... 160 
Table 6-8 Relative Risk Ratios_ Monetary Costs and Rewards ........................................................................... 161 
Table 6-9 Relative Risk Ratios_ Academic Performance and Other Variables .................................................... 162 
Table 6-10 Relative Risk Ratios of “Dropout” and “Work”_ Various Samples and Specifications ...................... 165 
Table 6-11 Relative Risk Ratios of “VHS” and “Undecided”_ Various Samples and Specifications .................... 170 
 
Table 7-1 Probit Outputs for the Determinants of Lighthouse Participation ..................................................... 187 
Table 7-2 Nearest Neighborhood Matching Results (t Scores)_ Most Recent Participation as Treatment ....... 191 
v 
 
Table 7-3 Nearest Neighborhood Matching Results (t Scores)_ Any Participation as Treatment ...................... 194 
Table 7-4 Akaike/Bayesian Information Criteria_ Various Models and Specifications ....................................... 195 
Table 7-5 Matching Results by Background Characteristics (t Scores) ............................................................... 200 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1-1 Typical Routes from Compulsory Education to Work for a Rural Student in China .............................. 2 
Figure 1-2 China's Changing Distribution of PCED (1997-2014) ............................................................................. 3 
Figure 1-3 National Trend of Student Supply ......................................................................................................... 4 
 
Figure 2-1 Geographical Coverage of PCED Literature ......................................................................................... 26 
Figure 2-2 Possible Nested Structures of PCED .................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 2-3 Pre-2010 Estimates of Return to Education in China .......................................................................... 56 
Figure 2-4 PCED Determinants Suggested by the Literature ................................................................................ 65 
 
Figure 3-1 Number of NGOs Registered in the Government Sectors for Civil Affairs .......................................... 75 
Figure 3-2 Locations of Rural Middle Schools with Lighthouse Interventions (by 2012) ..................................... 91 
 
Figure 4-1 PCED Process Suggested by the Literature ........................................................................................ 101 
Figure 4-2 Structure of the Delphi Panel ............................................................................................................ 103 
Figure 4-3 Suggested Impacts of the Lighthouse Program ................................................................................. 106 
Figure 4-4 Sorting the Determinants for Choosing Work in the 2nd to 3rd Rounds .......................................... 108 
Figure 4-5 Schools with Lighthouse Interventions in Guangdong ...................................................................... 118 
Figure 4-6: Connections of Research Steps ........................................................................................................ 133 
 
Figure 5-1 PCED from Grade-7 to Post-Graduation (Qingyuan Panel Sample) ................................................... 136 
Figure 5-2 High School Entrance Exam Score vs. Actual PCED (Qingyuan Panel Sample) .................................. 138 
 
Figure 6-1 Visualization of Standardized Effect Size and Statistical Significance ............................................... 178 
 
Figure 7-1 Distribution of Propensity Scores_ Adjusted Specification ............................................................... 196 
Figure 7-2 Propensity Score Matching Results for Educational Aspiration ........................................................ 198 








I would like to express my sincere respect and deep gratitude to my advisor Professor Mun Tsang 
for his insightful navigation throughout my doctoral study, his strong support to my adventure in the 
field study and data collection, his strict training of my analytical skill, and his understanding of and 
patience on my slow research progress that had been intertwined with family and out-of-campus 
commitments. Professor Tsang’s lifelong influence on me is not just academic, but also about being 
the one always cares about social justice as well as the growth of next generation. 
My deep gratitude goes to my dissertation committee. I would like to thank Professor Henry 
Levin for his insightful comments throughout my research, particularly during the year Professor 
Tsang was in Sabbatical. I also sincerely appreciate Professor Aaron Pallas, Professor Peter Bergman, 
and Professor Yao Lu for their constructive comments and advice. In addition, I am thankful to 
professors and peer researchers who have been at one of my six Chinese Education Seminar or 
Economics & Education Workshop presentations. Without their precious feedbacks, my dissertation 
would never reach the current level of sophistication. 
My sincere appreciation goes to my research assistants in China. I thank Guiying Zhou and Chulin 
Cheng for their outstanding outreach to local officials, principals, and students, as well as their 
professional arrangement of logistics. I thank Dan Chen, Huiyan Xu, Huizhen Huang, Jia’ai Lin, Peiyu 
Wang, Qihang Fan and Yisen Fang for their enormous help on data collection, data entry and filed 
interviews. We are more than a researcher and his assistants. We are friends who shared the same 
enthusiasm on rural education and grew together through an intellectual odyssey. 
My heartfelt thanks to the educators, officials, NGO members and researchers engaged in the 
qualitative Delphi survey or quantitative data collection. Due to IRB protocol or personal request, 
their names cannot be revealed, but their help will never be forgotten. It is warm to be invited to a 
family dinner when the field survey was halted; it is convenient to receive suggestion of localized 
questionnaire design when literature does not offer much help; and it is a great relief to have 
vii 
 
someone willing to standardize over one hundred village names during data cleaning.  
I am also grateful to the financial supports on data collection and dissertation writing provided 
by multiple institutes. In chronological order, they are Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund 
Grant from Nippon Foundation, Y.F. & L.C.C. Wu Fellowship and Weatherhead Ph.D. Summer Training 
Grant from Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Sasakawa Research Abroad Award from Nippon 
Foundation, Outstanding Abroad Student Award from China Ministry of Education, Doctoral 
Fellowship from Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, and Doctoral Dissertation Grant and Grant-in-aid from 
Teachers College, Columbia University. 
My deep gratitude and love goes to my family, in particular my parents and parents-in-law who 
are always supporting my pursuit of the PhD degree, and my wife Wenwen Liu and elder son Yige Yao 
who have stayed with me to bear the family-unfriendly living condition of New York City.  
Finally, my special thanks go to Qingpeng Lu and Jinying Zhi. When I met Qingpeng, I was a 
sophomore and he was a 9 year-old boys who lived with grandparents in a Dong Chinese village. He 
has a decent appearance, but his shirt has no button. He scored the top among the boys at his class, 
but he also needed to get up at 4 a.m. to feed the pigs. When I met Jinying, I was a junior teaching 
volunteer and she was a grade-8 student in northwest Guangdong. She gifted me a small bottle of 
swine oil to cure my pustule caused by local insects. She was the youngest among her seven siblings, 
but she did not proceed to grade-9 even though she performed quite well in tests. I had not met 
Qingpeng again, and the last time I met Jinying was near her factory when she told me about her 
attempt to get an accounting training at vocational school. These all happened over 10 years ago. 
They are the reason for my persistence on this dissertation research. I want to know more about and 
then do more for Qingpengs and Jinyings. My dissertation finally reaches its end. And the 




Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Context and Motivation 
In 2014, China had 138 million1 students enrolled in its 9-year compulsory education system, 
with nearly half living in rural regions. Most of these students need to make decisions based on four 
alternatives when approaching the end of their compulsory schooling. These can be called 
‘post-compulsory education decisions’ (PCED). They are: 
A. Drop out before compulsory schooling is finished (Dropout);  
B. Work right after finishing compulsory education (Work); 
C. Further their education in academic high schools (AHS); 
D. Further their education in vocational high schools (VHS).   
For over 90% of school-aged Chinese, “compulsory education” means six years of primary 
schooling plus three years of lower secondary education.2 Students then need to take the summer 
high school entrance exam (HSEE) if they want to enter a three-year AHS, but not everyone who 
succeeds in the exam decides to enroll. People who enter an AHS usually plan to continue 
post-secondary education, which requires them to take the national college entrance exam (NCEE). 
Contrary to AHS, VHS does not impose strict requirements for HSEE performance. VHS graduates 
mostly go directly to the labor market. There are three types of VHS in China (specialized, vocational, 
and skilled workers schools), which are similar in setting and curriculum. Those who decide not to 
engage in upper secondary schooling may choose Work. For rural students, work means being a 
farmer in the village, a local worker, or more often than not, a migrant worker. Other than upper high 
school and work, a number of rural students choose to drop out. Dropout usually takes place at 
eighth grade (Wang, 2005; Jiang & Dai, 2005) and therefore most dropouts are also supposed to find 
                                                             
1
 All data presented in this section was calculated from the Educational Statistics Yearbook of China. 
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a job quickly, however, this group should be separated from the Work group since it is definitely not a 
recommended option under the Chinese Compulsory Education Law.  
Figure 1-1 illustrates the above process. The end of compulsory education appears to be a critical 
turning point for future paths. This is especially true for rural students, since Dropout and Work are 
more likely to be options for them than they are for urban students, as discussed next. 
 
Note: This diagram presents the most common process, but the real routes could vary. First, as of 2010, about 10% 
of Chinese students are not in a 6-3 system of compulsory education. Second, there are at least nine options for 
students who fail the NCEE (http://learning.sohu.com/s2006/gkchulu/ plus the option of joining the army). Third, 
examination is not the sole channel of further education. Fourth, VHS students also have the chance to enter 
higher education. The ongoing NCEE reform offers the Spring NCEE that leads to VHEs and the Summer NCEE 
that leads to AHEs. Both AHS and VHS students are allowed to take both exams.  
Primary Schools 
(6 Years) 
Lower Secondary Schools 
(3 Years) 
Work 
Vocational High Schools 
(VHS 3 Years) 
Vocational Higher Education 
(VHE 3 Years) 
Academic High Schools 
(AHS 3 Years) 
Academic Higher Education 
(AHE 4 Years) 
Graduate Education 
(2/3 Years for Masters & 3/4 Years for Doctorate) 








Grad School EE 
Figure 1-1 Typical Routes from Compulsory Education to 
Work for a Rural Student in China 
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From the mid-2000s, there have been two trends among rural students. They face a more 
complicated PCED situation than their urban peers, who now usually only need to make a decision 
between AHS and VHS. This disparity is apparent in coastal regions with large rural-urban gaps, such 
as Guangdong where the data for this study will be collected.  
Figure 1-2 shows the yearly estimates of PCED distribution for the whole nation. In 2014, almost 
all students in Dropout or Work were from rural areas. There are also unofficial reports that the 
percentage of rural Dropout/Work groups might have been seriously understated by official data 
(Wang, 2005; Wang et al., 2009). Recalling that about half China’s compulsory education enrollment 
is rural, one can expect a relatively even distribution of rural PCED. For these students, ending 
compulsory education appears to be a critical turning point in their future paths. 
 
Figure 1-2 China's Changing Distribution of PCED (1997-2014) 
 
Note: Data is calculated from the Educational Statistics Yearbook of China. I assume the four alternatives to be 
the only PCEDs, although there are other alternatives, such as studying abroad and getting married. The new 
enrollment in vocational high schools (VHS) is the sum of new enrollment in specialized secondary, vocational, 
and skilled workers’ schools. The new enrollment in academic high schools (AHS) was obtained directly. The 
number of students graduating and working (Work) was obtained by subtracting the new enrollment in 
VHSs/AHSs from the number of lower-secondary graduates. The number of dropouts (Dropout) was calculated by 










































In the meantime, as Figure 1-3 shows, graduation from lower-secondary schools declined after 
2005. New enrollments in elementary and lower-secondary schools are also smaller due to the 
demographic change (caused by the One-Child Policy). It is safe to say that today’s students face less 
competition to enter AHSs, VHSs or even the labor market. The stabilized post-2008 PCED 
distribution together with the eased competition among students suggest that PCED determinants 
cannot be simply about cost concerns or the availability of AHS/VHS/work opportunities.  
 
Figure 1-3 National Trend of Student Supply 
 
Note: Data was collected from the Educational Statistics Yearbook of China. 
 
 
There is an increasing concern that the traditional material support provided for students lacks 
impact in affecting rural PCED. Figure 1-2 shows that the PCED distribution changed at an accelerated 
rate from 2006 to 2008. An increasing percentage of students chose upper secondary education. Two 
possible catalysts of this include the 2005 policy of the Promotion of Vocational Education, which 
expanded enrollment and offered subsidies, or even eliminated, tuition for VHS attendance, and the 
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tuition and fees. The change stagnated after 2008, however, with the percentage of Dropouts3 
increasing. This phenomenon echoes the concern that material support is not a panacea. In a 2003 
survey covering nine Chinese provinces, 52.8% of rural households selected ‘school-weary’ as the 
main reason for their children’s dropout, while only 29.4% selected ‘tuition and fees’ (Jiang & Dai, 
2005). If financial concerns are no longer the primary reason for dropouts, then material support 
lacks momentum, and it would be wise to look at non-material factors such as attitude, 
self-discipline, self-affirmation, and educational aspiration. These have been demonstrated as 
responsive to purposive personal assistance and support, and they have an impact on educational 
decisions (Almlund et al., 2011; Yeager & Walton, 2011).  
Currently, it is the grassroots nongovernmental organizations (GNGO) that are taking the lead in 
non- material PCED intervention, but GNGO is still a weak sector in China. Many GNGOs fail to 
register with the Civil Affairs Bureau due to the harsh governmental regulations, and of those 
registered, the majority have managerial problems, such as unstable personnel and budget deficits 
(Xie, 2004). GNGO may have a role in affecting PCED, but there has not yet been a rigorous 
evaluation of this role. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The radical change in PCED distribution throughout the 2000s (Figure 1-2) has created a gap in 
knowledge. There are many studies about why Chinese students choose Dropout or Work, which is a 
reasonable response to the late 1990s/early 2000s PCED distribution, but studies of China’s schooling 
track (AHS vs. VHS) determinants are very limited, let alone studies concerning the four PCEDs 
together. There are only five papers on rural schooling tracks, all in Chinese, and three of them are 
Master’s theses (Zhu, 2006; Fang, 2007; Zhang, 2009). Given the importance of a PCED for rural 
students, it is necessary to understand a list of its determinants. Accordingly, this study attempts to 
                                                             
3
 This group also includes student entered primary school in mainland but than transfer to outside mainland before 
finishing the nine-year schooling. However, the number of this group can hardly twist the trend shown in Figure 1-2.. 
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identify and estimate the determinants of both intended and actual PCED in rural China, using 
appropriate estimation techniques that correct for common data problems. 
Other than filling the knowledge gap, studying PCED determinants is about suggesting 
corresponding measures to advance education in rural China. Some potential interventions are 
straightforward and easily measurable. For example, if economic status is believed to have an 
influence on dropout decisions (Sun, 2004; Brown, 2006; Liu, 2007; Yi et al., 2011), then the 
intervention could be a cash transfer conditional on class attendance (Mo et al., 2011), or simply an 
elimination of tuition and fees (as in the 2006 Amendment of Compulsory Education Law). There are 
also determinants calling for fuzzy solutions, such as non-material interventions (e.g. teaching, 
informal discussions, games, counseling). There have been studies (Jiang & Dai, 2005; Wang, 2005; 
Hannum & Adams, 2007, 2008; Hannum & Park, 2007; Hannum et al., 2009) connecting a student’s 
personality/attitude and their PCED, but this proposed study will be the first impact evaluation of a 
specific intervention.  
More specifically, this study will evaluate the intervention used by The Lighthouse Project 
(Lighthouse), which is the oldest survived GNGO for rural education in China. It was established in 
2001 by a group of middle-class businessmen and college students in Guangdong, the southern 
province with a large rural-urban gap. Each year, Lighthouse trains and sends college volunteers to 
one of six to eight rural schools for a one-month long summer camp that is tailored to the local 
environment, mostly for current or soon-to-be lower secondary students. Participation in the 
program is voluntary. Schools assist in the publicity, and in some cases the volunteers go straight to 
local communities for recruitment. Activities in the Lighthouse program include, but are not limited 
to, the following: informal courses, psychological counseling, household visits, team building, the 
cultivation of local student organizations and specific projects such as ‘Model Mayor Election’ and 
‘Life Auction’. Most of these activities aim to change student attitudes towards life, such as making 
them more confident, ambitious, organized, and social (Lighthouse, 2004). Appendix A gives samples 
of the Lighthouse volunteer training schedule, teamwork division, and summer camp curriculum. 
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This study could uncover how the Lighthouse-style intervention changes rural students, as well as 
how those changes affect their PCED.  
 
1.3 Key Research Questions 
Given the existing problems, the key research questions of this study are: 
1) What are the current PCED determinants for China’s rural students? More specifically, what are 
the PCED determinants for lower secondary students in rural Guangdong province? Given the 
current trend of PCED, the assumption here is that subjective factors, especially the student’s 
own attitude toward education, are at least as important as traditionally recognized factors like 
economic status and academic performance. 
2) Does Lighthouse intervention affect the choice of PCED? If so, how does it work? The 
assumption here is that Lighthouse indirectly affects PCED by boosting certain subjective 
factor(s). 
 
1.4 Structure of Dissertation 
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reviews the theory, methodology, and empirical 
evidence of the PCED in China. In theory, rural households select the PCED that maximizes their 
utility given the information they possess. Such a decision process is influenced by characteristics of 
the household, non-household (school, community, policy), and student. These factors could be 
monetary and non-monetary, short-term and long-term. Because household members have their 
own preferences, the final decision could be a product of intra-household bargaining. Previous PCED 
studies have utilized a decent pool of data and approaches in their methodology. The datasets in 
these studies are of various structures, sizes, and sources, but are less satisfactory regarding variable 
selection and geographical balance. In terms of empirical tools, researchers have made various 
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attempts either to approximate the real determinant–PCED association or to uncover the causal 
relationship. Overall, there is rich evidence of PCED determinants, although little of it considers the 
four PCEDs altogether. Over the 2000s, the discussions became more sophisticated, and they help to 
clarify the theory by presenting possible mechanisms for the PCED process. Since it takes time to 
respond to the changing state of rural PCEDs, there is still inadequate evidence for some of the 
potential determinants. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the knowledge gaps regarding 
PCED, including those related to the influence of GNGOs.  
Chapter 3 is an exploratory review of China’s incipient grassroots NGOs for rural education. It was 
conducted at three levels. At the macro level, it presents the theories of triple-failure from the field 
of public management, and the more politically-oriented theories of pluralism, civil society, and 
corporatism. At the meso-level, it describes the status quo of China’s grassroots educational NGOs, 
calling for attention to voluntary failure and the corporatism of the Chinese government. Finally, the 
micro level review examines the development and operation of the Lighthouse, a pioneering 
grassroots NGO for rural education. At this level, concerns generated from previous levels become 
more specific.  
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the research design and the data collection of this study. This 
study employs a sequential mixed model of Delphi-Multinomial Logit (MNL)-Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM). The Delphi survey supports questionnaire design for data collection, as well as 
causal interpretation after quantitative analyses. MNL is used to answer Research Question 1, and 
PSM, which deals with the selective bias generated from voluntary Lighthouse participation, is used 
to answer Research Question 2. In terms of data collection, I organized two waves of surveys in eight 
towns before and immediately after summer 2012. Data was collected from students, households, 
homeroom teachers, principals, and the Lighthouse volunteers.  
Chapter 5 presents non-imputed descriptive statistics mainly related to the research question 
about PCED determinants, starting from the expected and actual PCED, and then the independent 
variables of different classification, highlighting comparisons between full and treated samples, plus 
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one section on additional variables for treatment outcomes or determinants. The full valid sample 
size was 6298, and the treatment group sample size was 678. 
Chapter 6 evaluates potential PCED determinants based on the multiple-imputed MNL model 
adopting all independent variables, those in Table 5-5 to Table 5-15. For succinctness, only relative 
risk ratios (RRR) and asterisks for p-values are presented. One asterisk is sued for estimates that are 
statistically significant at the 10% level, so we may know what variables may be significant at 5% 
when we alter the sample or specification (for robustness), or when we apply the model to a 
subgroup (for heterogeneity). The interpretation will focus, however, on those variables that actually 
have p values smaller than 0.05. Detailed MNL outputs can be found in Appendix E. Following the 
presentation of the main-model results, the chapter also tests robustness by offering results from 
other samples and specifications, and heterogeneity tests focusing on how the PCED determinants 
vary across gender, wealth, and academic performance. Finally, scatter graphs are used to visually 
compare the standardized coefficients and absolute z values, with all potential determinants 
generally classified as subjective, traditional, and localized determinants. This chapter ends with a 
summary of findings, plus a discussion about how these findings differ from those in previous 
literature. 
Chapter 7 analyzes the PSM results regarding Lighthouse impact for the six surveyed Lighthouse 
schools. It starts with the determinants of Lighthouse participation for those participating in the 
most recent program, in summer 2012, and those who have participated in any Lighthouse program. 
In Section 7.2, nearest neighborhood (NN) matching results are presented for all of the five 
imputations. Because the control group has a much larger sample size than the treatment group, NN 
control cases could be quite sensitive to different specifications and imputations, and this is 
therefore the most rigorous PSM method for screening effects that are really caused by Lighthouse 
program. Educational aspiration turns out to be the only solid outcome. Further analyses, including 
adjusted propensity score estimates, other PSM methods, by-background analyses, and by-site 
analyses, are conducted on educational aspiration. The chapter provides a discussion of causal 
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mechanisms based on qualitative findings, which suggests that the role-model effect could explain 
why the Lighthouse program mainly affects educational aspiration. It ends with a summary of 
findings, plus a discussion of technical issues that may affect PSM quality  
Chapter 8 concludes by summarizing the key findings, discussing the significance and limitations 
of the study, suggesting directions for further research, and proposing policy implications for 
education policy and educational GNGOs. 
Appendices A to G provide examples of Lighthouse operation, the English versions of the student, 
household, teacher, principal, and volunteer questionnaires, Delphi ratings, summary statistics for 
the Lighthouse six school sample, detailed MNL outputs, detailed PSM results with an adjusted list of 
variables for propensity score calculation, and the main statistics regarding Lighthouse volunteers. 
 
1.5 Definition of Key Terms 
The following are key concepts that need further explanation.  
(1) Rural Students 
In this study, rural student are students living in areas that are defined as “rural” by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).4 This is based on current location rather than 
the household registration (户口 hukou) system. The latter categorizes people into 
“agriculture” and “non-agriculture” no matter where they live. According to NBSC, China’s 
urban population exceeded its rural population in 2011. This definition of “rural students” 
also indicates that this study is not going to include migrant students in urban areas. 
Migrant parents tend to bring their children to urban migrant schools, which has become a 
new topic for educational research in China. 
(2) Intended and Actual PCED 
                                                             
4
 http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/  
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This study mostly considers intended PCED, the PCED that the surveyed students believed 
they are going to make. Actual PCED, or PCEDs that were realized during the survey, could 
only be recorded for graduating (Grade 9) or dropout students, and intended PCED involves 
students that are still in school. There is a much larger sample of Grade 7 and Grade 8 
students, and therefore the analysis of their intended PCED should be more convincing. 
Unless specified as “actual”, the term “PCED” in this dissertation refers to intended PCED. It 
is worth mentioning that this study establishes a sub-sample that allows a test of how 
intended PCED relates to the actual PCED. It is desirable to identify links. The determinants 
of intended PCED would thus also be potential determinants of actual PCED. 
(3) Academic High School Assignment 
The High School Entrance Exam (HSEE) is the major mechanism that determines whether a 
student can get into AHS, followed by government policies that promote rural-urban equity 
or serve the welfare of minority Chinese. AHS have their own HSEE cutoff, however passing 
the cutoff does not necessarily mean enrollment. Of the schools surveyed in this research, 
25.2%5 of students who passed the cutoff did not register. More often than not, rural 
students need to go to the county city for AHS (as for VHS). 
(4) Grassroots Nongovernmental Organizations 
The common definition of an NGO is “a unit that is organized, private, 
non-profit-distributing, self-governing, and voluntary” (Salamon & Anheier, 1997). This 
study distinguishes GNGOs from international NGOs (INGOs) such as the Ford Foundation, 
and government organized NGOs (GONGOs) such as the China Youth Development 
Foundation. INGOs and GONGOs usually offered material support for China’s rural education, 
such as instructional supplies, books, facilities and scholarships. 
(5) Social-emotional, Subjective Factors, and Personality 
                                                             
5
 While the study covers eight schools, this is calculated from the data provided by five schools. Two school refused to 
provide the data, and one school offered the wrong figures. 
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The socio-emotional process consists of variations that occur in an individual’s personality, 
emotions, and relationships with others during their lifetime (Santrock, 2007). In this study 
it is included in the group of subjective factors, which involves not only social-emotional 
factors, but also the perspectives that different stakeholders have of others, and of PCED. 
Among the social-emotional elements, personality has received relatively more attention in 
economics-of-education literature. It is defined as the relatively enduring patterns of 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that reflect the tendency to respond in certain ways under 
certain circumstances (Roberts, 2009). According to the literature, conscientiousness (e.g. 
self-discipline and ambition) best predicts overall attainment and achievement, followed by 
emotional stability (e.g. depression level and confidence) (Almlund et al., 2011). Personality, 
together with the other determinants and circumstances, affects a student’s attitude 















Chapter 2 Determinants of Post-Compulsory Education Decision: A Review 
This chapter reviews the theory, methodology, and empirical evidence about PCEDs in China. 
2.1 Theoretical Explanation 
The purpose of this section is not only to reveal the theoretical side of PCED study, but also to 
display their potential determinants and the ways they reveal their influences.  
In family economics, the standard neoclassical framework is used to explain the choice of PCED 
(Becker, 1981); that is, rural households select the PCED that maximizes their expected utility, subject 
to a series of constraints. The basic model is simple, but there can be different versions in accordance 
with the complexity of the research questions. Utility and production in the following functions are 
assumed to satisfy the standard assumptions. 
2.1.1 The Basic Neoclassical Model of Schooling Decisions 
The PCED can be treated as a subtopic of schooling decisions. The basic theoretical explanation 
of schooling decisions involves the application of standard consumption theory to the field of 
education.6 
We start by defining a household utility function, which depends on total consumption X in the 
household, and also on the child’s years of schooling CS : 
),( CSXUU   (1) 
 This utility function may be that of the head of the household, but it may include the input of 
other household members. CS  is obtained from a standard educational production function: 
( , , )SC S CS S h q AP  (2) 
                                                             
6
 The early literature contributing to this model includes Becker and Lewis (1973), de Tray (1973), and Rosenzweig and 
Evenson (1977). Here I use a version revised from Rivera-Batiz’s presentation in the course Education and Economic 
Development: Advanced Topics in Teachers College, Columbia University, Spring 2011. 
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where Sh is the time the child dedicates to schooling, Sq is the schooling quality, and CAP  
stands for the child’s (academic) ability and personality, or in other terms their cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills.  
The household maximizes U subject to budget constraints 
fpXWhIV LM   (3) 
where V is the fixed assets (e.g. land and savings) of the household, I  is the adult labor 
income in the household, W is the market wage for the child, and LMh  refers to the time the child 
dedicates to the labor market. The sum of fixed assets, adult income, and child income is supposed 
to be equal to the price of education (mainly the tuition and fees), f , and the spending on 
consumption, shown as X times the average price level p .   
 A trade-off takes place between Sh and LMh ; and so we also have  
Thh SLM   (4) 
 (3) and (4) yield  
ShpWTpWpfIVX )()()(   (5) 
In the short term, only X  and Sh  are changeable, so with (1) to (5) we obtain 
0)/)(/()(  SS dhhSSUdXXUdU   (6) 
This can be translated into the statement that a household maximizes its utility when the 
marginal utility of child schooling is equal to the marginal cost of schooling. 
We may return to Sq and CAP , which are assumed to be exogenous in the short term. In the 
long term, Sq is determined by both household factors hF  (e.g. parental tutor, distance to the 
school) and non-household factors nhF , which comprise school factors, community factors, and 




( , )S h nhq q F F  (7) 
( , , )C I h nhAP AP AP F F  (8) 
The basic model has very limited power in describing real life. It only looks at the short term and 
treats education as merely consumption, and it reports nothing about the decision between AHS and 
VHS. There are further complications. 
2.1.2 Extensions of the Basic Model 
Considering Additional Factors 
With a small adjustment, the basic model predicts the effect of birth order. Assume that there 
are n  children in the household: 
1( , ,..., )nU U X S S   (9) 
 In this case, the household may have n  children to join the labor market, or bear multiple f . 












)))((()(   (10) 
In the same period of time, older children are studying in a higher grade that requires greater 
input, and they are supposed to be more productive in the labor market than their younger siblings. 
It is reasonable to assume that ji ff   and ji WW   if ji  ; the household is more eager to 
compromise the educational opportunities of older children on this condition. 
 The inference above only considers the consumption side of education but education is also an 
investment. Poor households treat education more as investment than as consumption (Schultz, 
1973). Consequently, we take two small steps further, considering gender and the return to 
educational investment. 
),,,,,(,, GGBBGBGBSNX RNRNSSNNXUU    (11) 







BBB NSfNSfpXhWNhWNIV    (12) 
where B  and G  identify boys and girls and R  is the discounted lifetime return to a level of 
education. 
For girls, the return to education is 
}]1)1[({ rrhWfR G
LLM
GGG    (13) 
where r  is the interest rate and GL  is the number of years the daughter can work. Also, 
),( SGG qSfW    (14) 
The human capital equation serves as another popular constraint on the maximization problem 
in the education decision. The equations for sons are the same, with the G  replaced by B . 
According to (2), (4), (7), (8), and (11) to (14), we obtain a simplified expression of the schooling 
determinants 
( , , , , , , , , , , , , , )G B G B G B G B G h nhS F V I p r f f L L N N AP AP F F   (15) 
Daughters will get married and leave, so for a household GR  is probably smaller than BR . 
Holding all other factors as fixed, the household may thus be more eager to invest in sons. The fact 
that the characteristics of girls and boys are both included in (15) suggests a trade-off of educational 
opportunities between the two groups, depending on the household preference parameter. Some 
might question whether modeling “boy vs. girl” and “number of children” is necessary under China’s 
Birth Control Policy, or the One-Child policy. The answer is “yes” in the case of rural China. The 
“One-Child” policy actually allows rural households to have two children. People also manage to have 
additional children. In the 2010 Chinese Census, the NBSC identified 13 million citizens who were 
born in non-compliance with the policy but never reported to the government.7 
So far in this section, the utility function disregards interactions and different preferences among 
household members. The Nash bargain enables an exploration of these issues. It can be considered a 





more general form of the neoclassical model (McElroy, 1990). For a household utility function 
involving the interaction between mother ( m ) and father ( f ), we have 
[ ( , ) ( , , , )] [ ( , ) ( , , , )]m mforgone f fforgoneNash C m m m C f f fU U X S U f p V U X S U f p V      (16) 
subject to fpXWhVVII LMfmfm    (17) 
Here mforgoneU  and fforgoneU  are utilities that were forgone due to the marriage, and within 
them the newly added m  and f  indexes the out-of-marriage opportunities. A relatively larger 
m  implies that more bargaining power is possessed by the mother. It is empirically difficult to 
identify the bargaining powers. Parental education is a convenient proxy. 
A more general Nash model also helps explain the peer effect. The utility function below is 




i SSLYSGU     (18) 
In this function, iS  refers to the PCED for student i . The gain ( G ) from making a decision 
depends on individual preference   and local environmental characteristics eY . eiS  denotes the 
average schooling level of peers or favorite PCED. L  will be negative since more people making the 
same decision will lower the cost of making that decision for i . If no peer effect is present, L  
equals zero. Such an argument can be expanded to explain the effect of choices made by people in 
the same community. De Brauw and Giles (2008) applied this idea to discussing how the size of a 
migration group affects the enrollment/working decisions of rural students —as the network 
increases, the cost of migrating falls.  
Returning to the consideration of bargaining, what about the case between the parents and the 
child? Middle-school students in rural China are old enough to participate in the decision process, 
however the child’s opinion will be ignored in function (16) because they have no out-of-family 
resources for bargaining. Here the concept of altruism needs to be introduced. 
),( CUXUU    (19) 
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 The PCED in this case is made not based only on the utility function of the parents, but also on 
their child’s utility function, Uc. Parents either respect the child’s own decision or take into account 
the child’s future prosperity that will not be transferred to the household. For example, even if a girl 
is expected to leave the family one day, her parents may still provide the best education for her 
because they think it would give her a higher bargaining power in her future family.  
In their study of education and poverty in rural China, Brown and Park (2002) incorporated 
altruism into intra-household bargaining. They also touched on the topic of credit constraint. 
Assuming a zero interest rate and the perfect enforcement of lending contracts, they have 
)()1()( CCC SRASRfSIVU    where ]1,0[],1,0[  A   (20) 
subject to bIVfSC   (21) 
Here   is the share of the return to the PCED transferred from the child to the parents through 
future financial support and care; b  is a credit limit that is equal to or larger than zero. The 
altruism parameter A  is defined as follows: 
(1 )m fA A A      (22) 
1 2m mA a Sex a S    (23) 
1 2f fA b Sex b S     (24) 
 (22) to (24) state that altruism toward a child is jointly determined by the preference of the 
mother and father who possess the bargaining power of   and (1 ) . The preferences are also 
the weighted combination of the child’s sex and the father/mother’s education. If they are not bound 
by credit constraints, the first-order condition for (20) will be 
)]1([   AfSR C  (25) 
It is debatable what determines R , A , and  .The unconstrained schooling decision can be 
expressed as 
[ , , , ( , , , ), ( )]C C C h nh F MS S A F F A Sex S S Sex    (26) 
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If the credit constraint is binding, the optimum will then be simply 
fbySCC )(    (27) 
That is, schooling decisions are solely determined by income and credit limits. 
As admitted by Brown and Park (2002), income and credit constraints are hardly exogenous; they 
are under the influence of hF  and nhF , and therefore this parsimonious modeling does not 
convince us that the discussion of PCED can become simpler with credit constraints. Sawada and 
Lokshin (2001) developed a much more complicated model, which confirms that household income 
affects schooling decisions only when the constraint binds, but indicates that almost all the 
above-mentioned determinants have an impact on credit constraint. Their modeling has been 
omitted to keep the discussion concise. 
 So far, three constraints have been covered: income, human capital, and credit. These are 
conventional constraints in the literature. According to the Chinese education system (Figure 1-1), we 
might also take into account the score constraint specific to the choice of AHS. In modeling, it can be 
treated as a condition that “if failed, the number of PCED options drops from AHS/VHS/Work to 
VHS/Work.” The score constraint is exogenous, but the student’s academic performance, which 
decides whether they will be affected by the HSEE cut-off, relies on many factors. 
Considering the High-School Track 
The schooling track has not been discussed explicitly in the above modeling, but the way to 
achieve this is not difficult. Two recent studies introduce modeling specifically for the choice 
between AHS and VHS, one for Britain (Yang, 2008) and the other for Spain (Lopez-Mayan, 2010). 
These two studies compare the utility functions of different choices. Students are supposed to select 
the option that brings about the greatest lifetime reward given the existent constraints. The two 
studies use similar modeling processes since they share the same source of ideas from structural 
models (Willis and Rosen, 1979; Keane and Wolpin, 1997). Both modeling processes stress the 
impact of the expected lifetime monetary reward, which has already been mentioned in (13). Yang 
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(2008) made an additional contribution by incorporating non-monetary utility. For simplification, I 
focus on a single student instead of the whole household.  




U E d U Y U S I t

     (28) 
where d  is the discount rate. )( iklYU  stands for the utility for individual i , which is 
determined by i ’s profit Y  in the period l . k  indexes the four alternatives. )(tI  refers to the 
information set, which contains all the information available to i  that can affect the utility. 
)(1 CkSU  is the non-monetary utility, such as job stability, happiness, and the peer effect.   
measures the preference towards non-monetary utility in the decision, CkS . This is supposed to be 
relevant to the student’s academic ability and socioeconomic status (SES).  
 To explain the schooling track decision further, let us simplify (28) to assume the utility is 
determined only by the lifetime monetary benefit and cost. In China, the purpose of AHS 
participation is to be admitted to post-secondary education; not much human capital accumulation 
occurs in AHSs, and the largest benefit is realized only when the student graduates from college. For 
example, using a 1% sample of the 2005 Chinese Census, Wang (2009) found that for rural Chinese 
people the marginal return to high school is only 0.1%, while for college it is as high as 7%. More 
recent studies, such as those by Li et al. (2012) using twin data, and Yao et al. (2012) using a 20% 
resampling of Wang’s data, achieve similar findings. Higher education also means the chance to 
become an urban resident (Zhao, 1997). Thus, assuming that a student does finish compulsory 
education (no Dropout), we have8 
& 1Work AHS AHS PS VHSP P P P        (29) 
1 2 3 & 4Work AHS AHS PS VHSb b P b P b P b P       (30) 
2 3 & 4AHS AHS PS VHSc c P c P c P        (31) 
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 Here P  is the probability of Work, finishing AHS, finishing post-secondary education (PS), and 
finishing VHS. 1b  to 4b  are the corresponding monetary benefits. 2c  to 4c  are the 
corresponding opportunity costs. Work does not impose an opportunity cost. 
 (29) to (31) yield the additional benefit and cost of further education: 
1 2 1 2 3 1 3 4 1 3( ) ( ) ( )AHS AHS PS VHSb b c b b c p b b c p b b c p             (32) 
 This attributes the high-school track decision to the probability of entering higher education as 
well as how tempting a profit higher education is, compared with VHS. On the other hand, not 
everybody who is admitted to an AHS can continue to higher education, and there is a large variation 
in quality and labor market opportunities among higher education institutes and majors. Thus, AHS 
might be the most risky PCED. 
 Risk, or uncertainty has been considered by Sawada and Lokshin (2001) and Yang (2008). 
Sawada and Lokshin assumed a constant absolute risk-aversion specification to the utility function, 
while Yang used wage fluctuation for different educational tracks to express their instability of 
returns. Their discussions constitute not so much modeling but finding a proxy in the empirical 
specification.   
A general way to consider the risk is to use the expected utility function. In the simplest form, 















1   (33) 
where   measures the possibility of state C , such as being unemployed or earning a low level 
of wages after graduating from VHS, or failing to attend college after graduating from AHS.   can 
be a function of objective indicators (e.g. the unemployment rate for an educational level or a 
community) and the student’s ability and personality ( CAP  in equation (2)). The alternative that 
wins over the other three will be the best one. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the standard theory has little meaning unless we can find a way to 
measure utilities. For the PCED, the importance of treating utility as the function of more than just 
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monetary factors is known. In the PCED study for Britain, Yang (2008) found that prediction of the 
vocational track is sensitive to a student’s background (which contributes to 1( )CkU S ) compared 
with the academic track. Li’s study for China (2011) also found a higher non-monetary return for VHS 
graduates than for AHS graduates. She did not link the findings to the PCED, but called for attention 
to be paid to the complexity of the utility function. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
For policy purposes, researchers are also interested in the magnitude of PCED determinants, as 
well as how interventions change the PCED through changing those determinative factors. In this 
section, I will consider the data and methods adopted by PCED studies of rural China. A shortlist of 
PCED studies is presented in Table 2-1. They were selected based on three criteria: relevant to the 









Articlea Model Data source Dependent variable 
Survey 
year 








Han (2001) OLS 1996 Beijing, Gansu, Guangdong, 
Hubei, Liaoning, Sichuan, 
Zhejiang 
16-20 297  √  
Brown and Park (2002) OLS, Hazard Model and 
Conditional Logit 
1997 Gansu, Guizhou, Henan, 
Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan 
5.5-17 472 √ √  
Connelly and Zheng (2003) Logit with Fixed effects 1990 whole nation (Census) 10-18 100975  √  
Li and Tsang 2003 OLS 1995 Gansu, Hebei 7-15 424  √  
Sun, 2003 OLS 2002 Inner-Mongolia 15-30 444  √  
Sun, 2004 Probit and Order Probit 2000 Gansu 7-19 (mostly 
7-16) 
3976  √  
Song et al., 2006 Logit 1995 19 provinces (CHIP)
b
 7-18 8104  √  




2004 Yunnan 8-19 1067  √  
Hannum and Adams, 2007 OLS 2000 & 
2004 
Gansu 13-16 in 
2004 
1817  √  
Ding and Li, 2007 Logit 2005 Anhui, Beijing, Gansu, 
Guangdong, Guizhou, 
Heilongjiang, Hubei, Liaoning, 
Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, 
Zhejiang 
14-20 1029 √  √ 
Fang, 2007 OLS 2006 Inner-Mongolia High school 
age 
549 √ √ √ 







de Brauw and Giles, 2008 IV-GMM 1986 to 
2003 
Shanxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan High school 
age 
3160  √  
Hannum et al., 2009 OLS 2000 & 
2007 
Gansu 16-19 in 
2007 
1806 √ √  
Sun and Du, 2009 OLS and Probit 2007 Guangxi 16-55 1765  √  
Yu, 2009 OLS 2002 Jiangsu Young/ 
finished 
schooling  
130  √  
Li, 2009 Probit 2007 Hunan High school 
age 
2491   √ 
Li and Cheng, 2009 Probit 2007 Hunan High school 
age 
437   √ 




Shanxi Grade 7 300 √ √  
Song et al., 2011 Logit 2008 & 
2009 
Unnamed western province Grade 8 in 
2008 
2216   √ 
Yi et al., 2011 OLS 2009 & 
2010 
Shanxi, Shaanxi Grade 7-8 in 
2009 
7801  √  




Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong 
7-18 885  √  
a. These studies were selected based on three criteria. First of all, they are relevant to PCED, which also means the sample needs to include lower secondary students in rural areas. Second, 
they apply quantitative methods that contain at least the OLS. Third, they do not share a totally identical dataset.  





Studies of rural China’s PCED have taken advantage of a range of data. While the majority of 
datasets are cross-sectional, there are studies using panel structure datasets (e.g. Hannum and 
Adams, 2007; de Brauw and Giles, 2008; Hannum et al., 2009), which helps researchers capture 
unobserved individual effects as well as general shocks. In terms of the sample size, most datasets 
have 1000–4000 effective observations, sufficient to guarantee statistical power. 
There are two groups of PCED data, categorized by sources. The first group consists of national 
datasets, such as census data (in Connelly and Zheng, 2003) and the China Household Income Project 
(CHIP) (in Song et al., 2006). These datasets have large sample sizes, but are too general for an 
in-depth PCED exploration as they were not specifically designed for this purpose. The second group 
comprises surveys conducted for rural regions at the village, county, or provincial level. Most of these 
surveys were undertaken with rigorous sampling processes, ensuring the representation of the 
targeted populations. Although studies using this data do not guarantee external validity, they offer 
more accurate and comprehensive results. The Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) is the 
most widely cited dataset (in Park and Hannum, 2002; Hannum and Adams, 2007; Hannum et al., 
2009; Zhang, 2011, etc.).9 It is a longitudinal, multi-level study of rural children’s welfare outcomes, 
including education, health, and psycho-social development. It follows 2000 children aged 9–12 in 
2000 in 20 randomly selected counties of the Gansu province (Panel B of Figure 2-1). The most 
recent wave of GSCF surveys was conducted in 2009. The Rural Education Action Project (REAP) is 
another data source worthy of attention. At the time of writing this review, REAP is operating several 
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Although the data is of various structures, sizes, and sources, it is less satisfactory in its variable 
selection and geographical balance. To begin with, most variables in previous studies are 
case-specific, and mainly comprise student and household characteristics, however as the theories 
imply, alternative specific variables, like the cost, quality, or expected future earnings of each PCED, 
should also be considered. Fewer studies used the high-school track as the dependent variable. 
Three of the five studies identified in Table 1 are actually Master’s degree theses. 
The final problem is geographical imbalance. Panel A in Figure 2-1 displays the frequency of 
literature coverage as suggested by Table 1, in which a darker color means a higher frequency. With 
the operation of the GSCF, Gansu province has received overwhelming attention in the literature. 
Gansu is far from the coastal cities that are popular destinations for migrant workers (i.e. Beijing, 
Guangzhou, and Shanghai), and 70% of its population lives in rural areas where vocational education 
Figure 2-1 Geographical Coverage of PCED Literature 
Note: Panel A is based on Table 1. I divide the frequency of coverage into 4 categories: only 
covered by the census, 2–3 times, 4–6 times, and more than 6 times. The deeper colors mean a 
higher literature coverage. Before 1997, Chongqing was a city in Sichuan province. In my review, 
Chongqing has been covered only once, while Sichuan has been covered 5 times, however, 4 of 
the 5 data sets for Sichuan are pre-1997, and therefore, I do not differentiate Chongqing from 
Sichuan in the mapping. Information for Taiwan is unavailable. Panel B is cut from GSCF papers. 
http://china.pop.upenn.edu/. 








is hard to flourish10 These factors contribute to higher opportunity costs for the Work or VHS options, 
and therefore the Gansu data may be ideal for testing hypotheses about educational attainment and 
achievement (as in the literature), but are less appropriate in the case of the 4-alternative PCED.  
2.2.2 Analytical Approaches 
Researchers have used two general groups of approaches in PCED studies. One focuses on 
seeking and measuring the relationship between determinant candidates and PCEDs, mainly the 
discrete choice model, survival analysis (for Dropout), the pricing model, and the hierarchical model. 
The other group focuses on the causal identification of interventions, mainly the instrumental 
variable, regression discontinuity, difference in differences, and propensity score matching. I will start 
with a relatively detailed introduction to discrete choice models as they are fundamental approaches 
for the exploration of PCED determinants.  
Discrete Choice Models 
Discrete choice models (DCMs) are regressions used to predict the probabilities of the different 
possible outcomes of a categorically distributed dependent variable (here the PCED), given a set of 
independent variables. Eleven out of the twenty-one shortlisted studies in Table 1 employed DCMs. 
There are two sorts: logit and probit. As indicated by the name, the error term of the logit model has 
a standard logistic distribution, while that for the probit model has the standard normal distribution. 
The two groups of DCMs yield similar results. I will focus on the logit models, which involve 
multinomial logit (MNL) when dependent variables are categorical instead of dichotomous. 
















,  1,...,j m  
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That is, the probability that the outcome for individual i  is alternative j depends on factors 
ix .  
Both relative-risk ratios (RRR) and marginal effects (ME) are calculated, but only RRR will be 

















gives the proportionate change in the relative risk of choosing alternative j  
rather than alternative 1 when irx changes by one unit.   















p   is a probability weighted average of the l .  
MNL relies on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption that the relative 
probability of choosing between two alternatives is unaffected by the presence of additional 
alternatives. The seemingly unrelated estimation (SUE)-based Hausman test can be used to test the 
IIA assumption. 


















,  1,...,j m , 1,...,i N  
That is, the probability that the outcome for individual i  is alternative j  depends on 
alternative-specific factors 
ijx  and case-specific factors iz . In the case of the PCED, factors such as 
family income and parental education belong to 
ijx , while factors such as expected lifetime income 
and high-school costs could belong to iz . m  equals 4 as we have four alternatives.  
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A positive r  means that if a regressor increases for one category, then that category is chosen 
more, and other categories are chosen less, and vice versa. 

















 gives the proportionate change in the relative risk of choosing alternative j  
rather than alternative 1 when irz changes by one unit.   
Like MNL, CL is also conducted with the IIA assumption. If MNL/CL fails the test, then one can 
refer to the NL. While under IIA the alternatives are required to be independent, and NL splits the 
alternatives into groups, or “nests,” allowing the IIA property to be violated within each group. The 
probability that individual i  ends up with alternative j  is the product of the probabilities that 
nest k  is chosen and that alternative j  is chosen within k . Correspondingly, the regressors are 
classified as the regressors that influence the choice between groups and that influence the choices 
both between and within groups.  














      
   
   
where the error term 
ij  has Gumbel’s multivariate extreme-value distribution and k  are 
dissimilarity parameters ranging from 0 to 1. When k equals 1 for all k , NL reduces to CL.  
Previous studies have mostly used binary dependent variables, and so no alternative grouping 
can be made for an NL,11 but this is necessary if we intend to look at a four-alternative PCED. The 
alternatives may be classified into either education vs. non-education, or dropout vs. not-dropout 
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(Figure 2-2), and not-dropout could be further divided into AHS vs. VHS/Work depending on whether 

















Other DCMs—order probit, multinomial probit, and random-parameters logit— may also be 
appropriate for PCED study. For details of these models, please refer to Train (2003).  
 
Survival Analysis 
Survival analysis is about the probability that the time of an event T  is later than some 
specified time t . In PCED, this event refers to dropout. 
( ) Pr( )S t T t   
The Cox model is a popular model in survival analysis. It allows the baseline hazard rate for each 
community to vary (Cox and Oakes, 1984). Brown and Park (2002) used this model to study the 
hazard (risk) of dropout in rural China. In the Cox model, the hazard is 
0( ) ( )exp( )ih t h t X   









   







In the case of dropout study, the interpretation could be as follows: “conditional on having 
remained in school until the current time, the probability that student i  who experiences iX  will 
drop out is Hr  times that of other children.” The likelihood function will be used to calculate the 
parameter  .  
Pricing Model 
Since education is believed to be an investment, just like stocks, futures, and options, it is 
reasonable to consider models from the field of finance. Some researchers in the economics of 
education have taken this initiative (e.g. Hartog and Vijverberg, 2007; Hogan and Walker, 2007; Yang, 
2008). Among them, Yang (2008) specifically talked about the educational track. Her model alters the 
Black–Scholes option-pricing model, in which educational decisions are treated as options that will 
be realized each year from graduation to retirement, as follows. 
( 1) ( 1)( 1) 1 2
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im lY   is the expected start wage for individual i  who has an education degree m . m  
denotes the increase rate of wages and r  the interest rate. Ranging from 0 to 1,  measures the 
fluctuation rate of m . L  is a very low exercise price, set to be 1, and N  is the year in which i  
can stay in the labor market given a m , which can be calculated by subtracting the expected 




also set to be 1 since the option (the education investment) will be realized every year. By comparing 
T and the cost of a degree m , one can determine which degree is the rational choice. 
Elements in this model can be estimated in various ways depending on the data possessed by the 
researchers. Non-monetary utility can also be incorporated into the equation by adjusting ( 1)
e
im lY   
with non-monetary variables. Again, this is an arbitrary process that largely depends on data 
availability. In Yang’s study, considering non-monetary factors significantly increased the accuracy of 
predicting a choice on the vocational track. 
Hierarchical Model 
Data in educational research usually has a hierarchical structure. Students belong to a class, a 
school, a school district, and so forth. For an individual-level regression, non-individual factors are 
assumed to have constant effects on students, while this is usually not true. For example, a school 
policy of improving teacher communication skills should have different impacts on students in a 
20-person class from those in a 50-person class. A hierarchical linear model (HLM) is used to address 
the hierarchical structure problem. A simple two-level HLM is presented below: 
Level 1 0 1ij j ij ijY X r     
Level 2 0 00 01 0j j jW       
1 10 11 1j j jW       
Assuming level 1 to be the students and level 2 the schools, this group of equations is for student 
i  nested within school j . We firstly run a regression for students within each school, then use the 
obtained constant and coefficients as independent variables for regressions at the school level. X  
denotes student variables and W  school variables. 
In the case of the PCED, the level-1 equation could be a logit or probit equation. Liu (2007) 
employed the two-level HLM to examine the determinants of dropout in a rural county of Yunnan 




obtained by OLS. The greatest difference between the HLM and the OLS is that the HLM reports a 
“reliability” index for the coefficients for each group. 
Instrumental Variable and Regression Discontinuity 
The models presented above help to find and measure the associations between the 
determinant candidates and the PCED, however they suffer from common econometric problems, 
such as omitted variable bias, measurement error, and the endogeneity of explanatory variables, 
lacking the power of causal identification. The instrumental variable (IV) has been a standard method 
for causal inference.  
ˆ














In the second equation, the predicted value of ŝ  is used. Assuming that z  is correlated with s  
but uncorrelated with  , or in other words the IV is correlated with the determinant of interest but 
affects the outcome only through that determinant, then we establish a causal inference between 
the determinant and the PCED. Several PCED studies have used IV. Brown and Park (2002) 
instrumented expenditure per capita and credit limits using cultivated land and the share of 
cultivated land that is irrigated12; de Brauw and Giles (2008) identified the cost of migration using 
exogenous variation across counties in the timing of national identity card distribution, which made 
it easier for rural migrants to register as temporary residents in urban destinations; and Lee and Park 
(2010) instrumented changes in migration status with labor market shocks to village-specific 
migration destinations. In a schooling track study, Chen (2009) instrumented the possibility of 
attending a VHS with the specific type of school supply in the community, which could be a potential 
IV for future studies in China.  
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Regression discontinuity (RD) is a special and more recent form of IV design. Arbitrary program 
rules/ procedures create jumps, and RD focuses on the jump around this cut-off. More often than not, 
an RD is a fuzzy one because not all units follow the cut-off rule. Park et al. (2010) presented an RD 
study focusing on the determinants of the schooling decision in rural China, however it concerns the 
way that higher schooling quality influences the college entrance examination scores and college 
admission. The cut-off in this study is the HSEE threshold that determines the admission to magnet 
AHSs. The class-level version of this study can be found in the study by Ma and Shi (2010), which 
compared experimental classes with regular classes. For lower-secondary schooling, there is no 
longer an entrance examination, and due to the school merger movement, many rural towns now 
have only one lower-secondary school. It is therefore difficult to design a similar RD to evaluate how 
lower-secondary schools of higher quality influence the PCED. Nevertheless, RD is still a potential 
tool for intervention evaluation. For example, we may use the eligibility cut-off to measure the 
impact of vocational secondary school subsidies on students schooling track decisions. 
For either IV or RD, the greatest challenge is to find a convincing instrument. They also only look 
at a subgroup of the sample, measuring the local average treatment effect. For a detailed 
introduction to IV and RD, please refer to Angrist and Pischke (2008) or Murnane and Willett (2011). 
Difference in Differences and Propensity Score Matching 
Difference in differences (DID) and propensity score matching (PSM) are another set of common 
approaches to causal identification. It is convenient to combine DID and PSM. Chen et al. (2009) used 
them to study the impact of parental migration in Shaanxi province, and Liu et al. (2010) used them 
to test the effect of primary school mergers in Shaanxi and Ningxia provinces, however both studies 
focused on the academic performance of rural students rather than PCED.  
DID has been used in some classic economics-of-education works, such as that by Duflo (2001) 




the PROGRESA program in Mexico, providing evidence of how some programs changed children’s 
education decision in developing countries. A typical DID is as follows: 
0 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( * )i i i i i iy post treat post treat          
It is called “difference in differences” because it firstly take the pre/post-treatment differences 
within each individuals, then takes the difference of those differences between individuals. By doing 
so, confounding factors are captured by 1  and pre-treatment differences by 2 . 3  measures 
the treatment effect. 
PSM is also self-explanatory according to its name—it matches units that have the same or 
similar propensities of treatment participation ( iD ). Suppose that the conditional independence 
assumption holds, then 
( ) [ | ] [ 1| ]i i i i ip X E D X p D X    
The application of PSM is as follows. Firstly, a logit or probit regression should be run using a 
dummy variable for participation (1=participation, 0 otherwise) as the dependent variable, and 
potential participation determinants as independent variables. Then, substitute the value of each 
variable for each individual in the obtained equation. The result is a figure measuring the individual’s 
propensity to participate, their propensity score. There are various ways to use this score, the most 
straightforward being to compare the PCED between each pair of participants and non-participants 
with the closest propensity scores, or to make a comparison of people within a range of propensity 
scores, say 0.5 to 0.7. If the researchers fail to obtain a good overlap of the two groups, they can 
weight them by the inverse of the propensity scores to utilize more data. 
DID requires individuals to follow a trend that can be predicted by pre-treatment information if 
otherwise untreated; PSM assumes no unobserved difference between the treated and the 
untreated groups—both make assumptions that are often implausible, which could lead to bias in 




2.3 Evidence regarding the Determinants of Post-Compulsory Education Decision 
There is a huge archive of information about the determinants of educational attainment13 for 
rural teenagers in developing countries like Indonesia (Deolalikar, 1993), Tanzania (Al-Samarrai and 
Peasgood, 1998), Turkey (Tansel, 2002), Guinea (Glick and Sahn, 2000), Mexico (Lopez-Acevedo and 
Salinas, 2000), Pakistan (Sawada and Lokshin, 2001), and India (e.g. Sipahimalani, 1999; Kochar, 
2004), etc. Sun (2004) classified the determinants into seven categories: household economic status 
and credit constraints, parental education, number of siblings and birth order, gender, direct cost of 
education, school factors, and opportunity and wage in the labor market. These factors have been 
confirmed in studies for China, which will be introduced in this section.14  
China experts, mostly in sociology, have further extended exploration to subjective factors such 
as educational aspiration, confidence (self-affirmation), and affiliation to school, with strong impacts 
confirmed (Hannum and Adams, 2007, 2008; Hannum and Park, 2007; Hannum et al., 2009).  
Research on rural China suggests that governmental policy (e.g. Liu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010), 
academic ability (e.g. Brown and Park, 2002; Hannum et al., 2009), network/peer effect (de Brauw 
and Giles, 2008; Hu and Du, 2008), parents’ political status and ethnicity (Liu, 2007), and parental 
health (Yi et al., 2011) are additional PCED determinants.  
In comparison with the literature on attainment, there are much fewer discussions of high-school 
track determinants. A number of studies of the high-school track exist for developed countries, such 
as Britain (Yang, 2008), France (Goux et al., 2014), Germany (Dustmann, 2004; Heineck and Wölfel, 
2011), and Spain (Lopez-Mayan, 2010), and for developing countries like Thailand (Moenjak and 
Worswick, 2003) and Turkey (Aypay, 2003).They demonstrate the same problem of not looking 
specifically at the rural population. This problem is understandable. Rural areas usually lack the 
industrial basis to nurture vocational education, so the research priority was given to discussions 
about value, development, or problems rather than determinants. In China, vocational education has 
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been treated as a tool for rural–urban equalization following the Promotion of Vocational Education 
Act of 2005. It is still taking time for updated and rigorous schooling track studies to emerge, but 
some surveys have already been conducted (e.g. Zhu, 2006; Fang, 2007; Zhang, 2009; Song et al., 
2011). Both the Chinese and the non-Chinese literature have tended to focus on the impacts of 
parental background and the expected return to schooling track. They have also talked about 
high-school quality, but few have offered detailed measurements of this factor.   
In this section, I reclassify the determinants into six case-specific determinants that vary by 
student, and four alternative-specific determinants that vary by PCED. There is rarely a perfect 
classification. Some of the factors are tangled together when reporting on their impact (e.g. gender 
and household economic status; parental background and student age), or are highly correlated with 
each other (e.g. school quality and direct cost; direct cost and policy intervention). The classification I 
use is a balanced one that also reflects the rationale of the CL model. For each group of determinants, 
I will start by recapping the theoretical explanations, and then I present the empirical results for 
educational attainment15 and schooling track. When mentioning the term “coefficient,” “association,” 
or “correlation,” I refer to those that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The results of the 
major studies are briefly summarized in Table 2-2.  
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 Variable with coefficient that is significant at 5% level in the full model  
Han, 2001
b
 age (+), mother’s education (+), average schooling year of the 20-35 population in the county (+)  
Brown and Park, 2002 For dropout: male (+ for lower secondary school), older siblings (-), women’s empowerment (-), women’s empowerment*male (-), poor and 
credit constrained (+), distance to school (- for primary school), rainproof classrooms (-) 
For performance: male (-), male (+ for primary school), older siblings (+), women’s empowerment (-), log expenditure per capita (+) 
Connelly and Zheng, 
2003 
% of village peer in school (+), number of younger brothers (-), number of younger sisters (-), younger sister * boy (+), older sibling dummy 
(-), older sibling dummy * boy (+), parents attended primary school (+), parents attended middle school (+), Non-Han (mixed), Non-Han * 
boy (-), per capita rural income (+), per capita rural * boy (+), hill county (-), hill county * boy (+), mountain county (-), mountain county * 
boy (+), region * boy (+), boy (+) 
Li and Tsang, 2003 economic burden (-), gap between parent’s desired level of schooling for child and the economically attainable level of schooling (-) 
Sun, 2003 age (+), number of siblings (+), household size (-), distance to the nearest middle school (-), father’s schooling year (+), expenditure per 
household member (+) 
Sun, 2004 For all: household expenditure per capita (+), household land per capita (-), father’s education (+), household size (+), number of children 
older than 7 (-), home-school distance (-), middle school fee (-), elementary school fee (+), gender, number of county/town- owned 
enterprise (+), wage for farming (+), non-agriculture wage for female (+), non-agriculture wage for male (-) 
For girls: household expenditure per capita (+), household land per capita (-), household consumption goods value (+), father’s education 
(+), household size (+), number of children older than 7 (-), home-school distance (-), elementary school fee (+), wage for farming (+), 
non-agriculture wage for female (+), non-agriculture wage for male (-) 
Song et al. 2006 mother’s education (+), father’s education (+ only for upper secondary enrollment), proportion of men in the household (- for boy’s 
enrollment) 
Liu, 2007 For dropout: village-level income per capita (-), age square (+), older siblings (+), younger siblings (+), father is Han (-), mother’s education 
(+), mother is a member of the Chinese Youth League (-), household possess index (-), male*household possess index (+) 
Hannum and Adams, 
2007 
age(- for enrollment), male (+), log wealth (+), mother’s years of schooling (+), mother’s expectations for child’s schooling in year 2000 (+), 
child’s math achievement in year 2000 (+), teacher’s expectations for child’s schooling in year 2000 (+), log wealth*child’s gender (+) 
Ding and Li, 2007 For VHS instead of AHS: the stratification of father’s occupation (-), father’s education attainment (-) 
Fang, 2007 For VHS instead of AHS: the level of father’s occupation (-), the level of mother’s occupation (-), family income (-), father’s educational level 





(-), mother’s educational level (-), student’s academic performance (-) 
For performance: the level of father’s occupation (+), the level of mother’s occupation (+), family income (+), father’s educational level (+), 
mother’s educational level (+), parental expectation (+) 
de Brauw and Giles, 
2008 
number of migrants from village/10 (-), first born (-), first born in household was male (-), father’s years of schooling (+), mother’s years of 
schooling (+), number of male potential migrants in the household (-), father is professional (+), number of migrants/10*father had off-farm 
work (-) 
Hannum et al., 2009 male (+), age (+), schooling is useless for girls since they marry and leave home (reference=disagree) (-), educational expenditure last 
semester (+), parents help child with homework (reference=never) (+), mother’s aspiration for the child in year 2000 (+), alienation from 
school (reference=strongly disagree) (-), child education aspiration (years) (+), self-concept as a good student (reference=no) (+), family 
wealth quintile (reference=bottom quintile), parent’s total education (years) (+), elder sisters (+), younger brothers (+) 
Sun and Du, 2009 5-4-3 system (reference=5-3-3 system) (-), 6-3-3 system (reference=5-3-3 system) (+), male (+), male*6-3-3 system (-) 
Yu, 2009 gender, number of siblings (-), gender of the household head (+ for girl and - for boy), education attainment of the household head (+) 
Li, 2009 For VHS instead of AHS: Hukou status as non-agriculture (-), HSEE score (-), father’s educational level (-), father working off-farm (-), mother 
working off-farm (-), household durable goods index (-) 
Li and Cheng, 2009
c
 For VHS instead of AHS: lower tuition (+), increased subsidy (+), increased expected earnings (+)  
Mo et al., 2011 For dropout: conditional cash transfer (-),commuting time between home and school (+), plan to continue education after junior high school 
(-), homeroom teacher’s experience (-), availability of award based on academic performance to homeroom teacher (-), pre-treatment math 
score (-), age (+), has sibling (+), living with family/not living in boarding facilities of the school (-) 
Song et al., 2011
d
 For VHS instead of AHS: academic performance (-), household income (-) 
For VHS intention: academic performance (-), mother as migrant worker (+), knowing policy incentives (+) 
For Work instead of high school: academic performance (-), father’s educational level (-) 
Yi et al., 2011 For dropout: consumption asset value located the lowest 10% (+), math score (-), age (+), father’s education (-), parental health (+), 
accumulated time that parents stayed at home in the past 3 years (-) 
Lu, 2012 Living in labor migrant household (+), sibling migrant (+), age (+), household’s highest education level is some high school or more (+) 
a. When unspecified, the dependent variables are for attainment or enrollment to a high level. 
b. This study also considers the return to education for different type of work, but the coefficients are all insignificant.  
c. This study is for impacts of changing VHS cost or benefit heterogeneous to student characteristics including gender, political status, academic performance, SES, and location. 




2.3.1 Case-Specific Determinants 
The case-specific determinants are gender/age/ethnicity, parental background, number of 
siblings and birth order, peer/school/community factors, household economic status and credit 
constraints, and subjective factors. Health is a potential case-specific determinant; studies have 
merely pointed out its impact on performance in elementary schools (e.g. Luo et al., 2012), so I will 
not discuss health in this review, however we should keep it in mind since performance matters for 
the PCED. 
Gender, Age, and Ethnicity 
Gender, age, and ethnicity are individual characteristics that can hardly be altered by 
intervention. Based on the theories in Section 2, girls in rural China are likely to have fewer 
educational opportunities, since they contribute less to the household in the long term. Although 
older students may be more mature and gain better academic performance, which increases their 
chance of further education, they also bear a greater opportunity cost than their classmates. Age 
may influence the weight of student utility in the household utility function—older students have 
more autonomy in their PCED. Minority Chinese people, who make up less than 10% of the Chinese 
population and mostly live in remote regions, are likely to bear a greater cost related to language, 
transportation, and network than the Han Chinese, and therefore they might face a higher risk of 
dropout, however there are also more schooling incentives for them, such as extra subsidies and 
lower entrance scores.16 
Hunnam and Adams (2007) summarized the detailed reasons for the gender difference in 
educational attainment. There are parental perceptions that girls are unlikely to succeed in the labor 
market. Marriage norms dictate that parents live with sons, making sons the primary source of 
old-age support, while girls typically marry out of households. Culture might lead directly to parents’ 






discriminatory attitudes and practices, regardless of rationality. Song et al. (2006) added a fourth 
explanation that households may face a higher opportunity cost in enrolling girls because they take 
on more housework than boys do.  
Early research on developing countries suggested that the monetary cost of return to education 
is higher for boys than for girls, and that the opportunity cost of education is lower for boys (Schultz, 
1993; Psacharopoulos, 1994; Behrman, 1999), however at least for China, the gender gap has 
narrowed. Given the dramatic rise in migration to urban areas by young women and men seeking 
informal work, the perception of an employment disadvantage for females has become debatable (Li 
and Tsang, 2003). Using GSCF data, Hannum and Adams (2007) showed that the enrollment 
advantage of males might only be modest, and a more recent survey in Shanxi and Shaanxi (Yi et al., 
2011) showed no gender impact at all. 
What has remained unchanged is that the demand for female schooling has become more 
income-elastic than that for male schooling (Sun, 2004; Song et al., 2006). Girls are also more 
sensitive to their own performance. Brown and Park (2002) found that academically weak girls are 
more likely to drop out than academically weak boys. In the case of the schooling track, girls appear 
to be more cost- and earning-elastic than boys (Li and Cheng, 2009), but gender itself does not 
predict the high-school track (Li, 2009).17  
Studies have pointed out that within the same grade older students are more likely to drop out 
(Mo et al., 2011; Yi et al., 2011) or be less likely to enroll (Hannum and Adams, 2007). These findings 
conform to the argument of opportunity cost. Note that age has been used as a control variable in 
many other studies. When the grade is not controlled, the coefficients for age may simply describe 
the fact that older people had already finished more schooling, or that older people have less 
education because the educational requirements for their schooling age was not as good as it is 
contemporarily, or that the probability of dropout increases as the grade rises. Outside China, age 
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has received serious attention in Germany’s schooling track literature. The studies by Dustmann 
(2004) and Heineck and Wölfel (2011) showed that parental preference efficiently predicts a child’s 
schooling track. The authors attribute this to the fact that students do not participate in the 
household decision because they are only 10 years old when they need to decide their track.18 This 
phenomenon fits the theoretical prediction. 
Unlike the US, where evident ethnic stratification of educational achievement and attainment 
exists (Kao and Thompson, 2003), China presents a mixed picture. Based on the 1990 census data, 
Connelly and Zhang (2003) found that although it is easier for non-Han children to quit primary 
school, non-Han girls are more likely to attend middle school and all non-Han youths are more likely 
to complete middle school if they attended. Using more recent data from Yunnan province, Liu (2007) 
detected a lower probability of dropout for minority students. These results suggest that 
ethnic-specific incentives may outweigh the cost concern, especially in the later stage of compulsory 
education. It is also possible that the two factors offset each other—Li and Tsang (2003) found that 
ethnicity made no difference to primary education.  
Parental Background 
Another popular grouping in PCED determinants is parental background. The most widely 
discussed parental variable is education. The theory section is this review offers two ways to explain 
the impact of parental background. PCED may result from a unified household utility function 
(usually the father’s) or intra-household bargaining. Empirically it is hard to make a distinction 
between these two mechanisms. In addition to parental education, there are also discussions on 
occupation, political status, migrant status, and parental health (parental economic status will be 
discussed separately).  
The finding on parental education varies in regard to whose education weighs more. For example, 
Brown and Park (2002) found that a father’s education has a much greater influence on educational 
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investment decisions than a mother’s education. An additional year of paternal education reduces 
the likelihood of dropping out by 12–14%, however the probability of lower-secondary school 
dropout falls dramatically for sons when the mother has greater empowerment (measured by a 0–1 
index). Brown (2006) found that the educations of both parents have a positive association with 
educational expenditure on their children, but the coefficient for mothers is about 30% higher than 
that for fathers. Lu (2012) suggested that the highest education level in the household has the 
strongest association with attainment. 
There is also a study in which no impact of parental education was found (Li and Tsang, 2003), 
and a study that suggested that the effect of maternal education diminishes as the child’s 
educational level rises (Song et al., 2006). Some researches raise the concept of matched marriage. 
Using data from Gansu and Inner Mongolia, Sun (2003, 2004) found that husbands tend to seek 
wives of similar education attainment. If the impact of parental education is true, then the matched 
marriage catalyzes the attainment disparity within rural regions.  
de Brauw and Giles (2008) found that having a father who is a village leader or enterprise 
manager increased the chance of high-school enrollment. Ding and Li (2007) demonstrated that not 
only the father’s education but also the hierarchy of the father’s job is significantly associated with 
the decision about schooling track. Students of a lower parental job class are more likely to enter a 
VHS.19 This is also supported by the sociology literature, which supports social stratification (Fang, 
2005), however Ding and Li’s sample consisted of 14- to 20-year-old urban students, so the results 
may not be applicable to rural students. Finally, the matched-marriage phenomenon also exists in 
occupations (Fang, 2007). If the influence of occupation is true, then matched marriage also 
catalyzes the consolidation of the educational track in rural regions. 
Researchers have also considered parental political status. De Brauw and Giles (2008) identified a 
positive association between a father’s communist party status and children’s enrollment in high 
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school. The authors treated the party status as a proxy for household wealth. In another study, Liu 
(2007) used parental Communist Youth League status as a measurement of the household political 
resources. He found that children were more likely to drop out if the mother had never been a youth 
league member. The author explained that youth league status could be a proxy for mother’s 
capacity of mobilizing resource to the children.  
Parental migration status is another important determinant. Migration was used by Liu (2007) to 
explain his finding that only a mother’s education level has an impact on children. Because in his 
sample fathers spent less time at home than mothers did, he attributed the correlation to better 
communication between mothers and children. Time spent at home is relevant to the migrant 
worker status. In 2010, there were about 23 million left-behind compulsory-education-age children 
in rural China.20 There is a growing body of studies discussing how family separation affects 
education. The conclusions vary. Lee and Park (2010) found that a father’s migration reduces 
enrollment by sons and has significant positive effects on the academic outcomes of daughters, but 
has negative effects on the psychosocial well-being of both boys and girls. Their data came from the 
first two waves (2000 and 2004) of the GSCF. Chen et al. (2009) used 2006 data from Shaanxi 
province and detected a positive impact of a father’s migration on academic performance, however 
this study only included primary school students and did not take enrollment into consideration. 
Based on a survey carried out in Shanxi and Shaanxi, Yi et al. (2011) included a negative association 
between parents’ time spent in the household and the likelihood of dropout, or in other words a 
positive association between the parental migration time and the dropout decision. Finally, using the 
longitudinal data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, Lu (2012) found at the national level 
that neither the mother’s nor the father’s migrant status may affect attainment. 
Health is the final parental background factor that influences attainment. Yi et al. (2011) found 
that rural students are 3.4% (0.034 at 1% level) more likely to drop out if they come from a family in 
which one or both parents are chronically sick or permanently handicapped. It is worth noting that 






the coefficient is greater than the coefficients for “whether the accumulated months that parents 
stayed at home for less than 12 months in the past 3 years” (0.023 at the 5% level) and “whether the 
consumption asset value located the lowest 10%” (0.029 at the 5% level).21 It is possible that the 
students need to sacrifice some time for housework and taking care of their parents. 
Since 2005, there have also been discussions on the relationship between parental background 
and high-school track. Based on a survey in two rural schools in a central province, Zhu (2006) found 
that all kinds of parental background variables have an impact on the schooling track decision, 
however this study had a small sample (200–300 in various tests), and the author only used basic 
chi-squared tests, in which she was unable to control for other factors.  
Some more specific and reliable evidence follows. There are mixed results on how parental 
education impacts the schooling track. Based on the 2007 survey data from Hunan province, Li (2009) 
found that a father’s education level is negatively correlated with the possibility of VHS, but a 
mother’s education level has no impact. Contrary to Li, Fang (2007) found that a mother’s education 
level is more relevant to the schooling track. The most recent study, conducted by Song et al. (2011), 
found that neither a father’s nor a mother’s educational level has an impact. For other findings in the 
literature, Li (2009) suggested that students whose father and/or mother are off-farm workers are 
less likely to end up attending a VHS, and that the “agriculture” Hukou status is linked with a higher 
probability of attending a VHS. Despite the emerging research, it can be reported that studies about 
how parental background affects the high-school track still lag far behind those on attainment.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the parental background is simply an indirect (but easily attainable) 
determinant of the PCED. What is of interest is the parental effort, such as the frequency with which 
parents discuss coursework or school events with students, or their involvement in school activities. 
At least in the US, parental effort is believed to be more influential than school resources, and is not 
well captured by parental background variables (Houtenville and Conway, 2008). In the case of Turkey, 
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a higher frequency of parent–child discussions about school (e.g. help with homework, limiting the 
hours spent watching television) proved to be correlated with a lower likelihood of attending a VHS 
(Aypay, 2003).  
Number of Siblings and Birth Order 
The theory predicts that the number of siblings and birth order usually have a joint effect on the 
PCED, or more specifically educational attainment. Holding other factors constant, older children in a 
larger family bear a higher opportunity cost, and therefore they might have less education and they 
will work earlier to subsidize the younger children.  
There is not much controversy about this in the literature. Sun (2003), Liu (2007), and de Brauw 
and Giles (2008) all confirmed that older siblings are less likely to be admitted to high school. Using 
the hazard model, Brown and Park (2002) showed that the presence of siblings, especially older 
siblings, reduces the likelihood of dropping out. Their explanation is that siblings can increase the 
desirability of educational investments by substituting for each other’s labor contributions to the 
household, economizing on costs. They also argued that having a sibling can promote school 
performance because the children help each other with schoolwork. In this explanation, the help 
from other siblings can be treated as a household input for the quality of schooling (Function (7)).  
There is also indirect evidence of the impact of birth order. Lu (2012) found that the migration of 
siblings (rather than parents) increases attainment. Presumably, the migrant siblings are also the 
older ones; thus, this finding actually confirms the simplest theoretical illustration. 
Although unable to consider birth order, the survey of Life Histories and Social Change in 
Contemporary China (Lu and Treiman, 2008) showed a negative association between sibship size and 
educational attainment, which conforms to the intuition that having more siblings dilutes household 
resources. The same study also suggested that the sibship size is very “politics elastic” because the 
statistically significant coefficient was only detected for the cohorts of early years after liberation and 




The number of siblings and birth order are also nested with gender. Connelly and Zheng (2003) 
found that girls are equally disadvantaged by having a younger brother or sister, but boys are less 
disadvantaged by having a younger sister than by having a younger brother. This finding was 
confirmed by Yu (2009) with data from a rural Jiangsu province. They both suggested that the gender 
inequality is revealed through the number of siblings and birth order.  
Neither theory nor empirical study involves a specific discussion on sibship size or birth order 
regarding schooling track. 
Peer, School, and Community Factors 
The next group of determinants includes common non-household factors ( nhF ); the school (at 
the compulsory-education stage), peer, and community factors. School input affects both the 
academic achievement and the PCED. The peer and community effects can be treated as a cost factor 
in the Nash model (Function (18))—if a large proportion of peers or community members choose 
one PCED, then the cost of that PCED drops, making it a tempting option for the student.  
School input can be categorized into teacher/pupil ratio, teacher education, teacher experience, 
teacher salary, expenditure/pupil, administrative inputs, and facilities (Hanushek, 1989). The 
evidence of how school inputs affect student attainment in rural China is not particularly 
straightforward. Hu and Du (2008) looked at detailed school factors in west China, but their study 
was about the determinants of middle-school performance. Since academic achievement could be a 
mediating variable for the PCED, the findings are still meaningful. First, teacher quality matters. The 
percentage of certificated teachers was associated with better performance, while the percentage of 
minority teachers had the opposite effect. Unlike the results suggested by the US literature, the 
teacher/student ratio appeared to be negatively correlated with student performance. This could be 
an issue of inefficiency, or just a reflection of the fact that remote areas have smaller classes. Student 
school and classroom area had positive associations with performance, but student dorm building 




benefits students, while the latter has a higher management cost. Fourth, a negative association 
exists between school per student expenditure and test performance. This could be due to 
inefficiency in the use of budgets. 
Brown and Park (2002) found that school quality matters more for primary education than for 
lower-secondary education (no coefficient significant). Higher school fees and distance to school 
could both be proxies for quality, resulting in lower probabilities of dropout. The percentage of 
rainproof classrooms also increases the primary schooling. The association between the percentage 
of teachers with post-secondary education and schooling is in the opposite direction, which is 
probably due to the trade-off between education and experience. Unlike Hu and Du (2008), Brown 
and Park did not find an effect on learning. This is similar to the findings of Hanushek et al. (2008) for 
Egypt, where school quality has a positive effect on primary education enrollment with student 
ability and achievement held constant, suggesting that academic performance is not the only 
channel through which school quality affects the PCED.  
Another group of evidence came from Park and Hannum (2002). The authors looked at an 
extensive list of teacher variables using the first-round GSCF data. It emerged that higher quality rank, 
experience, and stipends paid to teachers are better for student learning. However, the coefficients 
for teacher college degrees and their interaction terms with years taught are both negative. They 
also found that teachers who were government employees or local villagers had a positive impact on 
student learning, which conveys the importance of commitment to, and trust from the local 
community.  
Note that quantitative discussions of the curriculum are missing from the PCED literature. This is 
because China has a unified curriculum for rural education. Despite dissatisfaction (Wang, 2005; 
Hannum and Adam, 2008), the curriculum is supposed to be the same for every student. It can still 
have impacts that are heterogonous depending on other factors, such as leading to the anti-study 




In comparison with school factors, peer and community factors are less visible. Hu and Du (2008) 
used the average educational attainment of classmates’ parents as a proxy for the peer effect. They 
found a positive association with student test performance. Han (2001) used the average schooling 
years of the 20–35 age group to proxy for the community PCED. She also identified an effect that fits 
the theory prediction. Connelly and Zheng (2003) found that rural students are more sensitive to 
county terrain and wealth. De Brauw and Giles (2008) detected a robust negative relationship 
between high-school enrollment and migrant opportunities, measured by the number of migrants 
from the village or in the household. The mechanisms behind the negative relationship are suggested 
by observed increases in subsequent local and migrant employment of high-school-age teenagers as 
the size of the current migrant network increases. This is a supply-side factor.  
In the case of the schooling track decision, the evidence is mostly qualitative, and mainly comes 
from interviews (Fang, 2007; Zhang, 2009). Parent and student preferences for AHSs are due not only 
to their own perceptions of the lower quality of and return to VHS, but also to peer pressure from 
the community: some households make the schooling track decisions largely based on a sense of 
satisfaction gained from peer and community approval. Rural or low socioeconomic status (SES) 
households tend to be more practical (i.e. more economic-oriented) than urban or high SES 
households (Fang, 2007) when choosing the high-school track.  
There has been no specific discussion of how primary or lower-secondary school quality 
influences the schooling track decision in rural China. Nevertheless, assuming that school quality 
matters for academic achievement, it is safe to say that better quality leads to a higher probability of 
attending an AHS.  
Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints 
Household economic status and credit constraints are traditional elements of PCED modeling. 
The literature did not challenge the view that a better economic status allows a PCED that bears a 




The greatest challenge noted in the research is not about finding an effect, but about measuring 
the factors precisely, especially economic status. For attainment study, measurements included the 
farming/off-farm wage and household consumption goods value (Sun, 2004), log value of household 
durables (Brown, 2006), index revealing the possession of 24 household goods (Liu, 2007), and index 
revealing the possession of electric appliances (Mo et al., 2011; Yi et al., 2011). Except for Mo et al. 
(2011), they all pointed out a wealth effect.  
The magnitude of the wealth effect varies, however. For example, in the study of Gansu by Sun 
(2003), a 1000 RMB22 rise in expenditure per household member only increased student educational 
attainment by 0.2 years. Sun’s survey was conducted in 2002, when the GDP per capita for Gansu 
was only 4294 RMB. In another study at the national level, Lu (2012) found no impact of per capita 
household income under every specification she tried. In Brown and Park (2002), conversely, the 
effect is sizeable. They found that holding expenditures per capita fixed, children from households 
that are both poor and credit constrained are three times as likely to drop out of school. A more 
recent study by Mo et al. (2011) also found a strong impact when the economic burden is relaxed. 
From 2009 to 2010, they conducted a randomized experiment in Shanxi province and found that a 
conditional cash transfer of 500 RMB per semester reduced dropout by 60%.  
Almost all the available studies suggest that students from poorer households tend to end up 
with a VHS instead of an AHS. The sole exception comes from Thailand, where Moenjak and 
Worswick (2003) found that a well-to-do family is more likely to undertake vocational education. In 
China’s case, Li (2009) identified a negative association between household economic status and VHS 
selection. To proxy for economic status, she used the durable goods index, which is the weighted 
sum of the possession of nineteen household durable goods.  
Subjective Factors 
The final group of case-specific determinants is subjective factors, personality, attitude, and 
perceptions, which have received increasing attention in the educational literature. The economic 
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model does not specify how subjective factors influence the PCED. It is more involved in the 
empirical findings than theoretical prediction. 
Personality is the first component of subjective factors. It is defined as “the relatively enduring 
patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that reflect the tendency to respond in certain ways 
under certain circumstances” (Roberts, 2009). Almlund et al. (2011) concluded that 
conscientiousness (e.g. self-discipline and ambition) best predicts overall attainment and 
achievement, followed by emotional stability (e.g. depression level and confidence). In China’s case, 
the evidence is less straightforward. The links between personality and education have been 
evaluated. Wang et al. (1999) found that most personalities influence academic performance, 
however these tests were mainly conducted with urban students. In another study, Lee and Park 
(2010) found that a father’s migration was linked with externalizing problems such as destructive 
behavior, impulsivity, aggression, and over-activity, but not with internalizing problems such as 
anxiety, depression, and withdrawal. Since the authors also found a negative correlation between a 
father’s migration and children’s enrollment, the adjusted personality traits serve as potential 
mediators. It is also notable that socio-psychological interventions can alter personality traits and can 
have a lasting effect on education (Almlund et al., 2011; Yeager and Walton, 2011), however so far no 
quantitative study has focused on China’s rural students. 
Another type of subjective factor is a student’s attitude towards schooling. Qualitative and 
descriptive surveys suggest that a student’s negative attitude towards schooling is the major reason 
for dropout. Jiang and Dai (2005) interviewed 392 households with dropout children in nine rural 
provinces. For households of different SESs, 45.1%–69.2% chose an “anti-schooling (厌学 yanxue)” 
attitude as the reason for dropout, and 15.4%–35.4% stated that the family could not afford tuition 
and fees. The other two factors, the family’s labor demand and the parental attitude toward 
children’s schooling, appeared to be less important. Jiang and Dai (2005) attributed the 
anti-schooling attitude to the school environment and direct cost. Wang (2005) suggested additional 




education is useless. Hannum and Adams (2008) had similar views. To some extent, attitude is a 
mediating factor. Based on these surveys, we can say that attitude matters, but we cannot say that 
attitude matters the most. 
The probit regression of the dropout decision by Mo et al. (2011) showed that randomly 
receiving conditional cash transfers has an impact smaller than that of the “plan to continue 
education after junior high school” (0.53 vs. 0.64). Nevertheless, the magnitude for being treated, 
0.53, is still large. The author conjectured that the “heretofore neglected” students (those who 
performed worse in tests) were actually encouraged by the cash transfer beyond the mere receipt of 
the payment. This constitutes indirect evidence that attitude matters. 
Perceptions among students, teachers, and parents also have an impact on PCED. Hannum and 
Adams (2007) found that student perceptions that “the teacher pays attention to them and likes 
them” have no impact on secondary school enrollment, but a mother’s and teacher’s expectations 
for the student’s educational attainment do matter. In turn, teacher perceptions also count. Zhang 
(2011) revealed that teacher evaluations of the importance of children’s SES are closely associated 
with the evaluations and educational expectations of the students, beyond the students’ academic 
achievement and actual SES. Teacher expectations at an earlier period help predict children’s later 
school persistence. Both Hannum and Adams (2007) and Zhang (2011) used the GSCF data.  
Based on the three-round GSCF, Hannum et al. (2009) incorporated the gender concern into their 
perception discussion. It seems that parental educational attitudes and practices toward boys and 
girls are more complicated and less uniformly negative for girls than is commonly portrayed. They 
found that boys received a small advantage in schooling years although parents did believe that a 
girl’s education is less rewarding than a boy’s education for the household. 
Student attitude or parental expectation alone might not be a strong determinant. Li and Tsang 
(2003) found that school attendance can be predicted by the gap between the parents’ desired level 
of schooling for their child and the economically attainable level of schooling. In other words, 




secondary students had high aspirations of education attainment, but the aspirations were not likely 
to be fulfilled due to the cost of post-compulsory schooling. Parents’ expectations for their children’s 
future education are chiefly shaped by their own wealth.  
Perception factors are also accountable for the schooling track. Parents are risk-averse. For 
example, a study in Germany suggested that risk-averse parents, particularly mothers, are more likely 
to enroll their children in the vocational track. Again, the daughter’s educational track is more 
sensitive to this factor (Heineck and Wölfel, 2011).  
In China’s case, there has been little change in the preference for AHSs over VHSs. Dong and 
Shen’s survey of 1571 rural students in the mid-1990s showed that satisfying parental expectations 
and gaining a place at college are the dominant reasons for choosing AHS (Dong and Shen, 1997),23 
while the motivation for VHS is mostly to secure a job: a risk-averse behavior. Such a finding is similar 
to the findings from other developing countries like Turkey (Tunali, 2005) and Egypt (El-Hamidi, 2006). 
The finding has also been confirmed by post-2005 studies that mainly relied on interviews (Fang, 
2007; Zhang, 2009). More evidence was presented by a 2004 survey held by the China Youth & 
Children Research Center, in which more than half the students said they would not choose a VHS, 
49.8% said that even if they wanted to attend a VHS, their parents would not allow it.24 In this survey, 
the top four perceptions regarding VHSs were “low wage,” “cannot get into government sector,” 
“only bad students go there,” and “can only become a low-class worker.” 
2.3.2 Alternative-Specific Determinants 
The alternative-specific determinants are the direct cost of each PCED, the reward in the labor 
market, policy intervention, and the score constraint for AHS. These vary by PCED. When discussing 
the schooling track, upper-secondary school quality can also serve as an alternative-specific 
determinant, however the previous studies did not apply direct measures of VHS or AHS quality. The 
same situation exists for other quality-related determinants, such as curriculum and subject major 
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(for VHS). The above student/parental perception and the opportunity and wage in 4.2.2 can be 
regarded as proxies for the quality factor.25  
Direct Cost of Each Post-Compulsory Education Decision 
Direct cost refers to the cost borne by the household, and more specifically the cost of 
non-dropout, entering an AHS, or entering a VHS. Holding other factors constant,26 the basic model 
explicitly suggests that a higher cost lowers the attractiveness of a PCED. 
In terms of the attainment determinant, Liu et al. (2009) presented two explanations for the low 
enrollment rate in upper-secondary schools. One is the barrier erected by the examination system 
(discussed in 4.2.4). The other reason is the cost–benefit consideration by students and their parents. 
They argued that the cost issue is the main barrier to upper-secondary enrollment. Two pieces of 
evidence were offered. The first was their survey of rural public high-school tuition rates in 41 
countries, which showed that China’s tuition, 160 USD, is the highest. For a rural family living on the 
poverty line or with a net income of around 100 USD, paying for three years of high-school tuition is 
equivalent to almost 5 per capita incomes. The second piece of evidence is from their survey of 1100 
randomly selected students in 20 high schools in rural Shaanxi. Their calculation suggested a direct 
cost of 1659 USD for a three-year high-school education.  
 If we focus only on Dropout, Sun’s study reported that school fees have a negative association 
with lower-secondary school enrollment, but a positive one with primary school enrollment (Sun, 
2004). Since school fees can be a proxy for school quality, such a result suggested that the price 
concern outweighs the quality concern when the educational level becomes higher.  
 Discussions about the schooling track are less straightforward. Using a resampling of 2007 data 
for Hunan province’s Grade 9 students, Li and Cheng (2009) examined the change in the VHS 
preference under different scenarios of cost change. They found that 27.6% to 37.8% of students 
who preferred an AHS at the beginning would switch to a VHS if it reduced the tuition to half the 
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original or to zero, or if a subsidy of 50 RMB was provided per student per month. Students with 
lower academic performance who are female, or come from poorer families will be more sensitive to 
the change, while the effect of the parental background diminishes. However, this was just a study of 
intention, which does not guarantee the change in the final PCED. Song et al. (2011) found that the 
awareness of policy intervention (mostly about lowering cost) did increase student preferences for a 
VHS, but the effect on the actual track is statistically insignificant. 
Reward in the Labor Market 
Reward in the labor market is the human capital constraint for the PCED optimum. Opportunity 
and wage are the major forms of reward. For AHS, the reward for higher education also matters. As 
indicated at the end of the modeling section, non-monetary return can also be influential.   
The economic (non-)reason for dropout in rural China constantly catches people’s attention. For 
example, based on data from 23 rural counties, Wei et al. (1999) found that the rate of return to 
lower-secondary education is 6.87%, which is not low compared with 4.84% overall. They also 
estimated the cost of schooling and calculated the internal rate of return. For lower-secondary 
education the unadjusted internal rate of return is 11.2%, demonstrating that such investment was 
quite profitable, however the data they used may be too old to shed light on the current PCED 
distribution. Applying data from Chifeng city in Inner Mongolia, Sun and Du (2004) offered more 
recent support for non-dropout: they found that lower-secondary education could be the most cost–
beneficial educational level if the household income is mainly from agriculture. The type of labor 
market opportunity also matters. Sun (2004) found that the development of county- or 
township-owned business encourages additional schooling, but the development of private business 
discourages it. The former group imposes strict educational requirements, while the latter group 
prefers the cheaper labor of less schooling. 
If we expand the discussion from dropout vs. non-dropout to educational attainment, empirical 




population (Figure 2-3). I am cautious about over-reliance on these findings. First, both the rural–
urban segregation system and the fact that the country is in transition to a real market economy 
could lead to distortions of returns. Secondly, the reason for the previous low estimates might be the 
inappropriateness of the methodology, such as not controlling for endogeneity or sample selection 
bias. More recent studies dealing with these issues (de Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Chen and Hamori, 
2009; Sun and Du, 2009) detected higher returns. For example, Sun and Du (2009) found that the 
real rate of return could be over three times the old ones (the upright dot in Figure 6). They used the 
variation in the education system as an instrumental variable for educational attainment. De Brauw 
and Rozelle (2008) conducted a survey of 1199 households in 60 villages, detecting 
higher-than-average returns among younger people and migrants and for post-primary education, 
which implied that being a migrant worker with enough secondary education could be a reasonable 
choice for rural teenagers.  
 
Figure 2-3 Pre-2010 Estimates of Return to Education in China 
 
Note: Obtained from a union of the literature listed in Sun (2004) and Guo (2010), plus two studies that are 
mentioned here but not cited by them (Chen and Hamori, 2009; Sun and Du, 2009). For panel data, I take the 
median year as the data year. When the coefficients are presented separately for males and females, or there are 













































The debate, however, continues. A recent argument comes from Li et al. (2012), in which the rate 
of return is as high as 8.4% in OLS, but shrinks to just 3.8% in the within-twin fixed-effects model. 
More specifically, the authors found that high-school education serves as a mechanism to select 
college students rather than a human capital investment per se. This finding is supported by Yao et al. 
(2012), using a resampling of the 2005 census. They found that the marginal returns to 
upper-secondary education were negative for East, North, and Northeast China, but these returns 
then jumped to twice the return to lower-secondary education if the individual finished higher 
education.  
Regardless of what the return looks like, the consensus lies in Chinese people tending to treat 
AHSs as a channel towards college. An AHS is necessary input in order to secure the rate of return to 
a complete education that includes post-secondary education. A similar logic also applies to poorer 
countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda (Appleton et al., 1996). 
When it comes to the relationship between work and attainment, the findings are more subtle. A 
number of studies have been undertaken on the effect of migrant work, mostly using Mexican data 
and identifying either a brain drain (e.g. McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006) or a brain gain effect (e.g. 
Boucher et al., 2005). Applying a hazard model to the CHIP 1995 data, McGuire et al. (2007) found 
that better off-farm employment opportunities increase the likelihood of dropout. Their study also 
suggested that educational attainment has a stronger association with off-farm work than with 
farming. This is a Chinese analog of a Mexican case. In another case in point, applying a 
household-time fixed-effect model to a 1986–1995 dataset of rural Sichuan, Yang (2004) found that 
schooling enhanced the ability of farmers to devote more labor and capital to non-farm production, 
resulting in income growth.  
All the above “reward” studies did not differentiate schooling tracks, yet reward is a frequently 
discussed determinant of track studies. Rich discussions can be found internationally. El-Hamidi’s 




education followed by on-the-job training. Moenjak and Worswock (2003) held a contrary view. In 
their study of Thailand, VHSs result in higher earnings returns than AHSs. It appears that there is no 
unique answer regarding the returns from the high-school track. In Turkey’s case, Tunali (2005) found 
that vocational education offers some protection against unemployment for males in rural areas. 
Using two waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey, Chen (2009) demonstrated that attendance at a 
VHS results in neither market advantage nor market disadvantage in terms of employment 
opportunities and/or earnings premium. In a more recent study of Spain, Lopez-Mayan (2010) 
confirmed that lifetime earning is important for the PCED. Two of this study’s findings may be 
applicable to China’s case. Raising the annual wage of vocational college graduates can reduce the 
dropout rate in VHSs, but not in AHSs. In China, this suggests the benefit of building a strong 
connection between VHS and vocational college. The relevant increase in lifetime wage from 
compulsory schooling discourages participation in post-compulsory education. For China, that 
implies that students might choose the migrant worker option if they perceive a low wage premium 
resulting from upper-secondary and/or higher education. 
Due to the shifting policy focus on VHSs and rural students, the number of studies of China’s 
high-school track determinant has grown, with a geographical emphasis on rural regions. I will 
introduce them one by one according to when the data was obtained. 
Min and Tsang (1990) conducted probably the first comparison of productivity between VHS 
graduates and AHS graduates. They used Beijing Auto Industry Company data and concluded that 
VHS graduates were more satisfied and productive than AHS graduates. Based on a survey of 1433 
employees in two cities, Yang (1998) concluded that pre-employment education gives better work 
performance, but vocational education does not lead to better performance than general education. 
Both studies focused on urban residents, while the following studies concern both urban and rural 
graduates. 
After the 2005 policy document, it has been claimed that VHSs are a better choice than AHS with 




usually higher than 90%, although as mentioned at the beginning of this review, the reliability of the 
official figures is questionable. Be that as it may, the survival analysis by Li and Ding (2008) confirmed 
that graduates from vocational high school take a shorter time to obtain jobs than their academic 
counterparts. The sample they used was from a 2004 survey of 12 provinces. In a more 
comprehensive study based on the same survey, Ding and Li (2007) found that there is no great 
difference between graduates of the two school tracks in terms of wages. They attributed this finding 
to the academic-like curriculum of VHSs, which fails to differentiate vocational students from the 
academic students in the job market. However, they also found that students going to VHSs came 
from households with lower SES, so it seems that VHSs work for equalization. In another study using 
2007 data for Hunan province’s Grade 9 students, Li and Cheng (2009) found that when the expected 
monthly wage for VHS graduates rises, about 50% of Grade 9 students who preferred AHS at the 
beginning will switch to VHS. Again, just like cost change, this effect is not heterogeneous to parental 
background.  
Finally, Li (2011) contributed a discussion on non-monetary returns. Her study found that VHS 
graduates enjoy higher non-monetary benefits than AHS graduates in terms of job satisfaction, 
frequency of job change, length of time unemployed, and perceived working environment. Two areas 
for caution should be raised however. First, the study focused on the 1993 VHS cohort from Hunan 
province, which has limited implications for today’s VHSs. Second, the findings may reflect the more 
conservative attitude toward the labor market held by VHS participants. For example, they might be 
more easily satisfied with a job, and thus be able to work longer and become a senior employee who 
feels comfortable with the working environment. In short, there could be selection bias. 
Policy Intervention 
Policy interventions aim to change some factors in the utility function, especially the direct cost. 
There are mild and less-PCED-specific interventions, such as changes in the resource allocation for 




of China’s vocational policy, which eliminates VHS tuition for some rural students. Let us start with 
the non-dramatic ones. 
Before the mid-1980s, when the Chinese government imposed a restrictive policy on labor 
migration from rural to urban areas, the sizeable urban–rural income difference provided a strong 
incentive for AHSs because it raised the accessibility of urban formal employment to rural people 
(Zhao, 1997). Since then, however, rural–urban segregation has been relaxed, so the motivation for 
post-compulsory education is no longer as powerful as before. 
In more recent literature, Sun (2004) found that when local governments increased the 
education budget, the impact of the household income shrinks. The government budget varies 
widely among rural schools. In fact, although the Chinese public tends to focus on the urban–rural 
gap, Theil decompositions showed that the great majority of spending inequality resided within the 
two groups instead of between them (Tsang and Ding, 2005).   
The change in the education system is another case of gradual policy intervention. Before the 
debut of the Compulsory Education Law in 1986, there had been different types of education system 
in rural China, including 5-3-3, 5-3-2, 5-2-2, 5-4-3, and 6-3-3. Of these, 6-3-3 eventually became 
today’s dominant system. Using a dataset from rural Guangxi province, Sun and Du (2009) found that 
the gender education gap was minimized under the 6-3-3 system. 
Some other studies provide indirect evidence. For example, based on a survey in Western China, 
Liu et al. (2009) suggested that teacher incentives and student education performance, which seem 
to be associated with students’ schooling decisions, are unlikely to benefit from the 2001 “to the 
county” (以县为主 yi xian wei zhu) fiscal centralization. In another study, Liu et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that when students are older (e.g. the fourth grade), their grades rise after merging, 
but the effect is reversed for younger students. School mergers are a controversial policy. Arguments 
against them include the longer distance for schooling, the lack of a nutritional diet and family 




As indicated at the beginning of this review, radical national policies toward compulsory 
education and vocational education were instituted during the 2000s. The 2005 fiscal reform was 
one of them. In this reform, the central government transferred the budget from richer schools to 
poorer rural schools. Sun et al. (2010) applied DID to analyze its effect in the provinces of Guangxi, 
Hubei, and Zhejiang. They discovered an equalization effect in school budget. If an equalization of 
investment leads to an equalization of academic performance across schools, then it is reasonable to 
believe that the fiscal reform has an influence on students’ PCED.  
No rigorous analysis is available about the free VHS for rural students, but a comparison of per 
student public expenditure can shed light on possible impacts of this policy. Since VHSs are designed 
to prepare students for work, they have a higher requirement for laboratory facilities than AHSs. Yao 
(2007) summarized the reasonable VHS/AHS ratio of per student expenditure in the Chinese 
literature. They are 2.5:1, 3:1, 5:1, 6.8:1, and 8:1. In 2001, the actual ratio was 2.53:1, which was 
acceptable, but since then it has been approaching 1:1.27 It is true that the elimination of tuition has 
attracted more students to VHSs, but its quality could be compromised by the declining investment. 
Looking more closely at Figure 1-2, the distribution of PCEDs between AHS and VHS was quite 
volatile throughout the 2000s. The descriptive statistics alone imply the great impact of drastic policy 
interventions, such as higher-education expansion, which have increased new enrollments from 1.08 
million in 1998 to 6.62 million in 2010,28 the end of secured job allocation for VHSs in 2001, and the 
ongoing Promotion of Vocational Education. Of these, the short-term effect of higher-education 
expansion is becoming apparent. There are reports (Wang, 2010) and working papers (Xing and Li, 
2010) that report the decline in job opportunities and wages for college graduates, and an expanding 
urban–rural gap of enrollment, which could discourage AHS enrollment, or even encourage dropout 
for rural students. It may be too early to evaluate the long-term outcome of these sharp policies. 
Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2008) offered a hint. They used RD to evaluate a 1973 reform in Romania 








that shifted a large proportion of students from VHSs to AHSs. They concluded that the differences in 
labor market returns between the two tracks are largely driven by selection.  
Other than government policies, there are also school policies affecting different factors. Based 
on a randomized controlled trial in suburban Paris, Goux et al. (2014) showed that low-achieving 
students’ aspirations can be made more realistic through collective meetings on track choice in 
school, and more realistic aspirations are followed by a significant reduction in grade repetition and 
high-school dropout. They also found spillover effects to untreated students that are close friends to 
the treated ones. China’s school managements are more centralized, but school-level innovations do 
exist29, yet not well evaluated. 
Score Constraints: The High-School Entrance Examination 
The last group of determinants involves the HSEE cut-off. The HSEE cut-off varies by school. 
Unlike urban students, rural students have fewer AHS options, and therefore, failing a cut-off usually 
means they have to choose Work or VHS. To some extent, the determinant is the student’s own 
academic performance rather than the exogenous HSEE cut-off.  
Academic achievement is actually a mediating factor. In rural China, many factors that influence 
achievements also influence the PCED (e.g. Brown and Park, 2002; Hannum et al., 2009). Lower 
achievement can lead to a negative attitude towards education (Jiang and Dai, 2005; Wang, 2005; 
Zhu, 2006; Hannum and Adam, 2008), which is another mediating variable for the PCED. I will not 
proceed much further with the discussion of HSEE on educational attainment since it overlaps with 
the previous discussion in this review. However, there are also cases in which the factors that affect 
PCED have no impact on performance. These include teacher experience (An, 2005), parental 
education and family income (Hannum and Sargent, 2007), per student expenditure (Xue and Min, 
2008), and the availability of a cash incentive (Mo et al., 2011). We cannot take for granted the 
direction of the impact on the factors that influence both performance and PCED. Parental migration 
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is a case in point. As discussed above, most studies (Chen et al., 2009; Lee and Park, 2010; Yi et al., 
2011) found that parental migration has a negative impact on attainment, but a positive impact on 
the performance of enrolled students. 
The literature all agrees about the importance of the HSEE for the high-school track. Despite a 
rising status in the second half the 2000s, vocational education is still treated as inferior education to 
the general academic-track education, both in China (Wang, 2005) and in other countries with a 
similar streaming system (Bertocchi and Spagat, 2004; Brunello and Checchi, 2007). Chinese studies 
that include academic performance or HSEE score as an independent variable all suggested a 
negative association between them and the student’s potential for attending a VHS (Fang, 2007; Li, 
2009; Song et al., 2011).  
The HSEE cut-off could be “cruel” for high-school tracking. In some parts of China, there was a 
huge gap between hope and reality. In a 2006 survey in Chifeng city in Inner Mongolia (Fang, 2007), 
85.1% of graduating students said they wanted to get into a magnet AHS, and only 30% did so. As 
one more example, in a 2009 survey of 41 counties in a western province (Song et al., 2011), 70.3% 
of graduating students expected to attend an AHS, but only 53.7% of this group did so, with 20.3% 
ending up in a VHS. There were 22.7% students who expected a VHS, but only 37.1% achieved this, 
with 30.7% ending up opting for Dropout or Work. Of course, with increasing study opportunities 
and decreasing school-age population, such “cut-off” effect of HSEE is supposed to be now much 
weaker. 
Finally, it is worth noting that relative academic performance might matter more than the 
absolute one for determining post-compulsory-education decisions. Park et al. (2010) showed that 
students in magnet high schools are less likely to attend a college entrance exam than students of 
the same initial academic performance in regular high schools, even though the former do develop 
higher academic performance because of the higher school quality. This finding indicates that 




within the school, and vice versa. Such an argument may also be applicable to students in 
lower-secondary schools.  
 
2.4 Summary 
2.4.1 Major Findings from the Literature 
The PCEDs faced by China’s rural students have become more subtle than ever before. While 
national policies and supply factors are no longer the dominant concerns in this process, this review 
summarizes two groups of possible determinants. It also introduces the economic theories and 
methodologies. Theoretically, the PCED process relies on the calculation of costs and benefits for the 
household and for the students themselves. Methodologically, researchers have applied a wide range 
of methods to measure the determinants in several parts of the countries, either for the accuracy of 
associations or for causal identification. It turns out that the empirical evidence supports the 
theoretical explanations, although the causal interpretation could be subtle. 
Figure 2-4 summarizes the PCED determinants reviewed. iC  and kA  stand for the 
case-specific and alternative-specific factors. Since some of the PCED determinants are 
heterogeneous to other determinants or highly correlated with each other, the two groups are not 
totally separate. 
The first group of determinants is case-specific. First, girls are more income, performance, and 
cost elastic than boys in the PCED, being older (in the same grade) leads to a higher probability of 
dropout, and being an ethnic minority is not necessarily a disadvantage in post-compulsory 
education. Second, parental education, occupation, political status, migrant worker status, and 
health status are also influential in most cases. More specifically, a “better” parental background 
leads to greater attainment and a higher probability of attending an AHS. Third, an older child with 




order affect the schooling track. Fourth, the effect of school quality, peer, and community are mostly 
indirect because research has mainly focused on performance, but it is safe to say they are influential 
on the PCED in a predictable way. Fifth, coming from a richer and less credit-constrained family helps 
attainment and/or entering the AHS track, although the magnitude varies. Finally, subjective factors 
such as personality, attitude, and perceptions of or between the PCED players (students, parents, and 













Note: Student health only appeared as performance determinant in the literature. High school (especially VHS) quality has 
been frequently mentioned, but not rigorously measured. 
 
The second group of determinants is alternative-specific. First, as predicted, a lower 
further-education cost of one PCED leads to a greater preference for that PCED when other factors 
are held constant, however preference does not necessarily lead to real choice. Second, a larger 
reward makes a certain PCED more attractive, but the sizes of monetary rewards to different PCEDs is 
still debatable. Multiple forms of reward are linked with the calculation of risk, such as college 
enrollment, non-agriculture status, job security, and job satisfaction. Third, both dramatic and 
gradual policy interventions can alter the PCED. For dramatic policy interventions, there could be 




mid- to long-term side effects, which require more time for observation. Fourth, the HSEE is still a 
mechanism to decide the chance to attend an AHS. This is to some extent a concern of the student’s 
academic achievement, which is also influenced by other PCED determinants. 
Different factors are more or less intertwined. For example, based on a randomized controlled 
trial in suburban Paris, Goux et al. (2014) showed that low-achieving students’ aspirations can be 
made more realistic through a series of meetings facilitated by the school principals and that more 
realistic aspirations are followed by a significant reduction in grade repetition and high-school 
dropout. They also found spillover effects to untreated students that are close friends to the treated 
ones.   
2.4.2 Gaps in the Knowledge 
This literature review also identifies several gaps in the knowledge. To begin with, since the 
majority of studies have just applied multivariable regression for non-randomized samples, it is hard 
to generate explicit interpretations of causal inference. Take, for instance, the relationship between 
“home-school distance” and attainment” (e.g. Brown and Park, 2002; Sun, 2003; Sun, 2004). When it 
is negative, the explanation is that the distance reflects the transportation cost, but when it is 
positive, the explanation becomes that a longer distance is a proxy for a better school quality—the 
more comprehensive the variable list, the less likely it is that the researchers need to rely on this kind 
of arbitrary judgment.  
The body of studies about schooling tracks is much smaller than that for attainment. There is no 
literature in English specific to the schooling track determinants in rural China, and no relevant 
Chinese literature uses methods more advanced than logit or probit. While VHS quality has been 
frequently cited in the literature, it has been kept as a black box.  
Most studies have focused on inland rural provinces (e.g. Gansu, Shaanxi) without sufficient 
consideration of the rural part of coastal provinces, such as northern Jiangsu, western Fujian, and 




Compared with the students in inland China, the students who live close to coastal metropolitan 
areas face a lower opportunity cost of migration. They also have a clearer perception of the rural–
urban disparity, and more accurate information on the urban opportunities.  
The existing studies have not caught up with the changing PCED distribution. As stated at the 
beginning of this review, during the late 2000s there was resistance to evolution of the PCED 
distribution even with the presentation of mighty policy interventions and the reduction of 
competition. The statistics suggest that most rural students in contemporary China need to deal with 
four choices when approaching the end of their compulsory education. The PCED is no longer simply 
about “drop out vs. continue” or “AHS vs. VHS.” 
Last but not least, while there are arguments that conventional determinants (e.g. gender, SES, 
performance, cost and reward) are becoming less influential on PCED, and there is a move in 
research focus towards subjective factors, investigations of how subjective factors could be formed 
or changed are scarce. It is after all harder to conduct and measure socio-emotional interventions 
that are supposed to alter expectations, perceptions, or even personality.  
Accordingly, the pool of literature could be enriched in four ways. A more comprehensive list of 
variables is required to make more convincing interpretations of quantitative results. More work 
should be devoted to studying the schooling track. It is advisable to bring in-depth surveys to the 
less-included regions. An informative study should use updated data and set a PCED-distributed 
dependent variable for lower-secondary students. Finally, it will be a strong addition to the literature 
to test how socio-emotional support affects PCED through changing subjective factors. In today’s 









Chapter 3 China’s GNGOs in Education and the Case of Lighthouse 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a constant growth in educational support programs offered 
by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in rural China. During the late 1990s, most of these 
programs were conducted by international or officially organized development organizations/ 
foundations, but later indigenous grassroots NGOs (GNGOs) began to play an increasingly important 
role in China’s rural educational development (Liang, 2009). As GNGOs for China’s rural education are 
relatively new, there are a limited number of studies of them. Those that exist are mostly 
introductive without empirical evaluation (e.g. McCabe in Sutton & Arnove, 2004; Zhu, 2004). It is 
necessary to make a rigorous examination of their contribution so that we are able to answer the 
questions of whether they are successful, and how they can be improved.   
Due to the lack of comprehensive studies, an exploratory review of literature is required before 
further study of GNGO impact. This review will be conducted on three levels. From macro to micro 
level, these are theories of NGOs, the state of educational NGOs (ENGOs) in China, and the case of 
the Lighthouse Project (Lighthouse), which was the first GNGO for rural education in China, and also 
the GNGO evaluated in this study.  
I begin with the “common definition” of NGO: a unit that is organized, private, 
non-profit-distributing, self- governing, and voluntary (Salamon & Anheier, 1997). This concept will 
be further explained in the review, and is exchangeable with that of nonprofit organizations (NPOs)30, 
the third sector, and social groups or voluntary organizations although technically there are nuances.  
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3.1 Theories about NGOs 
There are two major tracks of theoretical studies for NGOs31, one that belongs to the public 
management school, mainly including the theories of market failure, government failure, and 
voluntary failure; and another more politically-oriented, including pluralism, civil society, and 
corporatism. While voluntary failure and corporatism should be more appropriate for discussing the 
current development of Chinese NGOs, a simple exploration of Chinese literature shows that most 
studies do not connect theory with practice. There is a huge lag in corporatism study in mainland 
China compared to the “abuse”32 of civil society study.  
3.1.1 Market Failure, Government Failure, and Voluntary Failure 
While there can be specific reasons to justify the existence of NGOs, they mostly boil down to 
market failure or government failure. On the other hand, NGOs are also imperfect, which is stated as 
voluntary failure.  
Market failures are scenarios where an individual’s pursuit of pure self-interest leads to results 
that are not efficient, and there are three main reasons why this might happen (Krugman & Wells, 
2006). Agents in a market can gain market power, allowing them to block other mutually beneficial 
gains from trade. Monopoly is a market failure of this kind. The actions of agents can have 
externalities, such as pollution from manufacturing. Finally, some markets can fail due to the nature 
of certain goods (e.g. national defense), or the nature of their exchange. Accordingly, NGOs bring 
about diversification, impose supervision and provide services regarded as unprofitable by the 
market sector, which might help to prevent market failure.  
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For many countries, government policy intervention is still the most popular response to market 
failure, but this could also be a failure in itself. The term “government failure” was first used by 
McKean (1965) when discussing “the unseen hand in government”. Despite a government’s 
advantage over market, such as its offer of public goods, governments may create inefficiency and 
inequity in any of its provision, subsidy and regulation (Le Grand, 1991). There are many types of 
government failure (e.g. rent seeking, market distortion). Of these, the fact that government 
interventions usually try to raise the average welfare at the expense of certain communities, or 
simply fail to consider how some communities profit due to imperfect information, are arguments 
for the existence of NGOs, which work more closely with communities (Salamon, 1995).  
Voluntary failure is a theory raised by Salamon (1981, 1987) to replace the prevailing “market 
failure- government failure” theories. While admitting that the “double failures” are convincing 
arguments for advocating NGOs, he suggests that NGOs may fail too for four reasons. NGOs usually 
have insufficient resources for achieving optimal service outcome. NGOs may still fail to serve the 
interests of all groups, which is called ‘particularism’. There might be strong paternalism within an 
NGO. The fourth reason is amateurism, which refers to the fact that many NGO members are not 
professional at all. Rather than downgrading NGOs, however, Salamon argues that government-NGO 
partnership should be built to avoid these failures (Salamon, 1987). Sharing similar views with 
Salamon, Wang (1999) regards some frequently quoted NGO characteristics, such as their being 
voluntary, independent, and ‘saintly’ as mere “myths”.  
Salamon’s voluntary failure does not receive as much application as the other two “failures”. In a 
review of this theory, Hamilton (2004) invalidated all four types of failures. For example, no evidence 
shows that paternalism is more likely to exist in NGOs than in other sectors. The government-NGO 
partnership can be a good idea to offset each other’s shortcomings and strengthen the advantages, 




some sense, the value of voluntary failure is that it reminds people to pay attention to an NGO’s 
capacity despite the rhetoric surrounding them.  
3.1.2 Pluralism, Civil Society, and Corporatism 
From progressive to conservative, the political theories of pluralism, civil society and corporatism 
all involve the role (power) of NGOs.  
Pluralism is a widely used concept. In political theory, it refers to the situation where many 
interest groups (including NGOs in this case) compete in the political sphere, and the government's 
role as the mediator between these groups (Dahl, 1961). Three of the major tenets of the pluralist 
school are that resources, and thus potential power, are widely scattered throughout society; that at 
least some resources are available to nearly everyone; and that the amount of potential power at 
any time exceeds the amount of actual power33. 
‘Civil society’ is another widely-used academic term, but less progressive compared with 
pluralism. All theories of civil society are based on the presumption that there is a public sphere 
within a society that is separate from the government. According to the Centre for Civil Society at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, “Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced 
collective action around shared interests, purposes and values... commonly embraces a diversity of 
spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil 
societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development 
non-governmental organizations…”34 
In NGO studies, corporatism is to the opposite of pluralism. It refers to the situation where the 
state tends to coopt organization leaders, to preempt the articulation of demands by establishing 
organizations in certain key issue areas, to engage in ‘clientelistic and patrimonialist practices’, and to 
use ‘physical repression and anticipatory intimidation’ (Schmitter, 1979 cited in Whiting, 1991, p.20). 
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Whiting (1991) argues that corporatism is better than pluralism for understanding the role of NGOs 
in the Chinese case because of the predominance of mechanisms undermining the autonomy of 
associational groups. A quantitative study of the Communist Party and government’s influence on 
NGOs in three Chinese provinces (Shen, 2005) showed results favorable to the corporatism argument. 
For example, 66.9% of the 2597 surveyed NGOs said they undertook activities required by the 
party/government in the year 2000. It is also worth noting that corporatism has been used to analyze 
not only the government-NGO relationship, but also many political issues in China35.  
3.1.3 NGO Theory Studies in China 
Since this review is about China’s NGOs, it is necessary to take a look at Chinese NGO literature 
on the above theories. A simple count of journal articles from Mainland China was conducted. The 
database searched was the Full-text Core Journal of China Academic Journals (CAJ), from 1994 to 
2009. The search terms were ‘NGO/NPO’ in the title and the name of the theories in the full text36. 
The results included 106 articles for market failure, 96 for government failure, 25 for voluntary failure, 
18 for pluralism, 210 for civil society, and 13 for corporatism. According to further exploration of 
these articles, there are three findings concerning the state of NGO theories in Chinese literature. 
In China, the allocation of NGO theory studies does not match the reality of NGO development. 
The more common presence of market/government failure studies over voluntary failure studies is 
understandable, because the latter is a relatively new and narrow concept; it is also understandable 
that only 18 articles mention pluralism, since this theory can hardly explain Chinese society, but the 
ratio between the number of civil society and corporatism articles, 210 to 13, is problematic. A 
reversed ratio would be much more reasonable based on either the reality of China’s 
government-NGO relationship or the allocation of relevant international literature. There are several 
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possible reasons for this strange inclination. It could be the herd effect of research, or the fact that 
the concept of civil society is more multidisciplinary. It is also possible that this is a tactic for 
publication. ‘Corporatism’ is a relatively sensitive term (for both government and readers) because, 
although neutral, it could be linked with despotism or even fascism, but ‘civil society’ suggests an 
ideal society about which few people would disagree, so can be more easily accepted.  
The second finding from Chinese NGO literature is that the overwhelming majority of studies are 
about the introduction of theory, with little critique, application or examination. All 25 articles that 
mention voluntary failure, for instance, merely explain what voluntary failure is. As will be introduced 
in the following section, studies of the operational failure of China’s NGO do exist— studies of theory 
and studies of reality seem to be separate. One more example is that while in the Chinese context 
the emergence of NGOs should be chiefly a response to government failure, there are more articles 
mentioning market failure than government failure, 106 versus 96 with 84 overlapped, which 
indicates that most studies are still introductory. 
There are clear cut-offs for publication times, suggesting that the development of NGO research 
might largely depend on the government’s will (a form of corporatism). Although the time period for 
the search was 1994-2009, the articles mentioning market failure, government failure or civil society 
were only found after 1998, and those that mentioned voluntary failure, pluralism or corporatism 
were available only after 2002, except one for mention of pluralism in June 2001. 1998 was the year 
that two national NGO-related policies were introduced. 2002 is also three years after the 1999 Falun 
Gong incident37, which led the Chinese government to tighten NGO registration and supervision (Lu, 
2007). In total only 18 papers were published in 2000 and 2001, out of 545 papers published over 
the whole time period.  
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3.2 NGOs in China 
While abstract theories are useful for guiding research, detailed information is required to fully 
understand “the motivations of Chinese NGOs, the way they operate, their vital relationships, and 
the impact they make” (Lu, 2007). There is a rich set of literature on actual NGO behavior and 
situations in China. Certain leading academic works (e.g. Wang & Jia, 2002; Deng, 2004) come from 
the NGO Research Center (NGORC) of Tsinghua University and other researchers in Beijing (e.g. Kang, 
1999; Wang, 1999; Yu, 2006). There are also more thorough and up-to-date studies from overseas 
Chinese scholars (e.g. Lu, 2008; Ma, 2009). The review in this section confirms to the notions of 
voluntary failure and corporatism.     
3.2.1 Classifying NGOs in China 
The official Chinese term for Chinese NGOs is “popular organization” (民间组织). This comprises 
three subcategories, “social organization”, “private non-enterprise unit” (PNEU) and “foundation”. 
Figure 3-1 shows their growth. This official classification system was criticized as vague, a 





Figure 3-1 Number of NGOs Registered in the Government Sectors for Civil Affairs 
 
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 
Note: SO stands for Social Organization and PNEU stands for Private Non-Enterprise Unit. 
 
In practice, Chinese researchers and practitioners often divide Chinese NGOs into “government 
organized NGOs” (GONGOs) and “popular NGOs”. The former are initiated by the government and 
receive government subsidies. Their staff are often on the government’s payroll, and their leadership 
positions are often held by government officials. By contrast, popular NGOs are initiated by private 
citizens and receive no government subsidies. Their staff are not government employees, and they 
do not have officials occupying their top management positions. Government organized NGOs are 
also frequently called “top-down NGOs”, while popular NGOs are referred to as “bottom-up NGOs” 
(Lu, 2008). 
In order not to cause confusion by using “bottom-up” or “popular”, the term ‘grassroots NGOs’ 
(GNGOs) will be used for non GONGO Chinese NGOs (Zhu, 2004). In addition to domestic NGOs, 


























































































and therefore NGOs could be classified into INGOs, GONGOs, and GNGOs. Note that NGOs based in 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are usually treated as INGOs. 
In addition to the above classification, there are other classifications of China’s NGOs, which have 
been summarized by Yu (2006). For the convenience of further discussion, this review follows the 
INGO-GONGO-GNGO system38. 
3.2.2 Regulations Regarding NGOs 
In China, in order to have a legal identity for activities, NGOs are required to register with the 
Civil Affair Bureau. Before 1989, the only code governing registration or activities was the State 
Council’s 1950 “Interim Provisions on the Registration of Social Organization” (社会团体登记暂行办
法). After the Tiananmen incident, however, the State Council issued new rules to monitor NGOs on 
25th October 1989, with the goal of maintaining political stability by tightening the reins. Two further 
regulations came from the State Council in 1998 to update the previous guidelines: “Regulations for 
the Registration and Management of Social Groups” (社会团体登记管理条例) and “Provisional 
Regulations for the Registration and Management of Private Non- Enterprise Units” (民办非企业单
位登记管理暂行条例).  
The April 1999 Falun Gong protest led to a new round of restrictions. The “Interim Measures for 
Banning Illegal Non-Governmental Organizations” (取缔非法民间组织暂行办法) was issued a year 
after that incident. Other laws were established or updated to standardize the NGO operations. The 
first Chinese law specifically for NGOs, the “Welfare Donations Law” (公益事业捐赠法) was passed 
in August 1999. In 2004, the “Regulations for Foundation Administration” (基金会管理条例) were 
issued to replace the 1988 “Methods of Foundation Administration” (基金会管理办法). 
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The consensus on the Chinese government’s NGO regulations, especially the one in 1998, is that 
they are very unfriendly to GNGOs (e.g. Wang & Jia, 2003; Xie, 2004; Yu, 2006; Lu, 2008; Ma, 2009). 
Barriers including double-sector supervision, harsh requirements, hindering competition, and 
constrained locations mean formal registration is almost impossible for most GNGOs39.  
Before registering with the government sector for civil affairs, an NGO needs to accept 
management by an organization which is either an administration unit or an organization 
empowered by the administration unit, however no statement clarifies what type of unit is 
responsible for supervising which type of NGO. Such requirements create a barrier impossible to 
overcome in the registration of many NGOs. 
The regulations require that social organizations must have at least 50 members, an official office, 
full time staff, and funding of thirty thousand RMB40 (for local organizations) or one hundred 
thousand RMB (for national organizations). It is not easy for newly established GNGOs to conform to 
these requirements, so they have to start their operations as illegal organizations. 
The regulations also clearly claim that if there is a NGO with a similar service in the same 
administrative region (city or provincial level), then extra NGOs are unnecessary and their 
registration could be rejected, however no definition of “similarity” has been made. This gives the 
Civil Affairs Bureau, Department of Civil Affairs (on the provincial level) or the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MOCA) the discretionary power to dissolve applications. Since there are GONGOs in many social 
service areas, such requirements greatly lower the possibility of legal identity for GNGOs.  
Finally, to control the expansion of NGOs, current law does not allow registered social 
organizations to have regional branches. If an organization registers in City/Province A, then it cannot 
have activities in City/Province B. To have multi-region programs, one GNGO has to register in MOCA. 
Such national level application could be time-consuming.  
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3.2.3 The State of NGOs in China 
Although the focus of this study is GNGOs and most existing NGO studies are about GNGOs, it is 
necessary to also take a look at the state of INGOs and GONGOs because research indicates that they 
have interactions with or influences on the state of GNGOs.  
International NGOs 
According to the China Development Brief (CDF)41, there are over 200 well known INGOs 
operating in China, 38 working on education.    
Hsia and White (2002) provide a comprehensive review of the state of INGOs in China, with an 
emphasis on government- INGOs relationships. The Chinese government tends to treat INGOs as the 
“bridge” between people and itself, or a path of transmission for its policies rather than as 
autonomous social actors who can monitor the government and ensure that disadvantaged groups 
are not ignored (Hsia & White, 2002). On the other hand, despite the strong inclination of 
corporatism from the Chinese government, the lack of specific regulation for the operation of INGOs 
and the fact that central government no longer has total control of local governments in the reform 
era (Saich, 2000; Saich, 2004) allows a more sophisticated expansion.  
The development of INGOs confirms such suggestions; in a more recent study by Li (2006), the 
usual link with the government was considered an important feature of INGOs in China. Other than 
INGO- government interaction, Li takes a further step in the discussion of the INGO-GNGO 
relationship. INGOs need the assistance of local GNGOs for program operation. For example, from 
2004 to 2008 the Lighthouse Project assisted the Lions Club with voluntary teaching in Hunan 
province. GNGOs also receive funding and technical support from INGOs.  
Government Organized NGOs 






Well-known Chinese NGOs such as the National Woman’s Union and China Youth Development 
Foundation (CYDF), and also most higher education institutes, the national industrial associations 
and labor unions, all belong to the category of GONGOs. Their organizational structures are usually 
parallel to those of government sectors. Officials in the Labor Union, Woman’s Union and Youth 
League are even treated as government officials according to the Civil Servant Law, while in the 
definition of Chinese NGO regulations they are working in “social organizations”.   
Research (e.g. Wang & Jia, 2002; Cui, 2003; Lu, 2007; Lu, 2008) tends to focus on the 
consequences of GONGO affiliation to the government, which are usually negative. Compared to 
INGOs and GNGOs, GONGOs are less independent since both their funding and leadership come 
from the government. “This dependence on the government has limited NGOs’ usefulness as 
champions of interest and values that are different from those of the government” (Lu, 2007). The 
problem of bureaucracy is more likely to be found among GONGOs. GONGOs are closer to the 
government than to the public, which makes them less able to respond promptly to the public. The 
staff of GONGOs are usually serving or retired government employees receiving stable salaries from 
the government system. Their well-being is not tied to better services. Corruption is also facilitated 
within GONGOs due to the lack of transparency. An early example is the 2002 Project Hope42 scandal 
involving CYDF, in which CYDF was accused of the illegal appropriation of over one hundred million 
RMB43 in funding. A more recent and probably the best-known scandal is the 2011 online scandal of 
“Guo Meimei (郭美美) Baby”. Meimei Guo was a twenty year old girl who showed off her 
Lamborghini and Maserati and titled herself as the President of the Chamber of Commerce at Red 
Cross China. She created a trust crisis for the country’s largest charity.  
There are also positive views of GONGOs, however. According to Deng (2005), a trend of 
independence seeking has been encouraged among some GONGOs. The increasing interaction with 
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international organizations requires major GONGOs to expand their non-governmental side, and at 
the same time local governments count on these GONGOs to bring to them more resources. As 
funding sources become larger and more diverse, some government organized foundations are also 
able to seek independence by working on public relations internationally, and via mass media. 
Industrial associations are another class of GONGOs seeking independence, and their moves have 
obtained approval from the government. Some GONGOs register with the Civil Affairs Bureau in 
order to have their own systems of human resources, budgeting and decision making.  
Grassroots NGOs 
In 2009, there were 413660 registered NGOs in China44, but even the most conservative estimate 
of the actual number could still be over three million45, most of them GNGOs. More than 80% of 
GNGOs are illegal and of the legal GNGOs, the majority are still facing problems such as bad 
management and budget deficiency (Xie, 2004). At present, only about 300 GNGOs are well known 
to Chinese citizens, mostly in the fields of environmental protection, hotline, anti-poverty, and 
children (Deng, 2005). 
Studies of China’s GNGOs can be divided into two types. One focuses on the environment in 
which the GNGO grows, the other tends to look at how they operate.  
Issues concerning the developmental environment for GNGOs mainly involve government 
influence, which have been discussed repeatedly. Due to double-sector supervision, harsh 
requirements, hindering competition, and the constrained location of the government regulations, 
some GNGOs are registered in industry and commerce government sectors, some build affiliation 
with GONGOs, and some just keep operating without any legal identity. The good news is that as long 
as those GNGOs do not work against the government, nothing happens even if they are unregistered. 
The actual space for China’s GNGOs is far larger than the institutional space (Yu, 2006). An interview 
of GNGO leaders in the fields of the environment, HIV/AIDS, and gay/lesbian rights (Hildebrandt, 








2011) explicitly showed that organizations that are less politically-sensitive (environment vs. 
HIV/AIDS or gay/lesbian), further from Beijing, older, or larger are more likely to register. The 
interview also suggested that local government may prefer GNGOs to remain unregistered. Politically 
unregistered GNGOs are easier to control because they occupy a legal grey area, and economically 
the economic resources from the central government will have to go through the local government 
first if the sponsored GNGOs remain unregistered.  
Views of GNGO operation are quite similar to those presented in the theory of voluntary failure. 
Zhu (2006) suggests that China’s GNGOs are facing a shortage of high quality staff although they 
might be devoted; of funding, even though they do not need much; of trust from both the public and 
among the members; and of professional knowledge, technique and development strategy. The trust 
crisis is caused by many issues, such as low efficiency, unclear effect, low transparency (these are 
similar to GONGOs), unstable personnel, an extreme governance style that is either too relax or too 
dictatorial46, selfish motivations for engagement, the path dependence of Chinese who are used to 
accepting governmental service, and so forth (Lu, 2008). It is also worth noting that these 
embarrassments of GNGOs are to some extent the side effects of government regulations. For 
example, when GNGO development is seriously restricted by government, little career future can be 
seen, and thus many candidates might ultimately choose jobs in other sectors, resulting in instable 
personnel. 
In a nutshell, China’s GNGOs share some problems faced by other sectors, but at a more serious 
level. A combination of corporatism and voluntary failure describes their state. 
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3.3 Educational NGOs (ENGOs) 
Narrowing the review from China’s NGOs to China’s ENGOs, we are able to further the discussion 
with specific examples, but nevertheless, the meso-level conclusion stays the same— voluntary 
failure, corporatism, and NGO interactions describe the state of China’s ENGOs. 
3.3.1 NGO Functions in Education 
The NGO contribution is generally to respond to the market/government failure, as discussed in 
this section more specifically. Jia (2004) from the Tsinghua NGO Research Center summarizes four 
functions of NGOs on education that are applicable to practices in China. The first function, and also 
the most straightforward, involves financial aid. The second function is non-financial service. This is a 
vast category, including support such as voluntary teaching, book donation, vocational training, law 
consultancy, information support, and so on. The third function is to provide suggestions for and 
reflections on education. Organizations like the 21st Century Education Research Institute and the Tao 
Xingzhi Institute are working on topics such as the educational institution required by China. The 
Blue Book of Education (annual report on China’s education) is produced by the 21st Education 
Research Institute, “A popular storehouse of wisdom” (He, 2006). 
In addition to the three above functions, Jia (2004) also suggests that China’s ENGOs should have 
a role not only in service but also in supervising and urging47 both the government and the market 
to fulfill their responsibility for educational development. Currently NGOs, especially GONGOs, 
cannot do much about this in China. 
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3.3.2 Educational NGOs in the World 
“One of the clearest impacts of globalization upon education has been the increasing 
prominence of civil society organizations in the provision of schooling around the world” (Sutton & 
Arnove, 2004). Current studies on this topic are mainly about government-NGO interaction.  
Presenting eight case studies in eight countries48, Sutton and Arnove (2004) raise the question 
“civil society or shadow state?” for ENGOs around the world. The interaction between government 
and NGO has been shown in several forms. In regions where the government is relatively weak and 
unstable, NGOs have either preceded effective state intervention in educational provision at all levels 
or have substituted where the state is unable or unwilling to act. At some point when NGOs become 
too closely identified with the state, however, their own legitimacy is undermined. They almost 
invariably have to form some type of partnership with the state if they wish to expand or “go to 
scale”, and their activities are less progressive, and do not attempt to touch topics like democracy or 
human rights directly. There does not seem to be a big difference between China and the rest of the 
developing world in terms of the government-NGO relationship. 
3.3.3 Educational GNGOs in China 
In China, only 3% of NGOs are ENGOs, while a comparative study of twenty two nations shows 
that ENGOs are the most active and leading NGOs in most nations49. ENGOs in China are receiving 
increasing attention however, and, as a less-controversial type of NGO, they face relatively small 
barriers. On 27th August 2004, the “NGOs and the Development of Chinese Education” symposium 
was held in Beijing, which for the first time highlighted the terms “education” and “NGO” as well as 
the connection between them (He, 2006). This section will briefly introduce the status quo of China’s 
educational GNGOs, setting the context for the micro-level review in the next section. 
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Although China’s ENGOs are overall less developed than other NGOs, its grassroots NGOs 
actually face a relatively friendly policy environment. For instance, in the province of Yunnan, over 70% 
of registered GNGOs are for education50.  
Xiaoyan Liang (2009) summarizes the state and problems of seven types of Chinese grassroots 
ENGOs51. The first kind is for policy advocacy, and lead up-to-date policy discussion on education. For 
example, the 21st Century Educational Research Institute was working on policy for school 
construction as a response to school safety issues revealed by two recent earthquakes in China52. 
This kind of GNGOs is new to China. Their bottle neck is the lack of professional researchers. 
The second, and also the largest, group of educational GNGOs is for designing and providing 
multiple educational resources. They are involved in a huge range of topics such as the perseverance 
of tradition, cultivation of democracy, art, mental health, personal financial management, life 
appreciation, and so forth. The main problem of these GNGOs is that they are usually small, 
scattered and less organized, which makes it difficult for them to receive wider support from society 
or exert a wider influence. 
The third group is about supporting educational careers. These GNGOs offer training for teachers, 
principals and school managers on different topics using diverse techniques. Just like the first group, 
this kind of GNGO is still too new to offer sophisticated services. They face problems regarding 
resources, public relations, and recruiting professional staff. It is hard to evaluate their performance.  
The fourth type of educational GNGO is for voluntary educational support. This is another huge 
and influential group, including organizations that go to the rural schools for educational support and 
those using the internet to share relevant information with other organizations or individuals. The 
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detailed activities could be a mixture of financial support, material support, short/long term teaching, 
household visits, field surveys and so on. They may sometimes be overlapped with organizations for 
multiple educational resources. While these GNGOs are relatively mature and influential, they may 
not have a concrete theme for their activities and their operations are usually less organized. They 
are also over-reliant on volunteers, a group that is not stable as a full time group, which makes these 
organizations less sustainable. The Lighthouse organization belongs to this group. 
The fifth group are schools founded by NGOs, funded by charitable foundations, and aimed at 
children from vulnerable groups. These GNGOs are still new but have great potential for 
development since there are many children in need of this kind of schools (e.g. migrant children) in 
China. Whether the schools are really nonprofit is uncertain in the eyes of many people. Many of 
these schools are still in search of an appropriate operational institution, and they have a shortage of 
qualified teachers. 
The sixth is called the socialized learning group. These NGOs are based on the specific interests 
of small groups and are attractive to youth and white collar workers. People can even tell their 
specialty from their names, such as ‘Science Squirrel Club’ and ‘Learn to be Parents’. They are small 
in number and their effects are unknown yet, but they are very easily spread among people of 
similar interests.  
The last group of educational GNGOs is private educational foundations. Unlike most other 
educational GNGOs, this category has less worry about legal identity, and they have enough funding 
to ensure healthy operation as well as a higher reputation among the public. The largest issue for 
them is determining how to help to cultivate more educational GNGOs.  
The problems of voluntary failure can easily be identified for Chinese education GNGOs. One 
example is the early development of Western Sunshine Action, a famous Beijing-based GNGO that 
belongs to both the third and fourth type of groups. At the beginning this project could barely attract 




donors. They sent students from Beijing’s elite universities to offer training to local teachers in 
western China, but the feedback they received was disappointing, mainly because the students were 
either not professional or were too theory-oriented. Some graduate students joined this program at 
the expense of their own studies and research, leading to the question of cost-benefit to both 
individual and society (Jiang, 2004). 
In recent years, leading educational GNGOs have become more organized. In November 2009, 
the first conference of leading Chinese educational GNGOs was held in Beijing, and covered a vast 
range of topics including conventional ones such as existing problems and more cutting edge topics 
such as how to make the internet work for charity53. Only eight days later, another more local forum 
was held in the southern city Shenzhen, which included more detailed issues such as programs for 
migrant children and early education. The local government educational bureau, GONGOs and some 
INGOs from Hong Kong were also invited to that forum to share their new developments. In 
December 2011, the second conference of Chinese educational GNGOs was held in Guangzhou. In 
comparison with the first one in Beijing, this conference included more specific topics such as project 
design and monitoring54. 
In the field of education, in fact, both INGOs and GONGOs play a more positive role in the 
development of GNGOs. According to Liang (in Yang, 2010: 132-141), Education INGO activities since 
the mid-1990s have brought ideas, methods and financial support for development to Chinese 
GNOGs; and the dissemination effect of Project Hope turned the public’s attention to rural and poor 
regions and built the foundation for the rise of GNGOs. 
There are two more remarkable updates to China’s educational GNGOs. One is the establishment 
of ambitious foundations that are connected to large enterprises. New Huadu Foundation was the 
first example of it. In October 2009 Fashu Chen, the chairman of the Newhuadu Industrial Group, 
promised to donate 8.3 billion RMB to establish this foundation, with a concentration on education. 
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Followed by a series of accounting scandals, New Huadu’s promise has not been well realized. On the 
other hand, Foundations back by Internet giants like Alibaba and Tencent are getting more influential, 
though their operating fields are not confined to education.   
The second remarkable update to China’s educational GNGO, is the use of media, especially the 
internet. Online civil society is hardly new for the Chinese (Yang, 2009), starting in 2003 with the 
outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), but it is only very recently that activists have 
begun to use the internet to broadcast their action rather than simply expose social issues. The Free 
Lunch is a case in point. Initiated by a journalist named Fei Deng (邓飞) in March 2011, this project 
helps rural kids to get free school lunches. With the professional assistance of other journalists (e.g. 
in disseminating touching project photos) and China’s Twitter, the Weibo (微博), the project soon 
spread across the nation, speeding up the central government’s promise of universal rural free 
lunches.  
 
3.4 Grassroots NGOs for China’s Rural Education: Lighthouse 
So far, the discussion has moved from theory to practice, and within practice from China’s NGOs 
to its ENGOs. This section will narrow to GNGOs for China’s rural education. As listed by the Rural 
China Education Foundation (RCEF), there are currently over 50 well known non-GONGOs working in 
China’s rural education development, about half GNGOs55. Programs provided by these NGOs touch 
all contemporary challenges to China’s rural education56.  
More specifically, this section is going to introduce the first name on the RCEF list, the Lighthouse 
Project (Lighthouse). Although there are journal articles (e.g. Zhu, 2004; Tang & Zhu, 2007) 
mentioning this organization, they are very brief or include incorrect information. Zhu (2008) has a 
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book chapter introducing Lighthouse, which is so far the best reference in academia. In this review, I 
examine the more original sources, including the Lighthouse Brochure (Lighthouse, 2009) and The 
Strategy Evaluation of Lighthouse (Lighthouse, 2004). The latter is a comprehensive report. 
3.4.1 Origin and Theme 
Compared with other parts of China, the southern province of Guangdong is rich and open, but 
has serious within-region inequity. Combined with a tradition of not placing much value on schooling, 
the educational development in Guangdong’s rural regions lags far behind that in metropolitan 
regions, such as the Pearl River Delta. The wealth of some Cantonese allows them to spare time for 
voluntary service, and the urban-rural gap in education offers a good topic to work on. In this context, 
Lighthouse was born.  
Lighthouse was established in March 2001 by a group of middle class businessmen and college 
students in the city of Guangzhou. It aims to nurture student interests and ambitions in study and life. 
It works on Mental Poverty Alleviation (精神扶贫), or in a more familiar name the socio-emotional 
support. 
The organization sends volunteers, who are mostly college students, to rural areas for informal 
teaching, encouraging communication between college students and rural communities. Regarding 
their core idea of “Destination Guides the Way” (方向引领一生), there are four consensuses within 
Lighthouse. Students need to have goals in their life. It should be the students themselves who 
decide their direction (destination), and volunteers are only there to help inspire these pursuits. It 
does not matter whether the students finally obtain their own goal, but there should at least be a 







While Lighthouse as a whole is an organization with formal structure, it is chiefly characterized by its 
teams working in separate rural middle schools in northwest Guangdong and neighboring provinces, so 
there is not only macro-level departmentalization of the whole Lighthouse, but also micro-level work 
divisions of its teams in rural schools. 
Lighthouse’s macro departmentalization can be regarded as a triangle, with the Guangzhou office 
(the Secretariat), college network and team network on the three apexes. The Guangzhou office takes 
care of daily administrative work, training, monitoring, and public relations. The college network divides 
volunteers according to the universities they come from, and the team network divides volunteers 
according to the rural schools they serve.  
Within team divisions, there are typically only 15 to 20 new volunteers per team, but the work 
division can be rigid. Similar to the macro departmentalization, there are two tracks of work division in a 
team. One is divided by place—the class. Assuming there is an 18-person team (usually with one or two 
former volunteers) serving 120 students, the students would be divided into four classes, each class 
having four volunteers as supervisors for assisting the students to create their own class styles. All 
volunteers except the team leader and former volunteers work as supervisors. The other means of 
division is by process. A typical division is instruction, supply, and public relation, as shown in Table 3-1. 
 
 
Role  Sub Role Task 
Team leader —— Decision making and coordination 
Instruction Head Heading the instruction arrangement 




 Secretary team Dealing with paperwork and assisting  in decision making 
 Interest team Setting the schedule for extracurricular interest groups 
 Librarian Managing the books brought to the students 




Support Head Heading the support arrangement 
 Medicare Medical care for volunteers and students 
 Budget Manage the team budget 
 Material Providing and managing material for daily life and 
instruction 
Public Relations Head Heading public relations 
 Outside Communication with local governors, teachers, 
well-known persons and neighbor volunteer groups if any 
 Inside Maintains a friendly working environment inside the team 
(actually not public relations) 
Former 
Volunteer 
—— Supervising and assisting the team work, maintaining 
connection with former lighthouse students 




Between 2001 and 2012, Lighthouse has organized over two thousand college students and 
some in-job personnel to undertake voluntary teaching in thirteen rural schools, eleven of them 
middle schools (Figure 3-2), spread throughout the rural areas of Zhaoqing and Qingyuan in 
Guangdong province, and Guangxi and Hunan provinces. During these twelve years, the total service 
time the service time adds up to 735,000 hours, with over 6300 rural children assisted. 
The majority of Lighthouse volunteers are college students from universities in Guangdong 
province; they are trained to undertake volunteer teaching at assigned rural middle schools during 
the summer or winter vacation. Every year there will be about 150 new volunteers serving in 6 to 8 
schools. After that, they can keep contact with the place in which they served, or further their 
connection with Lighthouse by becoming a staff member—every member of the Lighthouse staff was 
first a volunteer. The organization is well known for its comprehensive training system, its emphasis 
on psychosocial support rather than material support, and the strong independence of its team 






Note: Qinglian, Damaishan, Macha and Pinglong middle schools are in minority region; Activities in Qinglian and Macha 
middle schools are cooperation projects with international NGO. 
 
Lighthouse’s formal activities include summer/winter programs, the golden-week57 revisit, 
long-term school programs and teacher training, and daily projects in its Guangzhou office. 
The major Lighthouse activity is voluntary teaching in summer and winter vacations. The 
program period is one month in summer vacation, and seven to ten days in winter vacation. Courses 
are usually divided into two parts: indoor classes and outdoor activities. Indoor classes include 
science, environment protection, English, music, art, psychological counseling and so on. Outdoor 
activities involve military training, household visits, games, team building, and student interest 
groups and so on. Class construction and student supervision are also important components of the 
activity. Volunteers divide students into different classes, let them create names, slogans, songs and 
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institutions for the classes and provide them with team-based projects. In terms of student affairs, 
most volunteers will visit student families, collect and arrange student files, or serve as psychological 
consultants for some students (relevant background required).  
In the golden-week holidays of National Day or Labor Day, each volunteer team organizes former 
or newly enrolled non-student volunteers to return to the sites, and invite potential donors or people 
interested in Lighthouse activities to take part in short-term activities such as seminars, small class 
teaching, household visit, or field surveys. 
Lighthouse also engages with long-term school programs and teacher training. Long-term school 
programs include building up and maintaining student libraries, setting up student organizations, 
compiling student journals, and enhancing the communication between Lighthouse and local schools, 
as well as government officials. A long-term project could last for up to five years. By means of 
programs such as ‘Lectures into Countryside’, or the ‘Small Fund for Excellent Teachers’, Lighthouse 
also tries to create the chances and circumstances for education reform for rural teachers, so as to 
push forward the development of rural education practically. 
The final category of activities is the daily work done by the Guangzhou office, such as website 
maintenance, information management, project designs, fundraising, training, and public relations.  
3.4.3 The Growth of Lighthouse 
The growth of Lighthouse could be roughly divided into two stages. 
Establishment and Transition: March 2001 to September 200358 
In March 2001, Lighthouse’s founders organized the first countryside investigation and chose 
Qiaotou Middle School and Yonggu Middle School in Huaiji, Zhaoqing, as the first two volunteer 
teaching schools. They recruited the first team from the South China University of Technology (SCUT) 
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and Sun Yat-sen University. After a set of instructions and team training, they conducted the first 
wave of Lighthouse programs.  
During the winter of that year, the second round of Lighthouse programs were held in Qiaotou, 
Yonggu, Longpu and Dengcun Middle School. Later the Lighthouse members established a standard 
recruitment procedure that has been used ever since. The organization also expanded its activities to 
Pinglong Middle School in Xindu of Guangxi Province. 
In 2002 and 2003, Lighthouse went through several crises —some members cast doubt on the 
‘purity’ of the organization due to the business backgrounds of some founder, so non-student 
Lighthouse members had to temporarily quit. In March 2002, volunteers in Yonggu Middle School 
were in conflict with the school and were forced to move to Xinxing Elementary School in a nearby 
village. Two months later, the volunteer teaching in Longpu Middle School and Renyi Middle schools 
was also rejected. After these events people in Lighthouse became aware that maintaining a good 
relationship with local schools is essential for Lighthouse’s survival. In September, professional social 
worker Bai Jin (金白) helped set up the departments of instruction, brand, and human resources, but 
at the same time the Lange Company, a NGO Bai Jin worked for, ended their partnership with 
Lighthouse, resulting in a serious budget deficit. The new team leader later prompted an institutional 
reform, but failed. Two of the leaders, Bai Jin and Panther, left over a disagreement about 
development strategy. The rest had to cancel the 2002 winter program. The organization was almost 
killed by budget problems, failed reform and then SARS. SARS meant that it was forbidden to have 
public events for several months and Lighthouse in fact did not have a full team to operate those 
events.  
Nevertheless, the organization survived. Some former volunteers donated to the organization 
and helped to collect funding through yard sales. The first Lighthouse Instruction Booklet was 
finished in this period, and the college network was added into the old “secretary-volunteer team” 




Consolidation, Expansion, and Registration: October 2003 to the present 
From March to August in 2004, Lighthouse developed its fifth cohort of volunteer teachers with 
three new schools, including Shidong Middle School in Zhaoqing, Damaishan Middle School and 
Baiwan Middle School in Qingyuan. The first comprehensive collection of volunteer teaching 
experiences was completed in this period. Right after the summer program, Lighthouse composed its 
comprehensive strategy evaluation. In November of the same year, it participated in the rural 
education forum held by the educational GNGO Tianxiaxi (天下溪). This was the first time the 
organization officially got in touch with other Chinese GNGOs.  
Lighthouse’s first Volunteer Representative Conference (VRC) was held in December 2004, 
followed by the sixth wave of volunteer teaching, adding Gansa Middle School in Zhaoqing to its list. 
The organization experienced a fruitful 2005. It presented its first documentary ‘Those Flowers’, 
which was shown as a part of an exhibition in different places. The first official booklet of Volunteer 
Teaching was distributed to new volunteers, and a new mechanism was set to encourage each 
Lighthouse team to build and maintain their own program styles. The teams began to develop their 
team-specific trainings and compose their own handbooks. In July, training aimed at local teachers 
from Lighthouse schools was jointly held by Lighthouse, the Non-governmental Development Center 
of South China, and Guangdong Lions Club (GLC). In that summer, Macha Middle School in northern 
Hunan province was added to the list. The voluntary teaching in this school was a joint program by 
Lighthouse and GLC. 
In March 2006, the second Lighthouse VRC was held, which marked the establishment of 
planning and supervision protocols. A series of activities for Lighthouse’s fifth anniversary was 
launched in the same year. 
Lighthouse then cooperated with the Decathlon Foundation in promoting rural school sports in 
200759, and with Oxfam Hong Kong on popularizing developmental education in 2008. In the summer 
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of 2008, the organization expanded its programs to nine schools. In that year it also cooperated with 
The Boys’ & Girls’ Clubs Association of Hong Kong to start activities in Yangshan, Qingyuan. 
In 2011, Lighthouse presented a series of activities celebrating its 10th anniversary. In December 
of the same year, it co-organized the second conference of Chinese educational GNGOs in 
Guangzhou, receiving leaders from over 200 GNGOs across the nation. To ensure in-depth and stable 
service, they incubated new ideas such as long-term boarding volunteers, curriculums that are totally 
tailored to local communities, and a three year cooperation contract with each school. 
3.4.4 Developmental Issues 
During the 2004 Strategy Evaluation, the writing group conducted a brainstorming session to list 
the issues faced by Lighthouse, which can be classified into seven points. Most still apply to today’s 
Lighthouse although things have changed in a positive direction.  
The first issue is the instability of the management group. Lighthouse is in need of a group of 
people who can devote themselves for longer periods to the organization. This team should be able 
to decide on a long-term strategy, and it should have the leadership to gather Lighthouse members 
to work on the plans. Note that this is about teams rather than individuals. Lighthouse experienced 
paternalism in its early years, which made the members sensitive to individual power. In 2005 the 
organization had its first full-time staff, who was mostly team leaders when working as volunteers— 
and a stable management group became possible. 
The second issue involves organizational structure. Most college volunteers graduated and then 
left. Even though the Lighthouse management group is stable and strong, no one can guarantee 
stability of its front-line volunteer groups. The annual Volunteer Representative Conference is a way 
to maintain the volunteer network, but currently Lighthouse’s organizational structure remains 




The third issue is funding and the fourth is having a legal NGO identity. The organization is 
cautious about donations. This is a wise policy for maintaining “purity”, but the result is that 
Lighthouse has to give up potential company donations. Even now volunteers still need to pay for 
most things by themselves during their voluntary teaching. In terms of the identity problem, while 
the organization has been officially recognized by the governmental media60, it had run without 
appropriate legal identity for over ten years, which in return impeded the further development of 
the organization (e.g. grant application) and made it vulnerable to crisis. The first secretary, Bai Jin, 
tried his best to ensure that Lighthouse would not die in its early ages. He then resigned to continue 
his own company. The second secretary, Siqing Yan (焉四清), helped set up today’s Lighthouse 
institution, but still cannot achieve registration. Instead, he led Lighthouse affiliates to a research 
institution at Sun Yat-sen University, so the organization could have a temporary identity. He also 
then resigned for the sake of his own career. The third secretary, Ning Gan (甘宁), chose a difficult 
path—she registered Lighthouse with the Guangzhou Industry and Commerce Bureau. In 2011, the 
“Uncle Kun (坤叔)” incident opened a policy window for NGO registration in Guangdong. Uncle Kun 
was an old man trying to register his educational GNGO for the sixth time. Yang Wang (汪洋) the 
Secretary of provincial Party committee noticed his story and sent out commands to loosen the 
restrictions. Lighthouse finally got registered with the Civil Affairs Bureau in 2012, eleven years after 
its establishment.  
The fifth issue concerns competition and cooperation with other ENGOs. As mentioned above, 
Lighthouse has been accepted by local governments, and it also has programs with INGOs from Hong 
Kong, however there is a worry within the management group that Lighthouse might lose its 
independence during competition/cooperation. It may become sub-organization of well-developed 
NGOs, or its operation may become similar to other ENGOs, thereby losing its appeal to potential 
members. If the “Go-to-the-Countryside” project duplicates Lighthouse’s mode of operation, for 
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instance, then, with its strong governmental background, it would recruit many college students who 
could otherwise be Lighthouse members.  
The sixth issue is culture. Lighthouse’s organizational culture is open and casual. The advantage is 
that this culture results in high efficiency of communication across the Lighthouse networks. The 
disadvantage is that individual messages that may threaten the organization, such as 
anti-government posts on its portal, could also spread quickly. Some members may not treat their 
works seriously in such an atmosphere. 
Last but not least, public relations with Lighthouse schools should never be ignored. In the 
Yonggu case, the volunteers gave local students a perception that their own teachers were worse 
than the volunteers, which threatened the reputation the local teachers and made their instructions 
to students much less acceptable than before. Puppy love among middle school students appeared 
to be a side effect of the volunteer’s open attitude towards each other. Unlike GONGOs which have 
strong governmental background or INGOs which have strong financial power, Lighthouse’s activities 
could easily be banned by schools or local officials, due simply to the lack of political tactics. On the 
other hand, as long as Lighthouse does not cause trouble, it is more advantageous than GONGO or 
INGO programs to the schools, not only because of its content, but because it does not lead to an 
extra administrative burden. In GONOG or INGO programs, the schools are usually required to 
cooperate on reception, recruitment, safety, etc., but for Lighthouse they only need to provide the 
site and facilities. 
3.4.5 Synthesis of Theory and State 
 Lighthouse offers a solid confirmation of the reviews of theory and state, which boil down to 
two key terms: voluntary failure and corporatism. Lighthouse has experienced all types of voluntary 
failure, such as budget shortages, inner conflicts, unstable and unprofessional personnel, unskillful 




has played with the corporatism of the Chinese government. It did not register with the Civil Affairs 
Bureau until 2012. Even after registration, to minimize government intervention, Lighthouse’s 
traditional programs are separated from the registered wing of the “Lighthouse Youth Development 
Association”, which is mainly in charge of fundraising and public relations. So far the grey identity has 
not brought problems, but the organization will be vulnerable to any change of policy environment.  
On the other hand, it is worth pointing out two encouraging lessons from Lighthouse. Time 
makes a difference. Before 2004, either inner crisis (e.g. budget and management crisis) or policy 
change (e.g. activity ban during SARS) could have stifled the organization in the cradle, but in today, 
although some problems still exist, they are no longer potentially fatal. A GNGO just needs time to 
increase its capacity and reputation. The content of service might be important. As mentioned earlier, 
many groups that can be categorized as GNGOs or INGOs are also undertaking “voluntary teaching”, 
but so far they have not challenged the status of Lighthouse. When compared to average voluntary 
teachings, Lighthouse has an advantage in its training system, program intensity, community 










Chapter 4 Research Design and Data Collection 
The previous chapters introduced the context for the two research questions, “What are the 
PCED determinants for lower secondary students in rural Guangdong province?” and “How does the 
Lighthouse program affect PCED by increasing certain subjective factor(s)?”, and reviewed the 
literature related to these two topics. My research will enrich the existing literature by exploring a 
comprehensive list of determinants, paying more attention to the schooling track, focusing on a 
location that has not yet been thoroughly researched, applying newer data to the four-option 
education decision, and investigating the subtle relationships between GNGO activity, subjective 
factors, and PCED.  
This chapter will explain the methodology and data in detail. It starts with a discussion of the 
theoretical framework and methodological challenges, then presents the qualitative method of the 
Delphi survey, plus its results, which will serve as the input to quantitative methods. It explains how I 
will conduct multinomial logit (MNL) to answer Question 1, and propensity score matching (PSM) to 
answer Question 2. Since this research uses firsthand data, there will be three additional sections 
devoted to survey design and data collection, missing data, and variable construction. The chapter 
ends with a synthesis of the research components. 
 
4.1 Theoretical Framework and Methodological Challenges 
As described in Chapter 2, the standard neoclassical framework in family economics (Becker, 
1981) can be used to explain PCED. Rural households select the PCED that maximizes their expected 
utility, subject to income constraints, human capital constraints, credit constraints and test score 
constraints (for AHS only). Assuming the standard assumptions are all satisfied, the parsimonious 
form of household utility function will be: 




That is, in a household with n  children, the PCED depends on total consumption X  and the 
children’s utility function, given the PCED they choose. Here k  indexes the four PCED alternatives. 
Complications can be added to reflect the roles of determinants raised by previous studies.61 By 
including the student’s own utility, this function considers parental altruism. Lower secondary 
students are old enough to have their own points of view. Parents either respect the child’s decision, 
or take into account the child’s future prosperity, which may not be transferred to the household. 
The household members work together to decide on a PCED that maximizes U .  
For simplification, one can narrow the function to a single child i , assuming the complete 
altruism of the parents. 
( , )ik i kU U C A  
Here, 
iC  and kA  respectively stand for the case-specific and alternative-specific factors. 
Lighthouse is supposed to influence the PCED by altering the subjective factors in 
iC . Since some of 
the PCED determinants are heterogeneous to other determinants or highly correlated with each 
other, 
iC  and kA  should not be completely separated. Figure 4-1 illustrates this PCED process. 
The standard theory has limited meaning unless we find a way to measure utility. For PCED, what 
was known is the importance of treating utility as the function of a comprehensive list of 
variables—in the PCED study for Britain, Yang (2008) found that the prediction of VHS choice is very 
sensitive to student background compared with the cases for other PCED. Since we have no parallel 
study for China, it is advisable to then be concerned with the completeness of variables, to try 
getting a full list of potential PCED determinants in modeling. This turns out to be the major 
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Note: Student health only appeared as a performance determinant in literature. High school (especially VHS) quality has 
been frequently mentioned, but not rigorously measured. 
 
For Question (2), the major challenge is selection bias. It is up to the students to participate in 
the Lighthouse program, thus students taking the program could be very different to their 
non-participating peers. For example, they may be more socially oriented, or free from housework. 
Those differences can affect the choice of PCED, so it is inappropriate to measure Lighthouse impact 
by simply comparing the participating group with the non-participating group. Even controlling for an 
extensive list of variables cannot fully address this problem — it makes little sense to suggest an 
effect by comparing students who will surely participate with those who are unlikely to participate in 
the program, which is like weighing the value of living on a coral reef for ocean fish compared to 
freshwater fish. The ideal comparison would be made between students with the same propensity 
for participation.  
4.2. to 4.4 presents three groups of methods that can together handle the methodological 
challenges to the research questions.  
 




4.2 Delphi Survey as Qualitative Input to the Quantitative Design 
Quantitative methods test assumptions and offers precise measurements, but they are less 
capable of answering questions like, ‘Are we able to identify all the potential PCED determinants?’ or 
‘Do we have enough factors that matter for the propensity of Lighthouse participation?’ In some 
quantitative works, the list of variables is based on whatever list the first researcher happened to 
select (Leamer, 1983). Variable determination is the strength of qualitative methods. 
4.2.1 The Delphi Process 
The Delphi approach was chosen here as the qualitative wing. It was undertaken in 2011 to guide 
the questionnaire design before data collection, as well as to inform the causal interpretation after 
quantitative works. Delphi is an iterative process used to collect and distill the judgments of experts 
using a series of questionnaires interspersed with feedback (Skulmoski et al., 2007). It is mainly used 
for forecasting, but the idea has been applied to any process aimed at unified decisions. The Delphi 
experts are separated, and they will be informed of what others think without knowing who the 
others are, so that they can refine opinions and achieve a final consensus without authoritative 
pressure and geographical confinement. The Delphi results could be unstable due to their complex 
application. It is more time consuming, and it relies on how the coordinator (myself) is capable of 
articulating the research and summarizing the opinions objectively, as well as how seriously the 
experts engage.  
In June 2011, I gathered a panel of 17 experts on my research topics.62 They lived in fourteen 
cities of three countries (China, America, and Britain), with diverse backgrounds regarding career, 
knowledge structure, and PCED preference. I made use of the networks at Center on Chinese 
Education of Columbia University in New York, Institute for Civil Society of Sun Yat-sen University in 
Guangzhou, and of course Lighthouse to locate and reach these experts. Figure 4-2 shows the 
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composition of these experts, in which a higher score for an item means that on average the panel 
members had a higher self-rating for that item. The representiveness of Delphi experts can affect the 
quality of Delphi results, especially their external validity. On the other hand, it is acceptable to have 
a less all-around panel since this research intentionally targets an area that was not well covered by 
literature, and that the second research question requires a good proportion of Cantonese panel 
members familiar with Lighthouse programs. Overall, the panel members tend to identify themselves 














It is worth mentioning that, although there is a mean preference of AHS> VHS> Work> Dropout, 
more than half the respondents added in the comment section that they could not make confident 
recommendations without having adequate background information. Such caution highlights the fact 
that PCED is hardly a simple process. 
From July to September 2011, the panel members were surveyed via email in three rounds. For 
example: In the first round, I asked each to suggest five major determinants of the schooling track 
decision, to grade them in the 1-10 range, and to offer any extra explanation or comment; in the 




second round, I summarized their answers and asked them to grade the suggestions and to respond 
to the judgments, explanations, and comments; in the third round, they were asked to again grade 
those suggestions of high average scores and wide view divergence (half the items selected), and to 
respond again to the new judgments, explanations, and comments. The same process was also used 
to identify and rank the determinants of Dropout and Work.  
4.2.2 Delphi Results 
There are three Delphi results that can assist not only the quantitative design but also the 
interpretation of empirical results. First and most importantly, 46 potential PCED determinants and 
14 characteristics of Lighthouse program participants were identified (Table 4-1). The top four 
potential PCED determinants according to panel members are family income, parental attitudes 
toward different decisions, high school cost, and whether parents are migrant workers. I exclude 
“academic performance” and “school-weary”. Both were considered exceptionally influential in the 
second round, and I therefore used them as a dependent variable in the third round and found that 
they could be explained by other determinants. Without Delphi, this study might have missed some 
regional specific variables - over one third of the suggested determinants did not appear in literature. 
On the other hand, these PCED determinants are still within the classification system generated by 
the literature review. The determinants of program participation are mostly intuitive. Among them, 
ambition, curiosity, extroversion and the need of affiliation are related to personality, suggesting a 


















Agricultural income Student attitude towards urban life Academic performance 
Availability of family business 
for inheritance 
Class size Ambition 
Birth order Development of local entertainment 
industry, e.g. internet bar, disco 
Attitude towards housework/farm 
work 
Connection between 
curriculum and real life 
Distance to high schools Attitude towards study 
Cost of high school Family income Availability of other activities, e.g. 
visiting cities 
Friends' PCED Father's migrant status Curiosity 
Gender Housework/farm work burden Distance to the school 
Governmental investment Outreach of nonlocal enterprises in 
the community 
Extraversion 
Health status of household 
member 
Outreach of VHS in the community Housework/farm work burden 
Historical PCED distribution in 
the school 
Parental education Need of Affiliation 
Interpersonal relationship in 
the school 
Parental marriage age Number of friends /relatives with 
Lighthouse experience 
Mother's migrant status Parent attitudes towards the PCED Parent attitudes to Lighthouse 
Number of siblings Parent PCEDs Previous Lighthouse experience 
Perception of AHS-VHS gap Perception of college cost Size of surrounding migrant 
network 
Perception of earning by PCED 
in the community 
Perception of job opportunity by 
PCED in the community 
  
Rate of admission to colleges 
in nearby AHS 
Perception of personal interest-high 
school education linkage 
  
Rate of admission to colleges 
in nearby VHS 
Relative's involvement in 
gambling/illegal lottery 
  
Teacher education level Reputation of surrounding VHS   
Teacher experience School violence   
Teacher's attitude towards 
each PCED 
School work burden   
Teacher's care of students Schooling related fees, e.g. meals, 
transportation 
  
Teacher's sense of 
responsibility 
School's hardware capacities   
Urban life experience Whether both parents migrated   
a. The determinants are alphabetically presented. In the first round, all members were asked to suggest the top 5 PCED 
determinants. In the second round, they were asked to rate the 46 PCED determinants collected from the first round. In the 
third round, they were asked to rate again the 23 PCED determinants of both large average score and view divergence, 
listed in the first column. The other PCED determinants are listed in the second column. 
b. PCED determinants that have not been directly included in literature are underscored. 
c. In the second round, both “academic performance” and “school-weary” are considered highly influential for the PCED. I 
therefore used them as dependent variable in the third round, excluded from this list. 





The second valuable Delphi result is a list of possible program outcomes. I calculated 25 potential 
Lighthouse impacts, 20 on students and five on schools and communities, shown in Figure 4-3. They 
will be helpful for explaining the mechanism of Lighthouse impact. They also confirm the logical 
framework where subjective factors will channel Lighthouse intervention to affect PCED. 
Socio-emotional characteristics such as confidence and courage are uniformly believed to be 
important and well-realized in the programs.  
 
Figure 4-3 Suggested Impacts of the Lighthouse Program 
 
Note: For both importance and realization, the ratings range from 1 to 10 for totally disagree to totally agree. Bubble 
diameter indicates the divergence of views. It is the mean of the “standard deviation divided by mean” for importance and 
realization. Smaller bubbles means better consensus. Detailed data is in Appendix C1. 
 
Finally, the Delphi survey generates a decent collection of opinions and debates over PCED and 
socio-emotional support. For example, there are intense debates over whether school fees and 




advantages of different PCED. This collection will be retained for causal discussions after the 
quantitative analyses. They are included in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In short, the Delphi survey contributes to this study by listing variables and interpretations that 
might be overlooked if researchers rely only on the literature. It is a qualitative input to the 
forthcoming quantitative analyses.  
4.2.3 (In)accuracy of the Delphi Results 
 Although Delphi is the qualitative wing of this study, it is implemented with an attempt to be 
more quantitative. Items (determinants or impacts) are given grades so they could be ranked, 
however it is notable that Delphi, like other qualitative designs, is not convincing enough when trying 
to provide measurement. 
Figure 4-4 shows an example of how those rankings could be misleading. The red line refers to 
the average ratings of 23 PCED determinants for the working decision, and the gray area expresses 
the divergence of views among the panel members, calculated as the 95% confidential intervals. The 
graph on the right ranks the determinants based on the ratings of the third round, and the graph on 
the left shows the ratings for the same series of determinants in the second round. We can see that 
the ranking changes, but the overall declining trend persists, which is a good thing, however it is less 
satisfying to see that the divergences have not narrowed from the second round to the third round, 










Figure 4-4 Sorting the Determinants for Choosing Work in the 2nd to 3rd Rounds 
 
 




It is thus more confident to suggest possible determinants/impacts from Delphi than to suggest 
which determinants/impacts are more influential. The latter is supposed to be better answered by 
quantitative design. 
 
4.3 Answering Question 1: Multinomial Logit 
Discrete choice models (DCM) are regressions used to predict the probabilities of the different 
possible outcomes of a categorically distributed dependent variable (here the PCED), given a set of 
independent variables. 11 of the 21 shortlisted studies in Table 2-1 employed DCM. Multinomial logit 
(MNL), conditional logit (CL) and nested logit (NL) were introduced in Chapter 2. After data 
exploration and field interviews, I decided to adopt the basic MNL.  
There are three reasons the advanced models are not practiced. Firstly, the summary statistics 
(Chapter 5) show that students and households have large variance in their views of alternative 
specific factors such as the direct cost and future reward of each PCED. Secondly, field interviews 
suggest that this variance is partially reasonable because, thanks to multiple government and social 




Thirdly, the summary statistics also tell us that most students/households are unaware of some of 
the alternative specific factors, such as the policy incentives for VHS. Such findings all point out that 
there is no real factor that can only vary by educational decision, and therefore models with special 
treatment for alternative-specific variables (e.g. CL and NL) are unnecessary in the case of this 
research.  
It can be predicted that there will only be a small number of students choosing dropout as 
expected their PCED (those expected to drop out may already have left school and thus not 
answering the questionnaire), leading to an imbalanced nested structure that is weak in supporting 
any statistical inference. NL is thus also unnecessary.  
















,  1,...,j m  
That is, the probability that the outcome for individual i  is alternative j depends on factors ix . 
m  equals 5 as we have 4 alternatives plus the situation of undecided. Based on local context, I 
made a little adjustment regarding the variables that will be used in the estimation of MNL. They can 
be divided into nine groups (1) gender, age and ethnicity, (2) parental background, (3) number of 
siblings and birth order, (4) peer, teacher, and school factors, (5) household economic status and 
credit constraints, (6) subjective factors, (7) health, (8) monetary costs and rewards, and (9) 
academic performance and other variables. Section 4.7 will explain how these variables are defined.  
Both relative-risk ratios (RRR) and marginal effects (ME) are calculated, but only RRR will be 

















gives the proportionate change in the relative risk of choosing alternative j  
rather than alternative 1 when irx changes by one unit.   


















p   is a probability weighted average of the l .  
In this study, the major independent variables will be the potential determinants from Delphi 
plus other suggested variables from the literature (a union of Table 2-2 and the first two columns of 
Table 4-1). My dependent variable has a value of 1 to 4 indicating students in the four decisions, and 
5 in the case of “undecided”. AHS is chosen as the baseline group for two reasons. Firstly, there is a 
satisfactory sample size for students choosing AHS (see Chapter 6). Secondly, from a policy 
perspective we would like to know more about how students decide between AHS and other options. 
The MNL output, in this study the RRR, will indicate how more or less likely the students are to end 
up with Dropout, Work, VHS or Undecided (compared with the AHS choice) as the values of potential 
determinants change, and whether these differences are statistically significant. 
MNL relies on the independence of the irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption that the relative 
probability of choosing between two alternatives is unaffected by the presence of additional 
alternatives. When using categorical variable, IIA tests are forbidden by Stata63, and therefore two 
measures are adopted to test the IIA assumption. The first is to change all variables into dummies 
and run the MNL plus IIA test. The other is to use multinomial probit for the main specification, and 
then compare its output with that of the MNL. If there is no big difference, we can expect that MNL 
is acceptable. It is worth mentioning that, due to the heavy computational burden when combined 
with multiple imputation, multinomial probit is not chosen as the main model. 
I then test the robustness of MNL by applying it to different samples and specifications, and 
examine how the regression results vary by gender, wealth and academic performance. Given the 
large variable list, I also visually compare the standardized coefficient and corresponding z scores in 
scatter graphs, which provide broader pictures of how different factors affect PCED. 
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 This research will not present other practices for regression with many predictor variables, like 
recursive model and step-up regression. The full-model MNL is not only for comparing the potential 
PCED determinants, but also for preparing the impact evaluation through showing if subjective 
factors remain influential when their possible determinants are in the same equation. If the 
subjective factors remain influential, then there is room left for socio-emotional supports to directly 
alter these factors. In the future, nevertheless, it is advisable to practice other regression forms to 
thoroughly examine specific PCED determinants. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, by applying MNL, this study does not treat PCED with an 
“order”. It is true that the length of schooling increases from dropout to AHS, but it would be 
arbitrary to claim that more education must be better for all students, especially when it comes to 
the comparison between VHS and AHS tracks. The research design has also considered the reality 
that not all students know their PCED, and placed an option of “undecided” on the student 
questionnaire. It is hard to assign an order for “undecided”. It is admitted, however, that continuing 
education is a “positive” decision when compared to dropout, work, or undecided.  
 
4.4 Answering Question 2: Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) matches units that have the same or similar propensities of 
treatment participation (
iD ) (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). By doing this, researchers can largely 
control for selection bias without facing the limitation of matching on many observed variables. 
Suppose the conditional independence assumption holds, then: 
( ) [ | ] [ 1| ]i i i i ip X E D X p D X    
The application of PSM runs as follows: firstly, run a logit or probit regression using a dummy 
variable for participation, (1= participation, 0 = otherwise) as dependent variable and potential 




the first research question for the selection of these determinants, or to be more straightforward the 
characters of the Lighthouse program participants known from Delphi (3rd column of Table 4-1), or to 
be more conservative, a combination of both with those possible program outcomes excluded. This 
study will use Delphi and the conservative specification, and will match only within schools with 
Lighthouse inventions. The measurements of the 14 characters are discussed in the last row of Table 
4-2. Some subjective factors will not be used for score calculation because some are also suggested 
as outcomes. More detailed discussion is available in Chapter 7. I then substitute the value of each 
variable for each student to the obtained equation. The result is a figure measuring the individual’s 
propensity for participation, namely the propensity score. After explorative analyses, outcomes 
worthy of further investigation will be identified, and more targeting variable lists for score 
calculation can be generated— based on the Monte-Carlo simulations, variables that are unrelated 
to the exposure but related to the outcome should always be included. The inclusion of these 
variables will increase the precision of the estimated exposure effect without increasing bias. In 
contrast, including variables that are related to the exposure but not the outcome at all will decrease 
the precision of the estimated exposure effect without decreasing bias (Brookhart et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, it is advisable to practice an adjusted specification based on variables that are closely 
related to outcome yet not fully unrelated to Lighthouse participation. 
To decide whether the obtained propensity score can be used, the premise is that at each value 
the distribution of observed covariates are the same in the treated and control groups. In other 
words, the specification for score calculation should allow us to find treated and control individuals 
with similar covariates, or “balance”. In practice, there are different tests for the balancing property 
(Lee, 2013). This study uses the “pscore” command in Stata, which divides treated and control 
individuals of the same average propensity scores into blocks for balance tests. If a covariate is not 
balanced for many blocks, it is suggested that the estimation be modified by adding interaction 




on just a few covariates that are believed to be important for the prediction, it is acceptable to keep 
them (Stuart, 2010).  
Another important requirement for PSM application is common support; there should be 
sufficient overlap of propensity scores between treated and untreated. Given the decent sample size 
and the fact that non-Lighthouse students largely outnumber Lighthouse students, common support 
is not going to be a problem for this study. 
 
Table 4-2 Instruments Related to Lighthouse Intervention 
 






Judgment of a list of statements: Categorized 




Time of participation: number 
Participation to the 2012 summer camp: 
Dummy 




Two groups of questions:  
1st, the volunteer’s background information 
and training participation;  
2nd, the volunteer’s perception on team 
operation (from totally disagree to strongly 
agree for 11 statements). Mean value would 
be taken for each team. 





Column 3 of Table 3) 
Academic performance: performance 
ranking and last semester’s exam score 
Attitude towards housework/farm work: 
Categorized from totally disagree to strongly 
agree 
Availability of other activities, e.g. visiting 
cities: Categorized on household’s agreement 
on different summer activities_ from totally 
disagree to strongly agree 
Distance to the school: commute time 
between school and home 
Housework/farm work burden: Time spent 
per day 
Number of friends /relatives with Lighthouse 
experience: Categorized_ best friends’ 
choice 
Parents’ attitude on Lighthouse: Categorized 
from totally agree to strongly disagree 
Previous Lighthouse experience_ Times of 
participation 
Size of surrounding migrant network: 
Categorized on popularity of migrant 
teenagers and job recruitment with the 
community_ from very popular to not sure 
Subjective factors (Ambition, Attitude 
towards study, Curiosity Extraversion, Need 
of Affiliation): Categorized from totally 
b8, b11, b12, b15, e1~62, 




disagree to strongly agree on relevant 
statements. These will not be used for score 
prediction because they can also be the 
treatment outcome.  
a. For pre-2012 volunteers, only background information is available. 
 
There are various ways to use this score, and this study will practice Nearest Neighborhood (NN) 
matching, Kernel matching, and Radius matching. For NN matching, a student in the control group is 
matched to a treated student based on the closest propensity score. More specifically, here I apply 
the single NN with replacement, in which a control case can be matched to multiple treated cases as 
long as it has the nearest propensity score. Single-with replacement matching yields less bias, but 
higher variance. NN could be very sensitive to imputations (discussed in section 4.6), especially when 
there is a relatively large control group. It is therefore predictable that NN results could be relatively 
unstable, making it a way to screen the outcome variables. If we find a large and statistically 
significant treatment effect for an outcome in different imputations, we may further investigate that 
outcome using Kernel and Radius matching.  
Kernel Matching uses the weighted averages of all students in the control group to estimate 
counterfactual outcomes (Heckman, Ihimura & Todd, 1998). The weight is calculated by the 
propensity score distance between a treatment case and all control cases. I will use a narrow 
bandwidth of 0.03 for Epanechnikov Kernel matching. Smaller bandwidth gives smaller bias but 
larger variance, and vice versa. Finally, radius matching allows a tolerance level in the maximum 
propensity score distance, the caliper, and matches all the individuals in the control group within that 
caliper (Cochran & Rubin, 1973). In this study I use a caliper of 0.08. Since in this study the control 
group is supposed to be much larger than the treatment group, radius matching with the smaller 
caliper should be more trustworthy when the three types of matching yield different results. 
This study also makes a small adjustment in 
iD  to measure both the short- and mid-term 
Lighthouse impacts. I run two waves of PSM. In the first wave the treatment group only includes 
student who were involved in the past summer, while in the second wave the treatment group 




There are two challenges to my PSM application. The first challenge involves the calculation of 
the propensity score. Some socio-emotional variables that were suggested as treatment 
determinants (last row of Table 4-2) are also the output in my evaluation. This will not be a problem 
if the data is collected both before and after the program. In that case, I can use the pre-intervention 
variables for score calculation, and the post-intervention variables for impact identification, however 
as will be discussed in the next section, a large part of my sample is post-intervention. This issue is 
largely resolved by adopting the conservative means of propensity score calculation that includes all 
available variables except the subjective factors. Pre-treatment subjective factors will be largely 
proxied by such a long list of variables. I thus practice both conservative variable list and the 
Delphi-suggested list for propensity prediction. As mentioned before, a best specification should 
include variables that are not unrelated to treatment status and related treatment outcome. So, once 
the NN matching helps decide which outcome(s) should be further investigated, adjusted 
specification(s) could be derived for propensity prediction. 
The second challenge comes from the fact that this PSM will be implemented with multiple 
imputations (see Section 4.6). There is not yet a real consensus on PSM after multiple imputation 
(Hill, 2004; Hayes & Groner, 2008), but of all the recommended ways it is advisable to make full use 
of the multiple dataset generated by multiple imputation, with different matching methods practiced 
(Stuart, 2010). In addition to the traditional way of putting results in tables, I also try simpler 
visualization. After different types of PSM on both treatment groups for each imputed dataset, the 
results will be pooled together in a scatter graph, where the y axis gives the average effects of 
treatment on the treated, or ATT, of an outcome, and the x axis refers to the corresponding t scores. 
The investigation will not end with confirmation and measurement of Lighthouse impact; it will 
also discuss why those effects exist. Reminded by the theory of voluntary failure, I disseminated 
volunteer questionnaires (see Appendix B) to learn about the characteristics and operation of each 




Lighthouse program. Ultimately, I will discuss how untestable elements throughout the PSM 
implementation may affect the research quality. 
Some might question the potential of other methods for causal identification, especially the 
options of difference-in-differences (DID) and instrumental variable (IV). Indeed, as will be 
introduced in the following sections, I do have a two-school sub-sample that could be used for a 
simple two-period DID, however those two schools are the shrinking Lighthouse sites with only 34 
surveyed students enrolled in their latest summer programs64. These two schools are also close in 
proximity to each other but far from all other Lighthouse sites, and therefore DID can guarantee 
neither statistical power nor the representativeness of findings from this sample. For IV, 
unfortunately there is no available theory on what factors are (1) related to the treatment status and 
(2) not related to the subjective outcomes that will be measured. In comparison, PSM remains a 
more reasonable method for the structure of my sample and the large number of available 
covariates. 
 
4.5 Survey Design and Data Collection 
The data collection was conducted at eight middle schools, six in Huaiji (怀集) County of 
Zhaoqing (肇庆) City, and two in two small towns of Qingyuan (清远) City. Both cities are located in 
the mountainous northwest Guangdong, and they are the major areas with Lighthouse interventions. 
Guangdong Province has a serious economic imbalance. Assuming a 1 to 6.3 exchange rate, in 2011 
the GDP per capita in the two richest Cantonese cities, Shenzhen and Guangzhou, was 14968 and 
13882 USD, while for the two cities I collected my data it was only 4442 and 4680 USD.65 Northwest 
Guangdong not only shares with other coastal rural areas the lower migration opportunity cost/ 
better access to manufacturing, clearer perception of the rural–urban disparity, and more accurate 
                                                             
64
 These two schools have primary school participants that were not included in the survey. 
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information on urban opportunities, but also has the Cantonese features of gender discrimination 
and mercantilism.  
Huaiji County was the major location of data collection. It is about 3.6 thousand square 
kilometers (21 times the size of Washington DC) with a population of 1.05 million. The 2010 per 
capita income for its rural population was only 6135 RMB, or 975 USD. I will mainly focus on this 
county when discussing the sampling strategy. Huaiji consists of 19 towns. Most towns have only one 
lower secondary school, except for the socioeconomic hub of Huaicheng. Most schools are named 
for the town in which they are located. 
Of the two Qingyuan schools, one is located in Liannan Yao Chinese (瑶族) Autonomous District, 
and the other is located in nearby Qingxin County. In 2010, the per capita incomes for their rural 
populations were respectively 4295 and 6642 in RMB, or 682 and 1054 in USD. 
Starting from the sampling section, pseudo names are used to further discuss the eight surveyed 
schools. 
4.5.1 Sampling Strategy 
Figure 4-5 shows the middle schools with Lighthouse interventions by 2012. Six of them will be 
surveyed as a result of the availability of a Lighthouse program in summer 2012. Of these, HQ, HS, HT 
and HY are all located in Huaiji. QD and QB are located in Qingyuan. According to the 
recommendations of local residents, I included two more Huaiji schools, HA and HL, to the survey, 
which have a socioeconomic environment similar to the towns with Lighthouse interventions. More 
specifically, I asked local residents to recommend towns were they perceived people had a similar 
income and culture to those of the Lighthouse towns. Including HA and HL helps expand the sample 

















These six Huaiji schools are sufficiently diverse regarding student enrollment and Lighthouse 
engagement. HQ had over 3000 students and eleven years of Lighthouse intervention before the 
survey; HS has about 4000 students and four years of Lighthouse intervention; HT has about 800 
students and is a new Lighthouse site; HY about 1500 students and seven years of Lighthouse 
intervention; and both HA and HL have over 1500 students but no Lighthouse intervention. The 
Huaiji survey was performed with all lower secondary students (Grades 7-9) and their households, 
head teachers, and principals.  
The two Qingyuan schools are relatively small, with a total enrollment of less than 1500. The QD 
middle school is dominated by Yao Chinese students, a minority group, while the QB middle school is 
dominated by Han Chinese students. Both the schools have been engaged with Lighthouse since 
2004. 
One concern to be instantly raised is sampling bias. In order to answer Research Question 2, six 
out of the eight surveyed school are Lighthouse schools. The school characteristics leading to their 
engagement with Lighthouse could also affect PCED, therefore causing bias for results of PCED 
determinants. This study does not intend to offer one-size-fits-all findings, but it does try to offer 




comprehensive questionnaires were developed to gather as many information as possible, as 
introduced in the following section.  
4.5.2 Questionnaire Design 
This research produces separate questionnaires for students, teachers, principals, and student 
households (presumably parents or guardians). There were also volunteer questionnaires for the 
Lighthouse volunteers when they were approaching the end of the 2012 summer program. These 
five questionnaires are presented in Appendix B.  
The major data collected were PCED determinants suggested by literature and the Delphi results. 
Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF) and Zhang’s dissertation on the determinants of NCEE 
performance in China (Zhang, 2011) were my major references for questionnaire design. GSCF is the 
most frequently cited project in rural PCED studies (e.g. Park & Hannum, 2002; Hannum & Adams, 
2007; Hannum et al., 2009, etc.).66 Zhang’s study also has a data collection process similar to that of 
this study (introduced below). Since the questionnaires from these two sources do not touch the 
topic of schooling tracks, I also refer to track-related questionnaires used in recent Chinese studies, 
including Zhu (2006), Fang (2007), and Zhang (2009).  
The most challenging issue involved the subjective factors, especially those related to personality, 
or non-cognitive skills. Literature has recommended the Big Five Personality traits and Duckworth’s 
Grit Scale for measurement (Muller, 2015), but with the tension between accuracy and answering 
time, I adopted the group of questions from GSCF (e1~e60 in the student questionnaire). They 
measure the student’s mental health such as confidence, courage and gregariousness. The similar 
questionnaire has proven reliability and validity after tests on over 20000 Chinese middle school 
students (Wang et al., 1997). It is neither too long nor too short, and much more localized and 
specific than other available tests. In the GSCF questionnaire, the student makes a choice from four 
options: “totally disagree”, “disagree”, “agree”, and “fully agree”. In my version, I expand the number 
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of options to 6, adding “agree a little” and “basically agree” to the middle. The reason for this 
adjustment is to create greater variation in answers to better capture the impact of 
personality-related factors on PCED, as well as the Lighthouse impact on these factors. In GSCF, most 
students were in elementary school when answering this group of questions for the first time, but in 
my sample the students were in lower secondary school. They are theoretically more cognitively 
ready to answer 6-option questions. 
As suggested by the Delphi result (Figure 4-3), the Lighthouse impacts that are consistently 
considered important and well-realized are mostly socio-emotional, and therefore the change in 
some subjective factors could be attributed to Lighthouse participation. This study is not going to 
cover all 25 suggested impacts as some are for the long term, and some are difficult to measure. 
More importantly, it is necessary to limit the time required to answer, to ensure answer quality. If it 
takes too much time to finish a questionnaire, the students could lose patience and their responses 
become cursory. 
The student, household, teacher and principal questionnaires are keys to answering the research 
questions, so in May 2012 a group of 20 students (and their families) and one retired principal were 
invited to answer the drafts to see if the number and content of questions are reasonable.  
Finally, I also gathered information about the Lighthouse operation. In schools with Lighthouse 
interventions, the questionnaires will incorporate questions about engagement with, and 
perceptions of, the program.  
4.5.3 Data Collection 
Survey Team  
I have seven research assistants (RA) working on this dissertation research. They are all college 
students recruited from Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong. Five are former Lighthouse 
volunteers, and the other two have volunteer experience in the survey area. I conducted resume 




completed the human research curriculum provided by the Collaborative Institutional Training 
Initiative (CITI), which teaches about how to engage human subjects without violating their rights. 
Their lodging and meals in the survey sites were paid, and each received a stipend of 1500 RMB (238 
USD).67  
The RAs were given two assignments. They disseminated and collected the questionnaires, and 
they worked on the data entry. They worked together in a classroom for an entire day of pilot data 
entry, so we could discuss confusing answers. Each RA was then provided with a proportion of the 
answered questionnaires for data entry in MS Excel. Finally their files were merged and imported 
into Stata by myself.  
At the same time as data entry was ongoing, my RAs had been involved with other qualitative 
surveys of students and their families at different stages of the summer camp. One worked on the 
Rural China Education Foundation (RCEF) project for service education, others worked as Lighthouse 
monitoring and evaluation volunteers at the sites. As the completed Delphi survey included scholars, 
volunteers, and educators, it was advisable to include students and households as they are also 
important stakeholders of PCED/Lighthouse interventions.68 Assuming that the Delphi is 
well-implemented, there should not be new findings about students and their households.  
Data Collection in the Qingyuan Schools 
I conducted two waves of surveys in the Qingyuan schools. The baseline survey was undertaken 
in June 2012. An early version of the student, household, homeroom teacher, and principal 
questionnaires in Appendix B was used in the survey.  
To some extent, this baseline survey served as a large-scale “pilot study”. It helped the 
refinement of questionnaire design. For example, in one question (d10 of the student questionnaire) 
I asked the students to write down the subject taught by their favorite teacher, and it turned out that 
some students thought I was asking for the name of the teacher. As a result, I had to again ask the 
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school the subjects taught by the indicated teachers. That question was refined to prevent the same 
misunderstandings from happening again when the survey was conducted for Huaiji students. The 
Qingyuan survey also helped me refine the survey procedure. Because some students were boarding, 
we had to take a weekend for the completion of household questionnaires. My implementation 
allowed students to finish the questionnaire in the classroom, and then bring the household version 
home. It turned out that this arrangement increased the administrative burden for both us and the 
schools, without an obvious improvement in survey quality. In addition, some boarding students just 
forgot to bring the household questionnaires to the schools. I obtained 1010 observations for 
students, but only 734 observations for households. Following this experience, I decided to let the 
students take home both student and household questionnaires for the survey in Huaiji. My team 
stayed for the extra days after the weekend to retrieve the questionnaires.  
The post-intervention survey was conducted in late September. Students who were in Grade 7 or 
Grade 8 in 2011-12 school year were to be asked again about the personality-related questions and 
PCED, and whether they participated in the Lighthouse program in summer 2012. The actual PCED 
and HSEE scores of Grade 9 students (who were no longer in local schools) were collected from 
homeroom teachers and parents. As suggested by the literature, actual PCED could be different from 
expected PCED (e.g. Song et al., 2011). An analysis in Chapter 5 is devoted to examining how 
different they could be. 
Data Collection in the Huaiji Schools 
The Huaiji survey was scheduled for September 21st to 26th of 2012. This is the most appropriate 
period in the year. It is right after the Chinese Teacher's Days. During that time, there is less 
administrative burden for lower secondary schools. It is also right before the 7-day National Day 
Vacation, so my RAs had sufficient time for engagement. I actually received an official survey 
approval for a pre-summer baseline survey, however it was cancelled immediately before my team 




Regarding the implementation of data collection, the student, household, homeroom teacher, 
and principal questionnaires were given out on September 21st, a Friday, while the rest of the days 
are for questionnaire collection. The local printing price was about 20 times that at urban universities, 
so my team printed everything in Guangzhou and took it to Huaiji. We used two cars to carry the 
staff and material.  
 
Table 4-3 Survey Log 
 







Visited 7 Principals, 1 in Yunfu, 2 in 
Qingyuan, and 4 in Huaiji County of 
Zhaoqing. Also visited the new director 
of Huaiji Education Bureau. 





1. Excluded Yunfu schools because 
Lighthouse is not going to have 
activities there. Targeted 10 Huaiji 
schools and 2 Qingyuan schools, which 
have different levels of Lighthouse 
intervention. 
 
2. Design of Questionnaires. Mainly 
revised from the questionnaires used by 
the Gansu Team, Yu Zhang, and three 
Chinese study on rural educational track 
Found two relative new 
Lighthouse schools so I 






 draft of 
questionnaires 
Before that, one 
Lighthouse staff visited 
schools and officials twice 




Research Assistant Recruitment (05/06) 
 
 






One day round trip between Huaiji and 
Shenzhen for survey negotiation. 
 
Pilot studies from students, teachers, and 
one principal 
Seven RAs recruited in 
late May after resume 




 draft of 
questionnaires 
Paper approval of 




Allowed to re-apply for 
a survey in 
late-September 
The questionnaires used 
for the June survey in 
Qingyuan 
Five RAs with Lighthouse 
experience. Started work 
assignment right after 
recruitment, e.g. 
questionnaire printing, car 
renting 
 
But then received a 
rejection on 05/29 
 
 
Informed of the reason of 
rejection. A report from 
other organization 




jeopardized the political 




06/07-06/08: surveys in two Qingyuan 
schools with 1 Lighthouse staff and 3 
RAs 
 
06/09-06/10: 3 RAs practiced data input 
 
06/11-06/13: Getting back the household 
surveys. All RA practiced data input. 






and Excel file for input 
Expect the baseline 
dataset finished on 
07/12. Building a doc. 
1. Data orally provided by 
the Principals were more 
accurate than those written 
down in documents.  
2. Having students answer 
the questions in class did 









Right after the Qingyuan survey, I 
submitted the new application for the 
Huaiji survey  
about input instruction 






1. Unable to receive the 
results quickly because the 
Bureau was busy in High 
School Entrance Exam. 
2. Included Sun Yat-sen 
University for survey 
organization to lower local 
government’s worry about 
international background 
July of 2012 Revised the questionnaire again based 
on the baseline answering quality. 




Start a negotiation with 
the Guangzhou Youth 
Cultural Palace, try to 
acquire a survey 
permission through the 
party league system 
For the 2 Qingyuan 
schools, received 1010 
observations for students 




Volunteer questionnaires finished. 
Conducted by Lighthouse staff 
 
2 RAs to the Lighthouse schools for 






information on student 
and household collected 
as observation reports 
Data entry completed 
 
 
Surveys by RCEF and 
Lighthouse, but data 
accessible to self 
September 
of 2012 
2 RAs worked on follow-up survey for 
Qingyuan schools 
 
5 RAs worked on survey in Huaiji 
schools 
The information needed 
for all of the major 
analyses were obtained 
A large expansion of 
expected sample size to 
over 7000. In the two 
largest school of HQ and 
HS, we randomly selected 





Disseminate the questionnaire to one 
more Huaiji school, HL 
Entry of Qingyuan Data 
done 
 
Information from one 
more non-Lighthouse 
school. 
The survey was finished in 
early October, but we 
cannot retrieve them until 
the winter revisit. The 
principal of HL is the 
former principal at HT 
school. He hoped 
Lighthouse could expand 
to his current school. 
a. Link to the report that caused a temporary rejection of the survey in May 2012: 
http://gcontent.oeeee.com/4/26/426c953178f1ab16/Blog/bfd/c4ed38.html 
 
4.6 Missing data 
It is not surprising to find missing data because the student/parent/teacher/principals may lose 
patience when answering the questionnaire, may be reluctant to answer some of the questions, or 
may find it difficult to answer some of the questions, especially those related to the monetary costs 




to deal with missing data. More specifically, the missing PCED69 was imputed by values attained from 
multinomial logit of PCED on all independent variables, and each independent variable was imputed 
by values attained from either the logit or order logit of that variable on PCED and other 
independent variables. The number of imputations to add is five, a classic number that can 
guarantee the efficiency of estimates (Rubin, 1987)70. It is also worth mentioning that five 
imputations generate the proper amount of PSM results, neither too many nor too few.  
Given the length of the student questionnaire, it is quite likely that some students lost their 
patience and provided random answers, generating systematic missing data that cannot be solved 
statistically. My solution to this kind of missing data is to insert a question asking how much they lost 
their patience in about 4/5 of the student questionnaire. If that question was left blank, the student 
is assumed to be totally impatient, and the whole observation will be removed from my analysis 
before the MI. This operation actually removes a large sample of 1693 students (860 boys, 833 girls). 
By checking the answers given by this group, it confirms that they did not fill the questionnaires 
seriously, with some even skipping basic information like gender and class. We cannot trust their 
given answers since we do not know whether they really paid attention to them. It is also interesting 
to see that among those responding to the question about patience, as many as 76.2% said they did 
not lose patience, so it seems the “distribution” of patience was polarized. Intuitively, impatient 
students may be less likely to continue their schooling, and, according to Delphi results, patience is 
neither a determinant nor an impact of, Lighthouse programs. Therefore, removing impatient 
students may result in selection bias for Research Question 1 about PCED determinants, but it should 
not affect the answers to Question 2 about Lighthouse impact. These assumptions are supported by 
cross-tabulation between the answering status of patience question and other variables on the raw 
dataset. The tabulation showed that students who skipped the patience question were more likely to 
choose dropout, work, or undecided, and that the two groups had almost identical treatment rate. 
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Of course, caution is needed for interpretation, as the answers provided by impatient students might 
be less reliable.       
 
4.7 Variable Construction 
This section gives a master table on variable construction. It divides all variables adopted by this 
study into thirteen groups, including one group for PCED and treatment variables, eleven groups for 
potential PCED determinants, and one group for additional variables about treatment’s outcomes 
and determinants. For each item, variable description and key questionnaire items (see Appendix B) 
are provided. Variables for volunteer teams are based on a very different sample and are not 
involved in the major model of MNL or PSM. They will be separately introduced in Chapter 7.  
The grouping of potential PCED determinants matches almost 100% those suggested by the 
literature, except that now alternative-specific variables are set as and proxied by case-specific 
variables due to the fact that there are no pure alternative specific factors in this research. 
Community factors were also not specified as a group, but they are included in peer and school 
factors71, as are some localized variables suggested by Delphi (e.g. local entertainment industries, 
outreach of factory). The eleven groups of PCED determinants are (1) Gender, Age and Ethnicity, (2) 
Parental Background, (3) Number of Siblings and Birth Order, (4) Peer Factors, (5) Teacher Factors, (6) 
School Factors, (7) Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints, (8) Subjective Factors, (9) 
Health Factors, (10) Monetary Cost and Rewards, and (11) Academic Performance and Other 
Variables (from Delphi). Groups (4) to (6) will be combined in the interpretation of regression 
findings.
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 Note that each town has only one middle school, and students living too far away tend to be boarding or lease a room 








Category Variable Description Key items used 
   
PCED and 
Treatment 
pced 1 to 5 for Dropout/Work/VHS/AHS/Undecided a7 
treated Participated in either the latest or earlier Lighthouse program(s); 1/0=Yes/No  g5 g6 g9 
participation Participated in the latest Lighthouse; 1/0=Yes/No  g9 
    
Gender, Age and 
Ethnicity 
female Female student; 1/0=Yes/No  b2 
f_income Female from a relatively high income household (log of income belongs to upper half); 1/0=Yes/No  b2 h8 h18 i2 
f_performance Female with relatively high performance (test score/ranking belong to upper half in school); 1/0=Yes/No  b2 b11 g8 
f_cost Female from a household that perceives relatively high cost of further education; 1 to 6 from low to high  b2 j5a~j5d 
age Older than the mode of age within the grade; 1/0=Yes/No  b1 
minority Minority; 1/0=Yes/No  b3 
    
Parental 
Background 
single_p With single parent; 1/0=Yes/No c2 
migrant_p With migrant parent; 1/0=Yes/No c2 h2 h12 
no_p Both parents dead or at home for less than 1 month in the past year; 1/0=Yes/No c2 h7 h17 
medu Mother's education level; 1 to 6 for no schooling to some upper secondary education or above h1 
fedu Father's education level; 1 to 6 for no schooling to some upper secondary education or above h11 
peasant Parents being peasant; 1/0=Yes/No h2 h12 
politicalc Political capital; 1 to 3 for either parent is other/Communist League member/Communist Party member h3 h13 
parent_leader Father or mother are cadres; 1/0=Yes/No h2 h12 
parentbadhealth Father or mother's health does not allow for normal life or work; 1/0=Yes/No h9 h19 




sibship Number of siblings (including the student); 1 to 6 in which 6 means 6 or more siblings c3~c6 
witheldersister Has an elder sister; 1/0=Yes/No c4 
eldercohort Being the older siblings; 1/0=Yes/No c3~c6 
    









Peer mignetwork Perceive prevailing trend of going out as young migrant worker; 1/0=Yes/No g1d g2d 
peerpedu Average parental education level in class; 1 to 3 for primary unfinished/primary/lower secondary unfinished h1 h11 
    
Teacher tch_origin Homeroom teacher's origin; 1 to 4 for local town/other town in county/other place in province/other province k7 
tch_edu Homeroom teacher's level of education; 1/0 for college/non-college k5 
tch_admin Homeroom teacher holds other administrative position in the school; 1/0=Yes/No k12 
tch_exp Homeroom teacher's experience as fulltime teacher; 1 to 4 for 2 years or less/3 or 4 years/5~10 years/over 
10 years 
k8 
tch_mthgain Homeroom teacher's monthly income; divided into 6 quantiles k13 k14 k15 
tch_paydelayed Homeroom teacher experienced pay delayed in the past 6 month; 1/0=Yes/No k16 
subtch_origin Key subject (Chinese/math/English) teacher origin; take means and divide into 4 quantiles 16a 17a 18a 
subtch_edu Key subject (Chinese/math/English) teacher level of education; take means and divide into 4 quantiles 16b 17b 18b 
subtch_exp Sum of key subject teacher's experience as fulltime teacher; take means and divide into 4 quantiles 16c 17c 18c 
    
School classsize Classsize; divided into 4 quantiles k1d 
distance Traveling time to school; divided into 6 quantiles b8 
survival School has relatively high retention rate (>66%) n15 n17 
oral-information  
school1 HL School; 1/0=Yes/No a3 
school2 QB School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school3 QD School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school4 HQ School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school5 HS School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school6 HT School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school7 HY School; 1/0=Yes/No 













wealth Wealth status; 1 to 4 based on the availability of cement house, computer/internet/car, and motor cycle i9k i9v i9w i9x i9y i10 
housesize Household size; divided into 4 quantiles i1 
income Log of household income; divided into 6 quantiles h8 h18 i2 
credit_financiali Log of available credit from bank or credit cooperative; divided into 6 quantiles i4 
credit_relative Log of available credit from relative; divided into 6 quantiles i5 
    
Subjective 
Factors 
stu_eduaspiration Expected highest level of education, 1 to 5 for lower secondary/vocational high/academic 
high/college/graduate school 
a11 
expect_norm Expect agriculture or manufacturing as future career; 1/0=Yes/No a12 
expect_advanced Expect science, technology, or government as future career; 1/0=Yes/No a12 
percep_schquality Perception of school quality; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles d1d d1e d1f d1l d1j 
d1m 
percep_schaffiliation Emotional attachment to school; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles d1a,b,c,o,p,q,r,s,t,u 
percep_schvalue Perceived value of schooling; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 4 quantiles d1g d1v 
percep_scheffort Willingness to study; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 4 quantiles d1h d1n 
confidence Level of confidence; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles e4 e8 e12 e14 e26 e44 
courage Level of courage; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles e5 e8 e25 e26 e29 
curiosity Level of curiosity; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles e24 e62 
ambition Level of ambition; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles e7 e11 e41 
familyonstudy Level the family cares about their study and PCED, perceived by the student; take mean of the ratings to 
related items and divide into 6 quantiles (end up only category 1 to 5 available) 
f5a f5b 
familyonemo Level the family cares about their emotional status and respects their opinion, perceived by the student; take 
mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
f5c f5d f5e 
tchr_contvsstop Homeroom teacher's preference of continuing education over stopping education; take ratio of the ratings 
and divide into 4 quantiles 
l1a~l1g 
tchr_genvsvoc Homeroom teacher's preference for academic high school over vocational high school; take ratio of the 









    
Health sick Suffers disease(s); 1/0=Yes/No b9 
sick_class Suffers health issues that directly affect study, namely feeling hungry/dizzy during class and having eyesight 
problem; 1/0=Yes/No 
b10 d7 d8 
    
Perceived Cost/ 
Reward of the 
PCED 
cost_vocvsjunior Cost of VHS relative to cost for middle school, perceived by the household; take ratio of the amounts and 
divide into 6 quantiles 
j5a j5c 
cost_genvsvoc Cost of AHS relative to cost for VHS, perceived by the household; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 
quantiles 
j5b j5c 
cost_colvsgen Cost of college relative to cost for AHS, perceived by the household; take ratio of the amounts and divide 
into 6 quantiles 
j5b j5d 
earn_workvsdrop Expected relative earnings in 35 if work-after-graduation instead of dropout, perceived by both the 
household and the student; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 quantiles 
f1a~f1e j4a~j4e  
earn_vocvswork Expected relative earnings in 35 if continue to VHS instead of work, perceived by both the household and 
the student; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 quantiles 
f1c~f1e f1g j4c~j4e j4g 
earn_genvsvoc Expected relative earnings in 35 if continue to AHS instead of VHS, perceived by both the household and 
the student; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 quantiles 
f1f f1g j4f j4g 
earn_colvsgen Expected relative earnings in 35 if continue to college instead of AHS, perceived by both the household and 
the student; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 quantiles 
f1f f1h j4f j4h 






knowvoc Student and their family's knowledge of vocational education policies; 1 to 4 for No to Very Much f2 j6 
performance Academic performance; take mean of both ranking and score and then divide into 4 quantiles within school b11 g8 
business Has family business to inherit; 1/0=Yes/No h2 h12 




urbanlife Used to stay in nearby cities for over 1 month; 1/0=Yes/No b16 
outreach_voc Perceived frequent outreach from vocational schools; 1/0=Yes/No g1f g2f 








local_negative Holds very negative view of local development; 1/0=Yes/No f3 j7 
local_entertain Perceived prevalence of entertainment industries (KTV, gambling or illegal lottery, internet bar) in the 
neighborhood; 1/0=Yes/No 
g1a g1b g1e g2a g2b 
g2e 
gambling Has been involved with gambling or illegal lottery; 1/0=Yes/No d4 
schatmos School has relatively good study atmosphere (level of violence, cheating, class discipline); 1/0=Yes(> mean 
value)/No 
d9a-d9f 
chore Time spent on housechore; divided into 4 quantiles b12 
love Was or is in love with someone; 1/0=Yes/No. Considering the sensitivity of this topic for teenagers, this 
question was asked with 6 options from strongly disagree to strongly agree, so student can answer 
“basically agree” if they feel shy about confirming the relationship 
e63 
grade_7 Study in Grade one of the middle school; 1/0=Yes/No a4 
grade_8 Study in Grade two of the middle school; 1/0=Yes/No 
grade_9 Study in Grade three (last grade) of the middle school; 1/0=Yes/No 






extraversion Level of extraversion; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles e17 e19 e25 e28 e29 
e43 e50 e55 
affiliationneed Level of need of affiliation; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles e31 e33 e35 
atti_chore_farm Attitude towards housechore/farm works; 1 to 6 for hate to love e61 
other_act Level of other activities (housechore/farm works/city visit or job), according to the household; take mean of 
the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
j3b j3c 
peertreated Popularity of Lighthouse participation among classmates (Lighthouse participants as % to the class); divided 
into 4 quantiles 
g5 g6 g9 
attoncamp How supportive the household is of participating in summer camp or how much they respect the student’s 





4.8 Synthesis of Research Components 
As a summary, Figure 4-6 illustrates the logical connections between the research components, 
as well as how they ultimately contribute to answering the two research questions.  
The review of PCED presents available quantitative methods and methodological challenges, 
while the review of GNGO uncovers the need of impact evaluation. From the knowledge gaps that 
both reviews suggest, we were able to select appropriate quantitative designs for this research. The 
literature reviews also lists potential PCED determinants and NGO factors for questionnaire design, 
however they offer little information specific to either Southern China or Lighthouse intervention, 
and therefore I conducted the Delphi survey to collect extra localized PCED determinants and 
Lighthouse-relevant information for questionnaire design.  
The PCED-related data will be used for the implementation of MNL, which helps identify the 
PCED determinants. The Lighthouse data, together with PCED-related data, will be used for the 
implementation of PSM, which helps identify the direct Lighthouse impacts. As Delphi does not 
include students and households, I have acquired additional qualitative information for these two 
groups to identify whether any missing information exists. In terms of the causal interpretation of 
quantitative results, they were mostly prepared by Delphi. The assumption to be tested is whether 













Chapter 5 Descriptive Statistics 
This chapter presents non-imputed descriptive statistics, starting from the expected and actual 
PCED, and then the independent variables of different classifications highlighting comparisons 
between full and treated samples, plus one section on additional variables for treatment outcomes 
or determinants. The full valid sample size is 6298 students from eight surveyed schools, among 
which the treated sample size is 678 for Lighthouse students of the six Lighthouse schools. Among 
these 678 students, 211 attended the most recent Lighthouse program (before data collection) in 
summer 2012.   
 
5.1 Expected PCED and Actual PCED 
The descriptive analyses on dependent variable illustrate how heterogeneous (to basic 
characteristics and grades) and changeable the expected PCED is. In addition, although expected 
PCED cannot fully predict actual PCED, the two-school subsample show that students expecting to 
continue schooling do tend to have further education (VHS or AHS) as actual PCED.    
Table 5-1 provides distributions of expected PCED for the whole sample, for the subsamples by 
gender, wealth, and test performance, and for the sample that had participated in Lighthouse 
program(s). Given that students who wanted to drop out might be already out of school and 
therefore absent for the survey, it is understandable that less than 2% selected dropout. For the rest 
of options, over one third of students chose VHS, and a quarter had not made a decision (chose 
“Undecided”). Girls were more inclined to VHS, while boys were more likely to choose work or AHS. 
It is also notable that girls apparently outnumber boys, reflecting the fact that boys are more likely to 
stay with their migrant parents in cities. Tabulations by wealth and test performance were no 
surprise, as students with higher SES or test performance prefer to continue their schooling (VHS or 




PCED distribution for the treated sample is close to those of higher SES or test performance, except 
for a dropout tendency similar to the whole sample.   
 
Table 5-1 Sample Distribution by Expected PCED and Student Background 
 Whole 
Sample 
Gender Wealth Test Performance Treated 
Sample  Female Male Richer Poorer Higher Lower 
Dropout 1.67 1.59 1.78 0.85 2.17 0.92 2.45 2.09 
Work 16.58 15.42 18.42 14.16 18.07 10.66 20.82 11.69 
VHS 36.88 39.87 32.14 40.63 34.57 40.71 34.8 40.31 
AHS 20.36 18.17 23.82 22.8 18.85 28.62 16.7 24.61 
Undecided 24.51 24.95 23.82 21.55 26.34 19.08 25.22 21.29 
         
# of obs 5222 3203 2019 1991 3231 1960 1796 573 
Note: Wealth and performance are both categorical variables with four values. Here values 1 and 2 are considered as 
Poorer/Lower, and values 3 and 4 Richer/Higher. 
 
While tabulations by background characteristic can give us a big picture of the PCED distribution, 
a tabulation by grade helps further enrich that picture in a more dynamic way. Table 5-2 shows the 
PCED numbers and percentages by grade for the full and the treated samples. Since there is a decline 
of sample size by grade that may result from dropout, transfer, early VHS enrollment, or simply the 
demographic change, caution is needed when interpreting the figures. It appears that PCED 
distributions for treated samples tend to show a sharper and positive change from Grade 7 to Grade 
9. For example, for both samples 25.1% of Grade 7 students chose undecided, and in Grade 9 they 
were still as high as 21% for the whole sample, but only 17.8% for the treated sample. Of course, 
without controlling for covariates, we cannot claim this gap is attributable to Lighthouse program.  
 
Table 5-2 Expected PCED by Grade: Whole Sample vs. Treated Sample 
  Whole Sample  Treated Sample 
#  Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9  Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9 
dropout  47 26 14  7 4 1 
work  377 303 186  25 27 15 
VHS  724 650 552  73 77 81 
AHS  345 297 421  29 34 78 
undecided  500 468 312  45 39 38 




%  Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9  Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9 
dropout  2.4  1.5  0.9   3.9  2.2  0.5  
work  18.9  17.4  12.5   14.0  14.9  7.0  
VHS  36.3  37.3  37.2   40.8  42.5  38.0  
AHS  17.3  17.0  28.4   16.2  18.8  36.6  
undecided  25.1  26.8  21.0   25.1  21.6  17.8  
 
People may question the fact that tabulations by grade are not really dynamic since they are 
looking at different students in different grades. People may also question the value of using 
expected PCED as the dependent variable. These two worries could be partially resolved by looking 
at the panel sample of the two Qingyuan schools. Data was collected twice, in June and September, 
for the same group of students, so in Figure 5-1 below, the Grade 7 ends/Grade 8 starts are for the 
same student group, so are the Grade 8 ends/Grade 9 starts and Grade 9 ends/actual PCED. Overall, 
the PCED distribution did not change much after one summer, and it is quite evident that there was 
attrition due to dropout, transfer, or early VHS enrollment. For graduating students, they mostly 
move to neighboring cities for AHS or VHS, and to the Pearl Delta area for migrant jobs. As requested 
by schools, this paper would not discuss greater details about their graduating students.   
 
Figure 5-1 PCED from Grade-7 to Post-Graduation (Qingyuan Panel Sample)72 
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 The 3 dropouts in “actual PCED” refer to the dropouts happened during the month after the first-round of survey but 
before the end of semester. 























































The simple tabulation conceals how changeable the PCED can be. Table 5-3 shows the detailed 
change of expected PCED. Overall, 45% of students still in middle school changed their minds after a 
summer, and there is no clear route for their change from one PCED to the other. The change rates 
for traceable students who had already left school (Table 5-4) are also high, although less statistically 
convincing due to the small sample size. Consequently, it is safe to say that PCED is quite changeable, 
or alterable, for the two schools with follow-up surveys. This means intervention on PCED 
determinants might work in changing expected PCED, which is good, but it also means that expected 
PCED might not be easily transferred to real PCED, which questions the value of this study since, due 
to data availability, the dependent variable has to be expected PCED. 
 
Table 5-3 Changeable Expected PCED (Qingyuan Panel Sample) 
 June 2012 
Dropout Work VHS AHS Undecided Total 





Dropout 2 2 0 1 0 5 
Work 3 48 6 5 14 76 
VHS 1 14 62 19 23 119 
AHS 0 7 26 48 13 94 
Undecided 5 24 19 10 74 132 
        
Total # 11 95 113 83 124 426 
# change minds 9 47 51 35 50 192 
% change minds 82% 49% 45% 42% 40% 45% 
 
Table 5-4 Change from Expected to Actual PCED (Qingyuan Panel Sample) 
 Expected PCED in June 2012 
Dropout Work VHS AHS Undecided Total 
      
Actual PCED in 
September 2012 
Dropout 3 10 0 4 11 28 
Work 0 8 4 7 8 27 
VHS 3 7 11 8 18 47 
AHS 0 4 8 74 4 90 
        
Total 6 29 23 93 41 192 
# change (undecided excluded) 3 21 12 19 — — 
% change (undecided excluded) 50% 72% 52% 20% — — 





Nevertheless, if we look closer at Table 5-4, the cross-tabulations actually justify the regressions 
of expected PCED. Those expecting work or being undecided were more likely to finally drop out or 
work than those expecting VHS or AHS, while those expecting VHS or AHS tended to stay within the 
pool of “continuing schooling”. Only 20% of those expecting AHS failed in their anticipation. These 
jointly imply that although expected PCED may not precisely predict actual PCED, it does predict 
whether the actual PCED will be positive, i.e. continuing schooling. 
Finally, the availability of HSEE scores for the two Qingyuan schools offers a chance to examine 
the correlation between actual PCED and test results. As shown by Figure 5-2, although it is true that 
students with higher test scores are more likely to choose AHS, there is no real HSEE cutoff. Students 
with different PCED overlap between score 300 and score 600. This also reconfirms the argument in 
Chapter 1 that PCED is mostly driven by factors of demand rather than the supply of schooling 
opportunities.  
 
Figure 5-2 High School Entrance Exam Score vs. Actual PCED (Qingyuan Panel Sample) 
 
Note: 2=Work (after graduation); 3=VHS; 4=AHS. 140 observations are available for this graph. No dropout data is 





5.2 Independent Variables and Treatment-Related Variables 
According to the literature, Delphi results and the reality of data availability, the candidates for 
PCED determinants were divided into nine groups. The rest of this section will provide non-imputed 
summary statistics by group for the whole and treated samples. Two-sample t tests were conducted 
for each variable to see if the treated sample differed from the whole sample at 5% level. Because 
the whole sample included two schools without Lighthouse intervention, finding a statistically 
significant difference may just reflect the difference between those two schools and the six 
Lighthouse schools. Notes will be given when this is the case. A summary table for the six-school 
sample is provided in Appendix D. 
It might be difficult to memorize such a large number of variables, so for each group of variables 
their descriptions from Table 4-4 are listed again under the statistics.   
5.2.1 Gender, Age and Ethnicity 
Descriptive statistics for basic student information (Table 5-5) produced the expected results, so 
are the differences between Lighthouse students and the overall population. There are more girls 
than boys (6:4) because girls are more likely to be left behind when their parents are migrant 
workers in the city, and there are even more girls with Lighthouse experience, probably because they 
have less chance to visit cities in summer. Older students have more housework burdens and 
working opportunities, so they are less likely to take part in Lighthouse programs. Minorities, mostly 
Yao Chinese, are concentrated in one school which has continuous Lighthouse interventions, and 
there are also two non-minority schools with no Lighthouse involvement, which is why the minority 
rate is much higher for the treated sample, 14% vs. 6%.  
For the three “interaction” terms, it turns out that girls with higher academic performance or 
whose family perceives a higher cost of further education are more likely to be engaged with 




variables are not real interactions. Due to missing data, I took the average of the imputed income 
and performance, divided them into two groups, and then multiplied them with female dummy. This 
operation aims to reduce the possible bias of imputed figures. For cost, I took the average of all 
imputations for all relative cost variables. This creates enough variation to generate a 6-quantile 
variable to be timed by the female dummy.  
 
Table 5-5 Summary Statistics_ Gender, Age and Ethnicity 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
female 6298 0.61  0.49  678 0.66  0.47  Y 0 1 
f_income 6298 0.42  0.49  678 0.45  0.50  N 0 1 
f_performance 6298 0.35  0.48  678 0.41  0.49  Y 0 1 
f_cost 6298 2.07  2.04  678 2.42  2.17  Y 0 6 
age 6298 0.33  0.47  678 0.29  0.45  Y 0 1 
minority 6298 0.06  0.24  678 0.14  0.35  Y 0 1 
 
female Female student; 1/0=Yes/No  
f_income Female from a relatively high income household (log of income belongs to upper half); 1/0=Yes/No  
f_performance Female with relatively high performance (test score/ranking belong to upper half in school); 1/0=Yes/No  
f_cost Female from a household that perceives relatively high cost of further education; 1 to 6 from low to high  
age Older than the mode of age within the grade; 1/0=Yes/No  
minority Minority; 1/0=Yes/No  
 
5.2.2 Parental Background 
Summary statistics for parental background reveal the dilemma faced by many rural households 
in China today. 7% of students come from a single-parent family, and according to interviews in the 
field migrant work has become a major reason for separation; more than half the students had at 
least one migrant parent, and over 20% of the students lived in a household where both parents 
were dead or had been at home for less than one month in the past year. On the other hand, over 30% 
of students households merely live on farming. Migrant work brings more income and vision, but 
separates family members; being a peasant keeps the family intact, but limits future potential under 




For other parental background variables, fathers are on average one level higher than mothers in 
terms of education, reflecting the gender gap in education for their generation. 3% of students have 
parent(s) who are government officers, and 4% have parent(s) whose health does not allow for 
normal life or work. Parents who are Communist League or Party members are more likely to have 
their children participating Lighthouse program.  
 
Table 5-6 Summary Statistics_ Parental Background 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
single_p 5131 0.07 0.26 589 0.07 0.25 N 0 1 
migrant_p 6090 0.54 0.50 656 0.57 0.50 N 0 1 
no_p 6081 0.24 0.42 655 0.22 0.41 N 0 1 
medu 5158 2.54 1.26 528 2.43 1.23 N 1 6 
fedu 4879 3.80 1.37 490 3.71 1.39 N 1 6 
peasant 5474 0.34 0.47 551 0.31 0.46 N 0 1 
politicalc 5864 1.21 0.55 637 1.26 0.61 Y 1 3 
parent_leader 5474 0.03 0.17 551 0.04 0.20 N 0 1 
parentbadhealth 4087 0.04 0.20 433 0.04 0.20 N 0 1 
 
single_p With single parent; 1/0=Yes/No 
migrant_p With migrant parent; 1/0=Yes/No 
no_p Both of parents dead or at home for less than 1 month in the past year; 1/0=Yes/No 
medu Mother's education level; 1 to 6 for no schooling to some upper secondary education or above 
fedu Father's education level; 1 to 6 for no schooling to some upper secondary education or above 
peasant Parents being peasants; 1/0=Yes/No 
politicalc Political capital; 1 to 3 for either parent is other/communist league member/communist party member 
parent_leader Father or mother being cadres; 1/0=Yes/No 
parentbadhealth Father’s or mother's health does not allow for normal life or work; 1/0=Yes/No 
 
5.2.3 Number of Siblings and Birth Order 
Living in a province far from Beijing, the towns included in this study are somewhat “immune” to 
the One-Child policy. On average, every couple has three or more children. In the sample, 60% of 
students have an elder sister, who according to literature may sacrifice their schooling opportunity 




between the full sample and the treated sample, which is because the two non-lighthouse schools 
happen to have lower sibship sizes, 3.05 and 2.61. 
 
Table 5-7 Summary Statistics_ Siblings and Birth Order 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
sibship 6298 3.12  1.57  678 3.27  1.61  Y 1 6 
witheldersister 6298 0.60  0.49  678 0.60  0.49  N 0 1 
eldercohort 6298 0.30  0.46  678 0.32  0.47  N 0 1 
 
sibship Number of siblings (including the student); 1 to 6 in which 6 means 6 or more siblings 
witheldersister Has an elder sister; 1/0=Yes/No 
eldercohort Being the older siblings; 1/0=Yes/No 
 
5.2.4 Peer, Teacher, and School Factors 
32% of students in the full sample perceived a prevailing trend of going out as young migrant 
workers, and this figure is much higher for Lighthouse students. The differences are statistically 
significant even when excluding non-Lighthouse schools. For around two thirds of students, the 
average parental education level in class is “primary completed”, or peerpedu=2. Due to better 
educational development in the two non-Lighthouse schools, the mean peerpedu is higher for the 
full sample. 
 
Table 5-8 Summary Statistics_ Peer 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
mignetwork 6298 0.32  0.47  678 0.40  0.49  Y 0 1 
peerpedu 6298 2.23  0.56  678 2.02  0.49  Y 1 3 
 
mignetwork Perceive prevailing trend of going out as young migrant worker; 1/0=Yes/No 





With regard to teacher characteristics, most homeroom teachers come from local or other towns 
of the same county, and half have a college degree. About 6% of teachers also have administrative 
roles in the school, a sign of power, and around one third experienced delay in payment, a 
disincentive for their devotion. Teacher experience and monthly gain vary. Other teacher variables 
are all in quantile. Again the mean differences between the full sample and the treated sample are 
mainly caused by the differences between the two non-Lighthouse schools and the six Lighthouse 
schools. 
 
Table 5-9 Summary Statistics_ Teacher 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
tch_origin 6298 1.88  1.07  678 1.88  1.09  N 1 4 
tch_edu 6298 0.52  0.50  678 0.49  0.50  N 0 1 
tch_admin 6298 0.06  0.25  678 0.06  0.24  N 0 1 
tch_exp 6298 2.40  1.12  678 2.40  1.14  N 1 4 
tch_mthgain 6298 3.63  1.72  678 3.44  1.81  Y 1 6 
tch_paydelayed 6298 0.37  0.48  678 0.29  0.46  Y 0 1 
subtch_origin 6298 2.70  1.14  678 2.91  1.17  Y 1 4 
subtch_edu 6298 2.54  1.19  678 2.49  1.20  N 1 4 
subtch_exp 6298 2.57  1.04  678 2.50  1.04  N 1 4 
 
tch_origin Homeroom teacher's origin; 1 to 4 for local town/other town in county/other place in province/other province 
tch_edu Homeroom teacher's level of education; 1/0 for college/non-college 
tch_admin Homeroom teacher holds other administrative position in the school; 1/0=Yes/No 
tch_exp Homeroom teacher's experience as fulltime teacher; 1 to 4 for 2 years or less/3 or 4 years/5~10 years/over 
10 years 
tch_mthgain Homeroom teacher's monthly income; divided into 6 quantiles 
tch_paydelayed Homeroom teacher experienced pay delayed in the past 6 month; 1/0=Yes/No 
subtch_origin Key subject (Chinese/math/English) teacher origin; take means and divide into 4 quantiles 
subtch_edu Key subject (Chinese/math/English) teacher level of education; take means and divide into 4 quantiles 
subtch_exp Sum of key subject teacher experience as fulltime teacher; take means and divide into 4 quantiles 
 
Variables for school characteristics are mostly for controlling purpose, except for schooling 
distance which was reported at individual level and then divided into six quantiles. The mean 
distance for the treated sample is far smaller than that of the whole sample (2.44 vs. 3.05), and there 




echoes the Delphi conclusion that schooling distance is influential in the possibility of Lighthouse 
participation.    
   
Table 5-10 Summary Statistics_ School 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
classsize 6298 2.34  1.06  678 2.22  0.97  Y 1 4 
distance 5972 3.05  1.73  656 2.44  1.56  Y 1 6 
survival 6298 0.48  0.50  678 0.47  0.50  N 0 1 
school1 6298 0.14  0.35  678 N/A N/A N/A 0 1 
school2 6298 0.07  0.26  678 0.14  0.35  Y 0 1 
school3 6298 0.06  0.23  678 0.14  0.34  Y 0 1 
school4 6298 0.12  0.32  678 0.13  0.34  N 0 1 
school5 6298 0.13  0.33  678 0.12  0.33  N 0 1 
school6 6298 0.08  0.27  678 0.14  0.35  Y 0 1 
school7 6298 0.25  0.44  678 0.33  0.47  Y 0 1 
school8 6298 0.15  0.36  678 N/A N/A N/A 0 1 
 
classsize Classsize; divided into 4 quantiles 
distance Traveling time to school; divided into 6 quantiles 
survival School has relatively high retention rate (>66%) 
school1 HL School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school2 QB School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school3 QD School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school4 HQ School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school5 HS School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school6 HT School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school7 HY School; 1/0=Yes/No 
school8 HA School; 1/0=Yes/No 
 
5.2.5 Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints 
The category of household economic status and credit constraints contains not only wealth, 
income, credits, but also the number of household members (housesize), as this determines the 
average resources each member can receive. Although this category is supposed to be important for 
PCED, its complexity results in a large amount of missing data. The data could also be seriously 




area of China. The summaries are presented in Table 5-11. In the section for robustness, I have 
regression excluding high-missing-data variables of income and credit. 
 
Table 5-11 Summary Statistics_ Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
wealth 6298 2.13  0.94  678 2.06  1.00  N 1 4 
housesize 5449 2.18  1.12  549 2.36  1.16  Y 1 4 
income 4230 3.44  1.68  452 3.50  1.64  N 1 6 
credit_financiali 3163 3.21  1.68  356 3.33  1.72  N 1 6 
credit_relative 3624 3.20  1.65  395 3.40  1.66  Y 1 6 
 
wealth Wealth status; 1 to 4 based on the availability of cement house, computer/internet/car, and motor cycle 
housesize Household size; divided into 4 quantiles 
income Log of household income; divided into 6 quantiles 
credit_financiali Log of available credit from bank or credit cooperative; divided into 6 quantiles 
credit_relative Log of available credit from relative; divided into 6 quantiles 
 
5.2.6 Subjective Factors 
In this study, subjective factors include a student’s personality, career expectations, perceptions 
of school life, perceptions of their family’s attitude to their study and emotions, as well as teacher 
PCED preferences. All variables are presented in quantiles of the raw value, except for the career 
expectations. Over one third of the students hope for a career in the field of science, technology, or 
government, which are considered advanced options in China, but close to one quarter of students 
were satisfied with agriculture or manufacturing, as were most of their parents. In the treated 
sample and either the full sample or the Lighthouse-school sample, there are statistically significant 
differences when it comes to educational aspiration, affiliation to school, and curiosity. From 
summary statistics, one cannot tell whether these are the determinants or results of Lighthouse 





Table 5-12 Summary Statistics_ Subjective Factors 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
stu_eduaspiration 5009 3.27  1.33  565 3.41  1.27  Y 1 5 
expect_norm 4624 0.23  0.42  543 0.24  0.43  N 0 1 
expect_advanced 4624 0.37  0.48  543 0.38  0.49  N 0 1 
percep_schquality 6194 3.38  1.65  666 3.33  1.63  N 1 6 
percep_schaffiliation 6210 3.45  1.70  668 3.73  1.72  Y 1 6 
percep_schvalue 6180 2.38  1.16  664 2.45  1.16  N 1 4 
percep_scheffort 6172 2.18  1.00  665 2.21  0.97  N 1 4 
confidence 6271 3.33  1.68  676 3.45  1.75  N 1 6 
courage 6268 3.30  1.74  676 3.32  1.74  N 1 6 
curiosity 6273 3.02  1.74  678 3.17  1.80  Y 1 6 
ambition 6258 3.13  1.71  675 3.13  1.71  N 1 6 
familyonstudy 6008 2.97  1.48  664 2.91  1.52  N 1 5 
familyonemo 6010 3.31  1.72  664 3.20  1.75  N 1 6 
tchr_contvsstop 6138 2.60  1.07  637 2.79  1.07  Y 1 4 
tchr_genvsvoc 6298 1.99  1.29  678 1.97  1.22  N 1 4 
 
stu_eduaspiration Expected highest level of education, 1 to 5 for lower secondary/vocational high/academic 
high/college/graduate school 
expect_norm Expect agriculture or manufacturing as future career; 1/0=Yes/No 
expect_advanced Expect science, technology, or government as future career; 1/0=Yes/No 
percep_schquality Perception of school quality; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
percep_schaffiliation Emotional attachment to school; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 
quantiles 
percep_schvalue Perceived value of schooling; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 4 quantiles 
percep_scheffort Willingness to study; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 4 quantiles 
confidence Level of confidence; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
courage Level of courage; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
curiosity Level of curiosity; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
ambition Level of ambition; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
familyonstudy Level the family cares about their study and PCED, perceived by the student; take mean of the 
ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles (end up only category 1 to 5 available) 
familyonemo Level the family cares about their emotional status and respects their opinion, perceived by the 
student; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
tchr_contvsstop Homeroom teacher's preference for continuing education over stopping education; take ratio of the 
ratings and divide into 4 quantiles 
tchr_genvsvoc Homeroom teacher's preference for academic high school over vocational high school; take ratio of 






38% of students in the sample suffered from one or more common health problems, such as 
anemia and hepatitis, and 48% had absenteeism due to health problems or experiencing symptoms that 
directly affected study, such as feeling hungry/dizzy in class or having eyesight problems. QD school has 
very high rate of Lighthouse students (25.3%), students reporting sickness (68.9%), and students with 
sickness related to class attendance (56.4%), increasing the mean values for the treated sample.  
 
Table 5-13 Summary Statistics_ Health 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
sick 5516 0.38  0.49  602 0.44  0.50  Y 0 1 
sick_class 6210 0.48  0.50  672 0.54  0.50  Y 0 1 
 
sick Suffers disease(s); 1/0=Yes/No 
sick_class Suffers health issues that directly affect study, namely feeling hungry/dizzy during class and having 
eyesight problem; 1/0=Yes/No 
 
5.2.8 Monetary Costs and Rewards 
For each PCED, the ratios of household estimates for different PCED costs, as well as the ratios of 
student estimates for earnings at 35 years old, were transformed into quantiles to construct the 
variables for monetary costs/rewards. The purpose of this group of variables is to test how PCED 
varies depending on the expectations of relative cost/reward among different PCEDs. As with the 
variables for economic status and credit constraints, missing data could be an issue for the accuracy 
of regression results. 
 
Table 5-14 Summary Statistics_ Monetary Costs and Rewards 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          




cost_genvsvoc 3202 3.24  1.78  364 3.20  1.79  N 1 6 
cost_colvsgen 3171 3.51  1.71  361 3.66  1.74  N 1 6 
earn_workvsdrop 4189 3.49  1.69  519 3.33  1.74  Y 1 6 
earn_vocvswork 4137 3.51  1.69  518 3.42  1.73  N 1 6 
earn_genvsvoc 4136 3.33  1.64  517 3.38  1.64  N 1 6 
earn_colvsgen 4123 3.43  1.68  518 3.35  1.67  N 1 6 
 
cost_vocvsjunior Cost of VHS relative to cost of middle school, perceived by the household; take ratio of the amounts 
and divide into 6 quantiles 
cost_genvsvoc Cost of AHS relative to cost of VHS, perceived by the household; take ratio of the amounts and divide 
into 6 quantiles 
cost_colvsgen Cost of college relative to cost of AHS, perceived by the household; take ratio of the amounts and 
divide into 6 quantiles 
earn_workvsdrop Expected relative earning in 35 if work-after-graduation instead of dropout, perceived by both the 
household and the student; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 quantiles 
earn_vocvswork Expected relative earnings at 35 if continue to VHS instead of work, perceived by both the household 
and the student; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 quantiles 
earn_genvsvoc Expected relative earnings at 35 if continue to AHS instead of VHS, perceived by both the household 
and the student; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 quantiles 
earn_colvsgen Expected relative earnings at 35 if continue to college instead of AHS, perceived by both the household 
and the student; take ratio of the amounts and divide into 6 quantiles 
 
5.2.9 Academic Performance and Other Variables 
The last group of MNL variables does not belong to one single classification, but are suggested in 
the Delphi survey as potential PCED determinants for the surveyed area. Academic performance is 
the most familiar, and in the descriptive statistics for expected and actual PCED we already knew that 
it does not completely decide a student’s fate since the HSEE score cutoff is becoming vague for the 
current generation. However, performance is still supposed to be one of the strongest “traditional” 
PCED determinants. Other variables in this group offer information hard to find in literature. For 
example, we now know that 10% of students are young lovers, 8% of students have been involved 
with gambling, and about one third of the survey students used to stay in cities for over one month.   
Among the variables with different mean values between whole and treated samples, it is 
interesting to see that Lighthouse students are quite different from their classmates in the same 
school, as they or their families had better knowledge of VHS policies, higher academic performance, 





Table 5-15 Summary Statistics_ Academic Performance and Other Variables 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
knowvoc 5650 1.64  0.66  630 1.73  0.68  Y 1 4 
performance 4358 2.53  1.12  532 2.72  1.12  Y 1 4 
business 5474 0.05  0.23  551 0.08  0.27  Y 0 1 
interpersonal 6295 3.52  1.69  678 3.49  1.70  N 1 6 
urbanlife 5538 0.32  0.47  602 0.38  0.48  Y 0 1 
outreach_voc 5830 0.14  0.34  658 0.14  0.35  N 0 1 
outreach_fac 5853 0.12  0.32  660 0.13  0.34  N 0 1 
local_negative 5814 0.07  0.26  649 0.09  0.29  N 0 1 
local_entertain 5915 0.07  0.26  662 0.08  0.27  N 0 1 
gambling 6071 0.08  0.27  658 0.09  0.29  N 0 1 
schatmos 6298 0.40  0.49  678 0.53  0.50  Y 0 1 
chore 5419 2.23  1.31  616 2.18  1.30  N 1 4 
love 6228 0.10  0.30  666 0.14  0.34  Y 0 1 
grade_7 6298 0.39  0.49  678 0.34  0.48  Y 0 1 
grade_8 6298 0.33  0.47  678 0.31  0.46  N 0 1 
grade_9 6298 0.27  0.45  678 0.35  0.48  Y 0 1 
 
knowvoc Students and their family's knowledge on vocational education policies; 1 to 4 for No to Very Much 
performance Academic performance; take mean of both ranking and score and then divide into 4 quantiles within 
school 
business Has family business to inherit; 1/0=Yes/No 
interpersonal Situation of interpersonal relationships in school; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 
6 quantiles 
urbanlife Used to stay in nearby cities for over 1 month; 1/0=Yes/No 
outreach_voc Perceived frequent outreaches from vocational schools; 1/0=Yes/No 
outreach_fac Perceived frequent outreaches from factories; 1/0=Yes/No 
local_negative Holds very negative views of local development; 1/0=Yes/No 
local_entertain Perceived prevalence of entertainment industries (KTV, gambling or illegal lottery, internet bar) in the 
neighborhood; 1/0=Yes/No 
gambling Has been involved with gambling or illegal lottery; 1/0=Yes/No 
schatmos School has relatively good study atmosphere (level of violence, cheating, class discipline); 1/0=Yes(> 
mean value)/No 
chore Time spent on household chores; divided into 4 quantiles 
love Was or is in love with someone; 1/0=Yes/No. Considering the sensitivity of this topic for teenagers, this 
question was asked with 6 options from strongly disagree to strongly agree, so student can answer 
“basically agree” if they feel shy about confirming the relationship 
grade_7 Study in Grade One of the middle school; 1/0=Yes/No 
grade_8 Study in Grade Two of the middle school; 1/0=Yes/No 





5.2.10 Additional Variables for Treatment Outcomes or Determinants 
A final list of variable consists of six variables that will only be used for propensity score matching, 
all of which are in quantile form. Household attitudes to summer camp appear to be a factor of 
interest. The mean is 3.13 for the treated sample, 2.93 for the whole sample, and actually even 




Table 5-16 Summary Statistics_ Additional Variables Related to Treatment 
 Whole Sample Treated Stat. 
Dif.? 
Min Max 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
extraversion 6294 3.38  1.69  678 3.37  1.72  N 1 6 
affiliationneed 6230 2.98  1.53  673 3.04  1.57  N 1 6 
atti_chore_farm 6225 3.64  1.29  669 3.60  1.30  N 1 6 
other_act 5173 3.08  1.57  520 3.20  1.61  N 1 6 
peertreated 4462 3.08  0.83  678 3.45  0.70  Y 1 4 
attoncamp 5321 2.93  1.68  525 3.13  1.75  Y 1 6 
 
extraversion Level of extraversion; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
affiliationneed Level of need for affiliation; take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
atti_chore_farm Attitude towards housechore/farm works; 1 to 6 for hate to love 
other_act Level of other activities (household chores/farm work/city visits or job), according to the household; 
take mean of the ratings to related items and divide into 6 quantiles 
peertreated Popularity of Lighthouse participation among classmates (Lighthouse participants as % to the 
class); divided into 4 quantiles 
attoncamp How supportive the household is of participating in summer camp or how much they respect the 
student’s own preference; take mean of the ratings and divide into 6 quantiles 










Chapter 6 Empirical Results for PCED Determinants 
This chapter evaluates potential PCED determinants based on the multiple-imputed MNL model 
adopting all independent variables. As explained in the research design chapter, other forms of 
regression results (e.g. recursive, step-up) will not be presented because the full-model presentation 
serves well for the transition to the impact evaluation in Chapter 7. For succinctness, only Relative 
Risk Ratios (RRR) and asterisks for p-values are presented. One asterisk is given to estimates that are 
statistically significant at the 10% level, so we may know what variables could have a chance to be 
significant at 5% when we alter the sample or specification (for robustness), or when we apply the 
model to a subgroup (for heterogeneity), however the interpretation here will focus on those really 
having p values smaller than 0.05. Detailed MNL outputs can be found in Appendix E. Following the 
presentation of main-model results, the chapter also tests robustness by offering results from other 
samples and specifications, and heterogeneity tests focusing on how the PCED determinants vary 
across gender, wealth, and academic performance. To draw a big picture by comparing the PCED 
determinants, scatter graphs are used to visualize the standardized coefficients and absolute z scores 
of all variables. The chapter ends with a summary of findings, highlighting the differences with, and 
new contributions to, the literature. 
Before unfolding the analyses, there are four issues to note. Firstly, the MNL in this study satisfies 
the IIA assumption. I converted all independent variables to dummies for the seemingly unrelated 
estimation (SUE)-based Hausman test. The p value obtained is close to 1, which means one cannot 
reject the equality of the common coefficients across PCED. I also applied the same list of variables 
to multinomial probit (MNP), which is free of IIA assumption. Although MNL and MNP results are not 
comparable, they do show the similar relative size of coefficients and z scores. MNP results are 
omitted. 
The second clarification is related to the number of independent variables. For the full sample, 




cause worry about multicollinearity. Fortunately, these 84 variables have weak correlation with each 
other; for most of the pairs the absolute correlations barely pass 0.1, let alone the weak-correlation 
cutoff of 0.3. Specified collinearity test provided mixed results. It appears that school and grade 
dummies can create high collinearity, but they are necessary for controlling purposes. Once the 
school/grade dummies are taken out, the mean variance inflation factors (VIF) of 1.68 and 
no-intercept condition index of 6.5 are far from the red lines of 10 and 30. Since I will not discard 
school and grade dummies73, the safest response to multicollinearity is to see if effect sizes or 
significant levels change drastically when applying different samples/specifications. This will be dealt 
with in Section 6.2. A related note to this is that the full sample/full specification model is also that 
with the lowest Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), meaning 
it carries the most appropriate variable combination for PCED prediction.  
 The third note is about missing data, for which the study applies five imputations as suggested 
by Rubin (1987). Because statistical packages do not allow for many additional tests following MI 
MNL, all the above tests except the collinearity tests are conducted imputation by imputation. The 
results are consistent across the five imputed samples. Although no imputation is perfect, applying 
the same model to samples with less missing data can help identify whether there is a large bias in 
estimates. This is included in the discussion of robustness in Section 6.2.  
The final note to make is on the role of Lighthouse treatment. The treatment dummy is not 
included in the full-specification MNL for PCED determinants. It is assumed that socio-emotional 
support affects PCED through mediators that are already included in the model. Lighthouse itself 
does not mention education decisions as something it aims to change. Nevertheless, including a 
treatment variable to observe its statistical significance can help uncovered whether Lighthouse 
impacts are fully captured by other variables, or if there are determinants of Lighthouse participation 
that happen to be PCED determinants that are overlooked. This chapter includes treatment variables 
only for one robustness-check model (column (2) in Table 6-10 and 6-11), but the next chapter will 
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have more discussion about what happens if treatment variables are included in the PCED 
regressions.    
 
6.1 Determinants of PCED 
In this section, imputed MNL results are reported as RRR according to the classifications of 
determinants presented in Chapter 574. From Table 6-1 to Table 6-9, the columns are for the three 
non-baseline (non-AHS) PCEDs plus undecided, and the rows are for independent variables. RRR is 
obtained by exponentiating the MNL coefficients to describe how the relative odds between one 
outcome and the base outcome will change given one unit of change in an independent variable. 
This is mathematically easy to understand. For example, holding all other factors constant, if the 
probability of choosing VHS instead of AHS rises from 40% to 80% due to an increase of 1 unit in a 
variable, than the RRR for that variable is 80%/40%=2. When RRR=1, it means no relative change at 
all, although the two options can change together in the same manner. 
Results in this section are all obtained from the fully imputed sample of 6298 students. Within 
each imputation, MNL gives a McFadden’s pseudo R-squared around 0.18, indicating a satisfactory 
goodness of fit, as exceeding 0.2 means extremely good fit (Domencich & McFadden, 1975). 
Nevertheless, the focus here is not perfect prediction, but to identify real relationships between 
PCED and its potential determinants, which are given by p values. 
6.1.1 Gender, Age and Ethnicity 
Gender impact does not follow suggestions in the literature for the surveyed towns. It turns out 
that the PCED of girls are not more elastic to income, performance, or expected PCED cost than 
those of boys. Rather, the old theory that girls are more likely to go with “disadvantageous” options 
are proven to be true. This is in line with Guangdong’s image as a province of gender discrimination 
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against girls. Being relatively old is also influential, by relatively increasing the possibility of choosing 
work or undecided, although the magnitudes are not impressive. Ethnicity does not play any role in 
PCED. This is probably due to the domination of minority students in just one school, which makes it 
hard to tell if any difference is a result of ethnicity or just a school fixed effect. 
Table 6-1 Relative Risk Ratios_ Gender, Age and Ethnicity 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
female 3.03** 1.93** 1.85** 2.12*** 
f_income 0.9 1.05 1.08 1.08 
f_performance 0.94 1.08 1.21 1.06 
f_cost 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.91* 
age 1.4 1.32** 1.07 1.24** 
minority 0.25 1.02 0.53 1.52 
Note: Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Please refer to Table 4-4 for variable description. 
 
6.1.2 Parental Background 
Surprisingly, parental background is no longer a powerful PCED determinant when the regression 
includes a comprehensive list of other factors. The sole clear trend to be found is that students of an 
incomplete family (single_p, migrant_p, no_p) are more likely to think of their PCED seriously, with 
the RRR for undecided all around 0.7. A natural explanation for this is that the children in these 
incomplete families tend to be more independent, and at their adolescent age know that they are 
going to take more responsibility for the family. Such findings are indeed important. The impact can 
actually be the opposite because these students do not receive as much advice from parents as their 
peers, but such assumptions are now rejected. Of other parental factors, education, health, and 
identity of the parents do not play strong roles in PCED. This is another interesting finding as they all 
are convenient variables in many studies. 
Table 6-2 Relative Risk Ratios_ Parental Background 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
single_p 0.39* 0.78 0.73* 0.66** 
migrant_p 0.9 0.97 1.03 0.71*** 
no_p 1.13 1.04 0.88 0.65*** 




fedu 1.06 0.91* 1.01 0.98 
peasant 0.72 0.86 0.93 0.92 
politicalc 1.38 0.99 1.06 0.93 
parent_leader 1.62 0.93 0.74 1.08 
parentbadhealth 3.19 1.13 1.17 0.89 
Note: Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Please refer to Table 4-4 for variable description. 
 
6.1.3 Number of Siblings and Birth Order 
Number of siblings, but not birth order, plays a role in determining PCED. Larger numbers 
of siblings increase the relative odds of work and VHS, both of which are faster ways of 
entering the labor market than AHS. The RRR is however just slightly over 1, meaning a small 
effect size. Having an older sister(s) may increase the odds of AHS, and being relatively old 
among the siblings may lower the odd, both of these match the theory, yet are statistically 
insignificant.   
Table 6-3 Relative Risk Ratios_ Siblings and Birth Order 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
sibship 1.2 1.16*** 1.09** 1.07 
witheldersister 0.82 0.78* 0.97 0.96 
eldercohort 0.86 1 1.1 1.22* 
Note: Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Please refer to Table 4-4 for variable description. 
 
6.1.4 Peer, Teacher and School Factors 
Peer, teacher and school factors are found to be influential on PCED. For peer effects, a larger 
migrant network is correlated to greater AHS odds, implying that a large migrant network may 
remind students of the benefit of vocational skills, rather than encourage more teenagers to become 
low-skilled migrant workers, however the RRR is statistically insignificant. The other peer-effect 
variable, mean parental education level in class, gives significant yet counter-intuitive results. If a 




work or being undecided against AHS. Since a class of more educated parents could mean better 
access to different information, the association with undecided is understandable. It is more of a 
mystery to see the effect on work, which will be further discussed in the sections on robustness and 
heterogeneity. 
The two related influential factors in teacher characteristics are a homeroom teacher’s education 
and experience. If the teacher has a college degree, the student’s relative odds of work or VHS are 
higher; and if the teacher has more years of experience, the relative odds of AHS are higher against 
all other options. It is true that a teacher’s experience and education can have an impact in either 
direction, but also true that schools may assign teachers based on their own rules, such as assigning 
more experienced teacher to classes with higher AHS hopes. There should be reservations about 
which direction the causality dominates. Other teacher characteristics such as origin, administrative 
role, income and payment delay do not matter much for student PCED, and, as expected, subject 
teachers matter less than homeroom teachers. After all, homeroom teachers are not only 
academically but also emotionally responsible for students. 
The last group in this category is school characteristics. Class size and schooling distance are not 
significantly related to PCED. Based on the literature, these two factors might be more influential in 
primary school children than in lower secondary school students in this sample. Students from 
schools of higher survival rates have a much lower risk of choosing VHS or undecided relative to AHS. 
This is understandable as the main incentive for staying in a school is the opportunity of getting into 
AHS. A low survival rate could be due to dropout, transfer, or early VHS enrollment. Finally, the range 
of RRR plus the number of asterisks illustrate how different the schools are in this sample. It also 
confirmed that there are remain unobserved school/town-level determinants, even though the 
regression has already controlled for so many variables. 
Table 6-4 Relative Risk Ratios_ Peer, Teacher and School Factors 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
mignetwork 0.92 0.86 0.95 0.83* 




tch_origin 1.11 0.88* 1 1 
tch_edu 1.13 1.42** 1.32** 1.15 
tch_admin 1 0.95 0.97 1.31 
tch_exp 0.71* 0.85** 0.87*** 0.89** 
tch_mthgain 1.01 1.05 1.06* 1.07* 
tch_paydelayed 0.71 1.1 1.02 1.15 
subtch_origin 0.92 1.08 1.02 1.14** 
subtch_edu 0.98 0.93 0.95 1.01 
subtch_exp 1.12 0.94 1.03 1.04 
classsize 1.05 1.07 1.01 0.95 
distance 1.2* 1.03 1.02 0.99 
survival 0.25 0.59 0.42*** 0.37*** 
school1 0.41 0.57* 0.4*** 0.4*** 
school2 0.47 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.56* 
school3 1.41 0.99 0.57 0.2** 
school4 0.39 0.76 0.57** 0.64 
school5 — — — — 
school6 1.32 1.13 1.04 1.77** 
school7 5.5* 1.08 1.67** 2.07*** 
school8 — — — — 
Note: Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Please refer to Table 4-4 for variable description. 
 
6.1.5 Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints 
In the category of household economic status and credit constraints, the most popular variables 
of wealth and income matter the most. In rural areas, being rich and having a higher income are 
correlated, but that correlation dos not need to be strong, as households largely inherit wealth from 
the previous generation. What is true is that both richness and high income promote the relative 
odds of AHS. Household size is not influential, nor are the credit constraints, although that could be 
due to high missing data and the household’s inaccurate estimates.  
Table 6-5 Relative Risk Ratios_ Household Economic Status and Credit Constraints 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
wealth 0.62*** 0.83*** 0.96 0.85*** 
housesize 0.95 1.01 0.94 1.02 
income 0.89 0.88* 0.89*** 0.88** 
credit_financiali 1.05 1.07 1.03 1.08 
credit_relative 1.07 0.97 0.96 0.97 





6.1.6 Subjective Factors 
Most subjective factors are significantly correlated with PCED. A student’s educational aspiration 
is strongly linked to the preference of AHS - in current China, AHS remains the main gate toward 
college and graduate education. It is worth noting that this correlation stays strong even though 
performance and family background are thoroughly controlled. This reveals that PCED should not be 
considered merely a “pure rational” process counting ability, affordability and returns. Career 
expectation also predicts PCED in a predictable way. If a student is expecting a normal low-skilled 
career, they will choose work or undecided, and vice versa for those thinking of an advanced career 
in science, technology or government.  
Student perceptions towards schooling form another subgroup of subjective factors. Except the 
perceived quality of current school, all perceptions matter for PCED. Affiliation to school leads to 
lower relative odds for options that will take the students out of school, namely dropout, work, and 
undecided. The perceived value of schooling is related to higher relative odds of VHS, still an option 
of continuing schooling. Willingness to study is related lower in the relative odds of work and 
undecided, which is self-explanatory. 
In terms of personality, confidence, courage, curiosity, and ambition all have statistically 
significant connections with PCED, ceteris paribus. Confidence, courage and ambition are correlated 
with each other, but they do have differences. Simply speaking, confidence is to trust that oneself 
can do something right, courage is to be brave enough to start and persist in that thing, and ambition 
is to have something better in mind for the future. According to the MNL results, RRR for courage 
and ambition actually point in different directions. Students with higher level of courage have lower 
odds of dropout, VHS and undecided, while interestingly students with higher ambition have higher 
odds of dropout, work, and VHS. A possible explanation for the ambition-PCED relationship is that 




be captured by variables related to SES. This will be further discussed in the section on robustness 
and heterogeneity. For the other two personality variables, confidence is linked to higher relative 
odds of VHS, and curiosity is linked to lower relative odds of VHS/undecided, both with small 
magnitudes.  
The last subgroup of subjective factors involves household and teacher attitudes. The more a 
family cares about a student’s study and PCED, the lower the relative odds of work or undecided, 
however PCED is not affected by how a family care about the student’s emotional status or respect 
their opinion. With regard to homeroom teacher PCED preference, it appears that the more a 
teacher prefers AHS against VHS, the higher relative odds of AHS, however a teacher’s preference for 
continuing schooling against stopping education does not change the odds of any option. In other 
words, teacher preference has an impact on student when it comes to schooling track. 
Table 6-6 Relative Risk Ratios_ Subjective Factors 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
stu_eduaspiration 0.46*** 0.39*** 0.75*** 0.66*** 
expect_norm 1.72* 1.51*** 0.99 1.3** 
expect_advanced 0.74 0.62*** 1.02 0.77* 
percep_schquality 0.98 1.05 1.04 1.05 
percep_schaffiliation 0.79** 0.88*** 0.96 0.91*** 
percep_schvalue 0.78 1.01 1.11** 0.96 
percep_scheffort 0.84 0.86* 0.92 0.88** 
Confidence 1.15 1.01 1.08** 1.05 
Courage 0.81*** 0.95 0.93*** 0.91*** 
Curiosity 0.87 0.96 0.94** 0.92*** 
Ambition 1.18** 1.1** 1.07** 1.01 
Familyonstudy 0.83 0.89** 0.98 0.9*** 
Familyonemo 1.09 0.96 0.99 1.01 
tchr_contvsstop 0.95 0.9 1.02 1.03 
tchr_genvsvoc 0.82* 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 






Health may affect academic performance and make a student more or less likely to pursue 
additional schooling, however since academic performance is already included in the regression, the 
results for health, especially health issues related to class attendance/performance, will inform other 
information. Suffering disease appears to lower the relative odds of work. A possible explanation for 
this is that a sick student knows about their incapacity for low-skill labor work, so they are inclined to 
continue with more schooling. 
Table 6-7 Relative Risk Ratios_ Health 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
sick 0.56 0.71*** 0.96 0.87 
sick_class 1.19 1.15 1.02 1.04 
Note: Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Please refer to Table 4-4 for variable description. 
 
6.1.8 Monetary Costs and Rewards 
The regression results for monetary costs and rewards suggest that PCED is more sensitive to the 
relative return than the relative cost of different options. If the household perceives higher AHS cost 
than VHS cost, their children have lower relative odds of choosing VHS. This is quite strange. It 
cannot be explained by common arguments such as “cost is a proxy of quality” because that effect 
should be captured by relative earning expectation. Indeed, both the relative earning expectations of 
“AHS vs. VHS” and “College vs. AHS” are strongly and positively correlated to the relative odds of AHS. 
There are two other possible reasons for the counter-intuitive cost effect. One is the nearly 50% 
missing data for that variable (cost_genvsvoc). Too many imputations will simply turn an insignificant 
coefficient into one that is significant. The other possible reason is that the construction of cost 
variables only reflects household opinions, while earning variables are the mean of the household 
and student opinions. In other words, these cost and earning variables are not totally comparable. 




expected rewards, as they can learn about these from the teachers as well as by observing adults 
with different education backgrounds. Finally, it is interesting to see that that the relative earnings of 
work against dropout increases the undecided odd, although at small magnitudes. Overall, caution is 
needed in interpretation as this group of variables relies on a large number of imputations. 
Table 6-8 Relative Risk Ratios_ Monetary Costs and Rewards 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
cost_vocvsjunior 1 1.03 1 1.04 
cost_genvsvoc 0.92 0.87* 0.86*** 0.95 
cost_colvsgen 0.95 0.9 0.96 0.95 
earn_workvsdrop 1.11 1.05 1.05 1.1** 
earn_vocvswork 0.84 0.99 0.96 0.91* 
earn_genvsvoc 0.65*** 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.79*** 
earn_colvsgen 0.67*** 0.84*** 0.87*** 0.85*** 
Note: Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Please refer to Table 4-4 for variable description. 
 
6.1.9 Academic Performance and Other Variables 
Some other candidates of PCED determinants show clear influence, as expected. The relative 
odds of work, VHS, and undecided are much lower for students with better test scores. Knowledge of 
vocational education also shows the expected association with the relative odds of VHS with a RRR of 
1.28, and being in love with someone is associated with higher odds of dropout, work, and 
undecided. It should be noted that some causal inferences could be two-way. For example, students 
and households might choose VHS because they know more about it, or because they have already 
chosen VHS they have done more research on VHS policies. Finally the grade dummies show the 
apparent attrition of students as they climb the grade, and that Grade 7 and Grade 8 students have 
much more diversity of PCED compared to the base group of Grade 9 students. Of course, grade 
dummies also help capture the rest of the unobserved grade-level factors. 
Some variables yield results neither easily predicted nor counter-intuitive. Urban life experience 
lowers the relative odds of work or undecided. It seems urban experience helps students to realize 




The prevalence of local entertainment industries and the time spent on household chores are two 
variables without clear theory guidance. The regression results show that the former raises the 
relative odds of VHS, while the latter is associated to higher relative odds of work.  
There are also variables showing no statistical association to PCED. These are the availability of 
family business, interpersonal relations in school, outreach of vocational schools/factories, prospect 
of local development, and involvement with gambling.  
Table 6-9 Relative Risk Ratios_ Academic Performance and Other Variables 
 Dropout Work VHS Undecided 
knowvoc 1.04 1.18 1.28*** 0.9 
performance 0.73 0.68*** 0.84*** 0.71*** 
business 0.38 0.52* 0.93 0.72 
interpersonal 1.01 0.94* 1.05* 1.02 
urbanlife 0.73 0.73** 0.9 0.77** 
outreach_voc 0.73 0.99 0.96 0.91 
outreach_fac 0.89 1.35 1.18 1.3 
local_negative 0.66 1.47* 1.34 1.06 
local_entertain 1.37 1.04 1.44** 1.09 
gambling 1.34 0.91 1.05 1.13 
chore 1.15 1.16*** 1.04 1.01 
love 3.59*** 1.71*** 1.18 1.56** 
grade_7 3.11*** 1.85*** 1.41** 1.73*** 
grade_8 1.8 1.68*** 1.65*** 2.1*** 
grade_9 — — — — 
Note: Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Please refer to Table 4-4 for variable description. 
 
6.2 Robustness  
The complexity of variable constructions, the concern about multicollinearity, and the missing 
data issue all remind us of the importance of examining how PCED determinants behave with 
different specifications and samples. Since one of the major purposes of applying a comprehensive 
variable list is to be free from problems caused by incomplete controls, it is also advisable to explore 
how different the results could be between the full specification and the specification that includes 




education. This section compares the imputed MN outputs for five samples/specifications. Because 
of the large number of results, the RRR for the four non-based outcomes are separated into two 
tables. For each outcome, Column 1 is for the original result, full sample and full specification. 
Column 2 is for the full sample but only conventional variables of basic characteristics, parental 
education, wealth, performance, and school/grade dummies. A Lighthouse treatment dummy is also 
included to lower the impact of uncontrolled factors, but not reported in the table. Column 3 is for 
the full specification but excludes the sample for QD, which has a tradition of early VHS enrollment. 
Column 4 is for the full specification but also excludes the QD sample as well as students who said 
they completely lost their patience during survey (answered “6” for Item e64). Column 5 is for the 
same sample as Column 4, but excluding variables related to money or cost/reward, which includes a 
large proportion of missing data. School and grade dummies serve as fixed effects, which this section 
will not discuss in detail regarding their corresponding estimates.  
Table 6-10 presents the RRR for the outcomes of dropout and work. Since those who want to 
drop out might be out of school and absent for the questionnaire, “dropout” is very small group in 
the sample with very few statistically significant estimates. Four differences can be found among 
different samples and specifications, however. The gender effect is consistently strong in all models 
except that with only conventional variables. This is alarming. Recent literature has tended to suggest 
that gender is less of a determinant of attendance, but perhaps that is just due to over-simple 
specification? At least for the sample in this study, it turns out that we can make a false adjustment if 
we only run regression on those easy variables. Schooling distance becomes statistically significant at 
the 5% level in smaller sample with less imputation (Column 4 and 5). Theoretically, schooling 
distance should be negatively correlated with school attendance. The main model does confirm this, 
but is only significant at the 10% level. Contrary to distance, ambition tends to be less significant in 
other models. Ambition’s positive correlation with dropout is one of the counter-intuitive findings of 
the main model, now it seems this may just reflect the problem of missing data and variable 




for Grade 8 become statistically significant at the 1% level, while in all other models their effects are 
considered random. This is not surprising however, as those two variables are supposed to absorb 
the effect of many other dropout determinants. 
There are also four findings worth mentioning for the outcome of work. Father’s education 
becomes statistically significant in models with fewer control variables: Column (2) and (5). This 
echoes the belief that a father’s education is a strong predictor of schooling decisions, although its 
impact is imposed through mediators such as income and family care for schooling. RRR for 
homeroom teacher origin, outreach of factories, and the size of migrant network tends to be more 
significant in other models. It is easy to see why more factory outreach will increase the possibility of 
choosing work, but it is harder to predict that homeroom teachers from further away discourage the 
work option. Given that teacher taste is already captured by variables of relative preference, the 
plausible explanation for this negative association could be that non-local teachers tend to be 
assigned to classes who are less in favor of the work option. The RRR of 0.79 at the 5% significance 
level for migrant networks in Specification (5) suggests that a larger migrant network may actually 
strengthen a student’s preference for AHS over work, as students living in this kind of community are 
more aware that further education is a better way to reach urban life than being a migrant worker. As 
for dropout, the estimates for ambition are no longer significant. The last finding from the model 
comparison is that some estimates change between statistical significance and insignificance under 
different samples/specifications. These are gender, age, mean parental education level in class, and 
homeroom teacher education. For gender, the RRR also changes a great deal across models. 
Accordingly, we should not be too certain when making claims related to these variables. 
Table 6-11 presents the RRR for the outcome of VHS and undecided. Five key variables do not 
give consistent results across different models, although the differences are of statistical significance 
only. Number of siblings, perceptions of the value of schooling, and ambition (again) turn from 
significant to insignificant in some of the models, implying that the impact of these factors should be 







Table 6-10 Relative Risk Ratios of “Dropout” and “Work”_ Various Samples and Specifications 
Dropout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  Work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
             
female 3.03** 1.42 3.38** 3.78** 2.74***  female 1.93** 1.22* 1.76* 1.8* 1.6*** 
f_income 0.9  0.89 0.93   f_income 1.05  1.08 1.07  
f_performance 0.94  0.96 0.93 0.9  f_performance 1.08  1.02 1 0.99 
f_cost 0.94  0.92 0.92   f_cost 0.93  0.95 0.95  
age 1.4 1.63 1.42 1.34 1.36  age 1.32** 1.39*** 1.34** 1.31* 1.31** 
minority 0.25 0.2 0 0 0  minority 1.02 1.35 0.68 0.68 0.75 
single_p 0.39*  0.41* 0.43* 0.52  single_p 0.78  0.78 0.81 0.91 
migrant_p 0.9  0.82 0.84 0.77  migrant_p 0.97  0.89 0.88 0.86 
no_p 1.13  0.93 1.01 0.92  no_p 1.04  0.99 1.07 1.07 
medu 0.9 0.96 0.92 0.9 0.91  medu 0.93 0.95 0.91* 0.9* 0.9* 
fedu 1.06 0.99 1.04 1.03 0.99  fedu 0.91* 0.83*** 0.91* 0.91* 0.88** 
peasant 0.72  0.8 0.82 0.83  peasant 0.86  0.83 0.82 0.85 
politicalc 1.38  1.38 1.34 1.28  politicalc 0.99  0.99 0.96 0.95 
parent_leader 1.62  1.72 1.97 1.96  parent_leader 0.93  0.89 0.94 0.98 
parentbadhealth 3.19  2.45 2.14 2.34  parentbadhealth 1.13  1.01 0.98 1.04 
sibship 1.2  1.18 1.18 1.15  sibship 1.16***  1.16*** 1.14** 1.13*** 
witheldersister 0.82  0.87 0.85 0.8  witheldersister 0.78*  0.8 0.81 0.81 
eldercohort 0.86  0.87 0.83 0.81  eldercohort 1  0.98 0.94 0.94 
mignetwork 0.92  0.92 0.91 0.79  mignetwork 0.86  0.85 0.85 0.79** 
peerpedu 1.91*  1.61 1.88 2.05*  peerpedu 1.53***  1.47* 1.5** 1.58** 
tch_origin 1.11  1.06 1.07 1.1  tch_origin 0.88*  0.84** 0.83** 0.84** 
tch_edu 1.13  1.27 1.31 1.33  tch_edu 1.42**  1.44* 1.45* 1.46** 







tch_exp 0.71*  0.71* 0.7** 0.71*  tch_exp 0.85**  0.88* 0.88* 0.88* 
tch_mthgain 1.01  1.01 1 1.01  tch_mthgain 1.05  1.05 1.04 1.04 
tch_paydelayed 0.71  0.77 0.81 0.79  tch_paydelayed 1.1  1.11 1.15 1.21 
subtch_origin 0.92  0.94 0.96 0.95  subtch_origin 1.08  1.11 1.1 1.09 
subtch_edu 0.98  0.98 0.94 0.91  subtch_edu 0.93  0.95 0.95 0.93 
subtch_exp 1.12  1.1 1.12 1.12  subtch_exp 0.94  0.91 0.9 0.92 
classsize 1.05  1.08 1.07 1.06  classsize 1.07  1.07 1.06 1.05 
distance 1.2*  1.19* 1.22** 1.23**  distance 1.03  1.03 1.05 1.06 
survival 0.25  0.31 0.26 0.21  survival 0.59  0.65 0.63 0.51* 
school1 0.41 0.94 0.45 0.43 0.31*  school1 0.57* 0.79 0.61 0.58 0.49** 
school2 0.47 0.77 0.45 0.35 0.37  school2 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 
school3 1.41 5.26     school3 0.99 1.06    
school4 0.39 0.8 0.39 0.38 0.36  school4 0.76 1.11 0.77 0.71 0.69 
school5  2.15*     school5  1.59**    
school6 1.32 1.15 1.31 1.38 1.59  school6 1.13 1.13 1.2 1.34 1.49 
school7 5.5* 1.36 4.29 5.43 5.99*  school7 1.08 0.75* 0.92 0.94 1.08 
school8       school8      
wealth 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.6***   wealth 0.83*** 0.78*** 0.82*** 0.81***  
housesize 0.95  0.92 0.93   housesize 1.01  0.99 1  
income 0.89  0.89 0.89   income 0.88*  0.89* 0.89**  
credit_financiali 1.05  1.04 1.06   credit_financiali 1.07  1.07 1.08*  
credit_relative 1.07  1.06 1.04   credit_relative 0.97  0.97 0.96  
stu_eduaspiration 0.46***  0.48*** 0.46*** 0.46***  stu_eduaspiration 0.39***  0.39*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 
expect_norm 1.72*  1.77* 1.79* 1.93*  expect_norm 1.51***  1.42*** 1.43*** 1.49*** 
expect_advanced 0.74  0.71 0.67 0.67  expect_advanced 0.62***  0.61*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 







percep_schaffiliation 0.79**  0.8** 0.8* 0.8*  percep_schaffiliation 0.88***  0.89** 0.89** 0.88*** 
percep_schvalue 0.78  0.78 0.77 0.77  percep_schvalue 1.01  0.99 0.97 0.97 
percep_scheffort 0.84  0.85 0.83 0.81  percep_scheffort 0.86*  0.87 0.87 0.86* 
confidence 1.15  1.16 1.18* 1.18*  confidence 1.01  1.01 1.02 1.02 
courage 0.81***  0.82*** 0.82** 0.81**  courage 0.95  0.95 0.95 0.95 
curiosity 0.87  0.87 0.85 0.84*  curiosity 0.96  0.96 0.95 0.95 
ambition 1.18**  1.16* 1.14* 1.12  ambition 1.1**  1.1* 1.08 1.06 
familyonstudy 0.83  0.83* 0.81* 0.81*  familyonstudy 0.89**  0.88*** 0.87** 0.87** 
familyonemo 1.09  1.1 1.1 1.11  familyonemo 0.96  0.97 0.96 0.97 
tchr_contvsstop 0.95  0.93 0.93 0.95  tchr_contvsstop 0.9  0.88* 0.88* 0.9 
tchr_genvsvoc 0.82*  0.85 0.84 0.84  tchr_genvsvoc 0.85***  0.85** 0.83** 0.82*** 
sick 0.56  0.6 0.59 0.62  sick 0.71***  0.7*** 0.71*** 0.74** 
sick_class 1.19  1.2 1.24 1.17  sick_class 1.15  1.18 1.23* 1.18 
cost_vocvsjunior 1  1.02 1.02   cost_vocvsjunior 1.03  1.04 1.04  
cost_genvsvoc 0.92  0.92 0.93   cost_genvsvoc 0.87*  0.88* 0.88  
cost_colvsgen 0.95  0.95 0.96   cost_colvsgen 0.9  0.89 0.89  
earn_workvsdrop 1.11  1.11 1.13   earn_workvsdrop 1.05  1.06 1.07  
earn_vocvswork 0.84  0.87 0.88   earn_vocvswork 0.99  0.99 0.98  
earn_genvsvoc 0.65***  0.66*** 0.66***   earn_genvsvoc 0.82***  0.81*** 0.8***  
earn_colvsgen 0.67***  0.67*** 0.67***   earn_colvsgen 0.84***  0.84*** 0.84***  
knowvoc 1.04  1.06 1.08 1.04  knowvoc 1.18  1.18 1.19 1.16 
performance 0.73 0.57*** 0.73 0.75 0.76  performance 0.68*** 0.56*** 0.68*** 0.67*** 0.68*** 
business 0.38  0.43 0.42 0.38  business 0.52*  0.52* 0.54 0.48* 
interpersonal 1.01  0.99 1 0.98  interpersonal 0.94*  0.93* 0.95 0.95 
urbanlife 0.73  0.73 0.69 0.69  urbanlife 0.73**  0.73** 0.73** 0.69*** 







outreach_fac 0.89  1.04 1.13 1.07  outreach_fac 1.35  1.49* 1.56** 1.58** 
local_negative 0.66  0.64 0.66 0.67  local_negative 1.47*  1.41* 1.43* 1.47* 
local_entertain 1.37  1.51 1.75 1.9  local_entertain 1.04  1.11 1.14 1.17 
gambling 1.34  1.45 1.63 1.55  gambling 0.91  0.91 0.81 0.77 
chore 1.15  1.18 1.17 1.17  chore 1.16***  1.17*** 1.16*** 1.15*** 
love 3.59***  3.63*** 3.78*** 4.19***  love 1.71***  1.84*** 1.83*** 1.86*** 
grade_7 3.11*** 2.54*** 2.93*** 3.43*** 3.96***  grade_7 1.85*** 1.48*** 1.86*** 1.82*** 2.08*** 
grade_8 1.8 2.45*** 1.68 1.85 2.01  grade_8 1.68*** 1.9*** 1.79*** 1.79*** 2*** 
grade_9       grade_9      
Dropout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  Work (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Note: 
Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Model (1) Full sample full specification, N=6298. (2) Full sample but conventional variables. Lighthouse participation (1=yes) included but not reported, the RRR is 1.09 for Dropout and 
0.56*** for Work. There is no big difference in results if Lighthouse participation is excluded. (3) Full specification but excludes the sample for QD, which has a tradition of early VHS admission, 





actually quite easy to understand. Income is not included as a conventional variable because it was 
hard to measure in previous literature. Once income is excluded, its effect is presumably captured by 
wealth, which reflects current income plus that previously inherited. The last variable with a changed 
significance level is the mean parental education level in class. The estimates are significant at the 10% 
level in the original model, but 5% in Columns (3) to (5), with an RRR larger than 1.3. This is no 
mystery since VHS is still about getting more schooling. 
Finally, according to the main model, whether the students have thought about their PCED 
seriously, i.e. are not undecided, was proved to be sensitive to a number of PCED determinants. 
Results from other samples and specifications warn that we cannot be 100% confident of some of 
the effects, as they turn out to be statistically insignificant in some cases. Those variables are age, 
single parents, teacher experience, expectations of a normal career, and the feeling of affiliation to a 
school. On the other hand, migrant network turns out to be significant at the 1% level in 
Specification (5) with an RRR of 0.74, indicating that access to a larger migrant network actually 
makes students believe that getting a further education is a better track than being a migrant worker 
like the last generation. They could move to a city for AHS attendance, and then to a metropolitan 
area if they are able to enter higher education.  
Overall, changing samples and/or specifications alters the statistical significance of certain 
variables, such as ambition, age, homeroom teacher origin and education, mean parental education 
in class (a proxy to peer effect) and perceptions of schooling, but it is good to see that there is no 
large change in RRR. Gender is the only variable with a sharp change in effect size— the gender 
effect declines every time with the conventional variable list. If we recall that recent literature 
tended to find a diminishing gender effect on education decisions, our robustness test suggests that 
this may be due to a simplification of covariates. Gender effect remains worrying when extensive 









Table 6-11 Relative Risk Ratios of “VHS” and “Undecided”_ Various Samples and Specifications 
VHS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  Undecided (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
             
female 1.85** 1.71*** 1.83** 1.85** 1.66***  female 2.12*** 1.51*** 2.06*** 2.06** 1.67*** 
f_income 1.08  1.11 1.11   f_income 1.08  1.1 1.08  
f_performance 1.21  1.14 1.16 1.17  f_performance 1.06  1.04 1.04 1.04 
f_cost 0.95  0.95 0.95   f_cost 0.91*  0.92 0.92  
age 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.02  age 1.24** 1.22* 1.21* 1.2 1.22* 
minority 0.53 0.6 0.37 0.37 0.38  minority 1.52 1.55 0.96 0.96 1.01 
single_p 0.73*  0.72* 0.73 0.81  single_p 0.66**  0.68** 0.7* 0.76 
migrant_p 1.03  1 1 0.99  migrant_p 0.71***  0.68*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 
no_p 0.88  0.84 0.87 0.88  no_p 0.65***  0.64*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 
medu 1.01 1.02 1 1 1  medu 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92* 
fedu 1.01 0.97 1.01 1.01 0.99  fedu 0.98 0.94* 0.98 0.98 0.96 
peasant 0.93  0.93 0.92 0.95  peasant 0.92  0.91 0.91 0.96 
politicalc 1.06  1.05 1.04 1.04  politicalc 0.93  0.95 0.94 0.94 
parent_leader 0.74  0.72 0.77 0.81  parent_leader 1.08  1.03 1.07 1.13 
parentbadhealth 1.17  1.09 1.09 1.13  parentbadhealth 0.89  0.83 0.81 0.84 
sibship 1.09**  1.08** 1.08* 1.06*  sibship 1.07  1.07* 1.06 1.06 
witheldersister 0.97  0.99 1 0.96  witheldersister 0.96  0.95 0.94 0.92 
eldercohort 1.1  1.08 1.07 1.05  eldercohort 1.22*  1.18 1.16 1.15 
mignetwork 0.95  0.98 0.96 0.89  mignetwork 0.83*  0.84 0.82* 0.74*** 
peerpedu 1.22*  1.3** 1.31** 1.45***  peerpedu 1.51***  1.58*** 1.58*** 1.67*** 
tch_origin 1  0.95 0.94 0.95  tch_origin 1  0.96 0.95 0.96 
tch_edu 1.32**  1.43*** 1.49*** 1.49***  tch_edu 1.15  1.16 1.2 1.23 








tch_exp 0.87***  0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87***  tch_exp 0.89**  0.91* 0.91 0.91 
tch_mthgain 1.06*  1.05 1.05 1.06*  tch_mthgain 1.07*  1.06 1.05 1.05 
tch_paydelayed 1.02  1.03 1.06 1.13  tch_paydelayed 1.15  1.16 1.19 1.25* 
subtch_origin 1.02  1.11* 1.12* 1.11*  subtch_origin 1.14**  1.18*** 1.2*** 1.19*** 
subtch_edu 0.95  0.93 0.91 0.89**  subtch_edu 1.01  1.02 1.01 0.99 
subtch_exp 1.03  0.97 0.96 0.98  subtch_exp 1.04  0.98 0.98 0.99 
classsize 1.01  1.04 1.04 1.02  classsize 0.95  0.97 0.98 0.97 
distance 1.02  1.02 1.03 1.03  distance 0.99  1 1.01 1.02 
survival 0.42***  0.49*** 0.48*** 0.41***  survival 0.37***  0.41*** 0.43*** 0.35*** 
school1 0.4*** 0.66*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.38***  school1 0.4*** 0.7** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 
school2 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.24***  school2 0.56* 0.93 0.64 0.67 0.63 
school3 0.57 0.85     school3 0.2** 0.49    
school4 0.57** 1.08 0.62** 0.61** 0.62**  school4 0.64 1.3 0.66 0.69 0.66 
school5  1.81***     school5  2.08***    
school6 1.04 0.89 1.03 1.12 1.21  school6 1.77** 1.59** 1.87** 1.97** 2.17*** 
school7 1.67** 1.08 1.31 1.33 1.49*  school7 2.07*** 1.29* 1.77** 1.7* 1.91** 
school8       school8      
wealth 0.96 0.92** 0.95 0.95   wealth 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.84*** 0.84***  
housesize 0.94  0.94 0.94   housesize 1.02  1.01 1.02  
income 0.89***  0.89*** 0.89***   income 0.88**  0.88** 0.89**  
credit_financiali 1.03  1.03 1.04   credit_financiali 1.08  1.08 1.09  
credit_relative 0.96  0.96 0.95   credit_relative 0.97  0.97 0.97  
stu_eduaspiration 0.75***  0.75*** 0.75*** 0.74***  stu_eduaspiration 0.66***  0.66*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 
expect_norm 0.99  0.95 0.92 0.95  expect_norm 1.3**  1.26 1.23* 1.26* 
expect_advanced 1.02  1.02 0.99 0.99  expect_advanced 0.77*  0.78 0.77 0.76* 








percep_schaffiliation 0.96  0.98 0.98 0.96  percep_schaffiliation 0.91***  0.93** 0.93* 0.92** 
percep_schvalue 1.11**  1.07 1.08 1.07*  percep_schvalue 0.96  0.94 0.94 0.94 
percep_scheffort 0.92  0.94 0.94 0.94  percep_scheffort 0.88**  0.88** 0.89** 0.88** 
confidence 1.08**  1.07** 1.07** 1.07*  confidence 1.05  1.04 1.04 1.04 
courage 0.93***  0.92*** 0.93*** 0.93***  courage 0.91***  0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 
curiosity 0.94**  0.94** 0.94** 0.95**  curiosity 0.92***  0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 
ambition 1.07**  1.07** 1.06* 1.04  ambition 1.01  1 1 0.99 
familyonstudy 0.98  0.97 0.96 0.95  familyonstudy 0.9***  0.89*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
familyonemo 0.99  0.99 0.99 1  familyonemo 1.01  1.01 1 1.01 
tchr_contvsstop 1.02  1 0.99 1.01  tchr_contvsstop 1.03  0.99 0.98 0.99 
tchr_genvsvoc 0.86***  0.89** 0.89** 0.89***  tchr_genvsvoc 0.83***  0.84*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 
sick 0.96  0.96 0.95 0.98  sick 0.87  0.89 0.9 0.93 
sick_class 1.02  1.03 1.07 1.03  sick_class 1.04  1.04 1.08 1.03 
cost_vocvsjunior 1  1 1   cost_vocvsjunior 1.04  1.04 1.04  
cost_genvsvoc 0.86***  0.86*** 0.86***   cost_genvsvoc 0.95  0.96 0.96  
cost_colvsgen 0.96  0.96 0.97   cost_colvsgen 0.95  0.95 0.95  
earn_workvsdrop 1.05  1.06 1.06   earn_workvsdrop 1.1**  1.11*** 1.11***  
earn_vocvswork 0.96  0.96 0.96   earn_vocvswork 0.91*  0.91* 0.91*  
earn_genvsvoc 0.76***  0.75*** 0.75***   earn_genvsvoc 0.79***  0.79*** 0.78***  
earn_colvsgen 0.87***  0.86*** 0.86***   earn_colvsgen 0.85***  0.84*** 0.84***  
knowvoc 1.28***  1.29*** 1.29*** 1.25***  knowvoc 0.9  0.9 0.9 0.88 
performance 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.83***  performance 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 
business 0.93  0.94 0.94 0.85  business 0.72  0.73 0.76 0.69* 
interpersonal 1.05*  1.05* 1.05* 1.05*  interpersonal 1.02  1.01 1.01 1.02 
urbanlife 0.9  0.89 0.89 0.85  urbanlife 0.77**  0.78** 0.78** 0.74*** 








outreach_fac 1.18  1.19 1.21 1.23  outreach_fac 1.3  1.36* 1.38* 1.39* 
local_negative 1.34  1.32 1.35 1.35*  local_negative 1.06  1.04 1.06 1.08 
local_entertain 1.44**  1.52** 1.54** 1.59**  local_entertain 1.09  1.15 1.12 1.19 
gambling 1.05  1 1 0.97  gambling 1.13  1.11 1.08 1.04 
chore 1.04  1.05 1.04 1.03  chore 1.01  1.02 1.01 1 
love 1.18  1.21 1.17 1.19  love 1.56**  1.59** 1.5** 1.53** 
grade_7 1.41** 1.53*** 1.33** 1.36** 1.64***  grade_7 1.73*** 1.43*** 1.71*** 1.71*** 1.94*** 
grade_8 1.65*** 1.67*** 1.63*** 1.69*** 1.94***  grade_8 2.1*** 1.96*** 2.07*** 2.05*** 2.26*** 
grade_9       grade_9      
VHS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  Undecided (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Note: 
Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Model (1) Full sample full specification, N=6298. (2) Full sample but conventional variables. Lighthouse participation included but not reported, the RRR is 0.97 for VHS and 0.68*** for 
Undecided. No great difference in results if Lighthouse participation is excluded. (3) Full specification but excludes the sample for QD, which has a tradition of early VHS admission, N=5931. (4) 




6.3 Heterogeneity  
For policy purposes, it is important to learn how the effects of determinants vary across different 
student groups, so there could be better targeting of knowledge and interventions for them. To 
achieve this, in this section the imputed MNL is conducted by gender (female vs. male), wealth 
(richer 50 percentile vs. poorer 50 percentile), and test performance (higher 50 percentile vs. lower 
50 percentile). I chose by-background regression instead of using interaction terms to avoid 
expanding the matrix dimension, which is already big. The regression output of RRR and p-value 
asterisks are presented in Appendix E2. Here the findings are highlighted by the category of the 
independent variables. 
For basic characteristics, the richer and high-performance groups are more sensitive overall. In 
the richer group, being female has an RRR for VHS and undecided close to 3, and being relatively old 
has an RRR of 1.54 for undecided. It is also notable that, in this group, being a girl with a higher 
estimated cost of further education can significantly lower the relative odds of VHS. In the 
high-performance group, girls have much greater odds of work, VHS, and undecided. The only 
significant finding for the disadvantage group is that, among lower-performance students, being 
relatively old leads to higher relative odds of work. 
The effects of family completeness and mother’s education vary regarding parental background 
variables. For lower-performance children with single parents, the relative odds for dropout are 
much lower (RRR=0.16), but this needs to be carefully interpreted as that may actually suggest that 
those without strong determination have already dropped out. Migrant parents and no-parent status 
are able to lower the odds of undecided for all groups, with a slightly greater effect (lower RRR) for 
the advantaged groups of male, richer, and higher-performance students. For higher levels of 
mother’s education, it is able to lower the relative odds of work and undecided for the 
higher-performance group. Without these by-group regressions, the impact of mother’s education 




 All variables for siblings, have associations with PCED that are heterogeneous to student 
background. Sibling size has increased odds for work among female, poorer, and lower-performance 
students, so are the odds for VHS among female and lower-performance students, and the odds for 
undecided among lower-performance children. Having an older sister largely lowers the odds for 
work among females and higher-performance students. Finally, being relatively old among siblings 
only affect students with lower test performance. It increases the relative odds of VHS and 
undecided for this group. 
The large variable group of peer, teacher and school factors shows complicated relationships 
with PCED in the full sample regression, yet the by-group regressions reveal a clear rule for these 
relationships, which is that they are largely driven by the reactions of disadvantage groups. Generally 
speaking, female, poorer, or lower-performance students are very sensitive to mean parental 
education level in class, schooling distance, teacher characteristics, and school survival rate. More 
attention should be paid to the subtle peer effect. For richer students, the mean parental education 
has no impact at all on the relative odds of dropout or work, and if there is any, it would be negative 
as the RRR is lower than 1. For poorer students, however, the RRR is statistically significant and far 
greater than 1, which basically drives the results for the whole-sample regression. Such a finding 
suggests a possible explanation for why higher mean parental education in class may not nurture 
positive PCED— students with relatively disadvantaged backgrounds may find it easier to give up 
positive PCED after seeing the rest of the class have more hopes for it.  
As shown in the full-sample results, the effect of household economic status and credit 
constraints are concentrated in wealth and income. Greater wealth lowers the relative odds of 
dropout for high-performance students; its negative association with the relative odds of work 
mainly applies to female or lower-performance students; and its negative association with the 
relative odds of undecided mainly applies to female or higher-performance students. For higher 
household income, it lowers the relative odds of work for girls, the relative odds of VHS for the poor, 




that the six category income variable has an effect heterogeneous to gender, but the interaction 
between gender and income level, a dummy, does not reveal that heterogeneity. This is an example 
of how different forms of variable construction lead to various results. We should also bear in mind 
that income data has many imputations, which adds to the uncertainty of regression results. 
Despite having a similar number of variables, the rules of heterogeneity are not as clear for 
subject factors as for peer, teacher and school factors. For simplification, the discussion here will 
follow the grouping instead of single variables. More details are presented in the appendix. For 
gender difference, ambition, curiosity, affiliation to school, and the level of family care for study and 
PCED, appears to mainly affect girls, while expectation of advanced career, willingness to study, 
courage, and confidence matter more for boys. When it comes to wealth difference, curiosity, 
ambition, expectation of advanced career, affiliation to school, willingness to study, perceived value 
of schooling, and teacher’s relative preference for AHS are all more influential for poorer students, 
while level of confidence and family’s care for study/PCED matter more for richer students. The 
effects of courage are a mixture. Higher levels of courage mainly lower poorer student’s relative odds 
of dropout, and richer student’s relative odds of VHS and undecided. For performance difference, a 
teacher’s relative preference for AHS, expectation of advanced career, willingness to study, and level 
of family care for study/PCED matter more for lower-performance students, while expectations of 
normal career, perceived value of schooling, confidence, and courage play a stronger role for 
higher-performance students. There are also variables showing impacts on different PCEDs for 
different groups, such as the affiliation to school, ambition, and curiosity. Lastly, educational 
aspiration is a variable maintaining a strong and stable influence without regard for gender, wealth, 
and academic performance. 
As shown in the main model results (Table 6-7), sickness lowers the relative odds of work, and 
that is the sole effect discovered for health factors. Regressions by background further reveal that 





The expected relative earning of AHS vs. VHS and college vs. AHS continue to have strong effects 
across different backgrounds in an expected direction, however heterogeneity does exist for other 
cost/reward variables. Perceiving a relatively higher cost of AHS lowers the relative odds of work for 
boys; perceiving a relatively higher cost of college lowers the relative odds of VHS for boys; and 
perceiving higher earnings from VHS vs. work (strangely) lowers the relative odds of VHS for girls. 
Poorer student’s relative odds of being undecided turns out to be sensitive to all four 
relative-earning variables. Here we again see the counter-intuitive cost effect on VHS odds, which 
may result from too many imputations and the cost variable construction that merely reflects 
household opinion. 
Finally, academic performance and other variables have PCED links that are heterogeneous to 
gender, wealth, or performance, but most are not surprising. Some eye-catching links are as follows. 
It is among the higher-performance students that more time spent on household chores and being in 
Grade 7 can be associated with higher relative odds of dropout and work. Urban experience 
discouragement of work option mainly applies to female, poorer, and higher-performance students. 
It is among the richer students that holding negative views of local development can largely increase 
the odds of work (RRR=2.18). Knowledge, performance, local entertainment industry, and being in 
Grade 7 all affect the odds of VHS disproportionally, but they are not as extreme as the outreach of 
factories, which has a statistically significant RRR of 1.66 for higher-performance group, but an 
insignificant RRR of 0.71 for lower-performance groups. Lastly, the opposite effects of factory 
outreach also apply to the odds of undecided. Its RRR is 1.94 for higher-performance students and 
0.75 for lower-performance students, although the latter is again statistically insignificant. 
 
6.4 Synthesis: Subjective vs. Traditional vs. Localized Determinants 
Give the large number of potential PCED determinants, it is never easy to explain all regression 




help in grasping the whole picture. In Figure 6-1, independent variable- standardized coefficients (y 
axis) and absolute values of z scores (x axis) are drawn as scatter graphs for each outcome, with the 
variables generally categorized as subjective factors, traditional variables (non-subjective variables 
mentioned in previous literature), and performance, plus extra Delphi-suggested variables that are 
mostly localized. Since the coefficients are standardized, we can compare the effect sizes of different 
variables. Dots falling on the upper or lower right-hand side will be for variables showing strong 
PCED connections, holding other variables constant75.  
 


























Note: School and grade dummy results excluded. The MI standard deviations (SD) for independent variables are calculated 
with Rubin's combination rules, listed in Appendix E3. The independent variable-standardized coefficients are calculated as 
coefficient * SD, and the corresponding RRR are calculated as exp(coefficient * SD).   
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 Coefficients are not proportional to effect size, neither is the absolute z score to statistical significance, but larger 





In the big picture, PCED is something quite alterable. There are many dots squeezed near the 
origin, but there are also dots passing |z|=2 with decent dispersion, especially for “work” and 
“undecided”. Since different factors also affect each other, it is acceptable to have many dots behind 
the |z|=2 line. For example, the effect of class-related sickness will be absorbed by performance, so 
we will see no effect from class-related sickness. Those most critical determinants can remain having 
an absolute z score that is higher than 2. It is notable that educational aspiration stands out. For all 
outcomes against AHS, the dots for educational aspiration are always in the lower right, even though 
relevant variables like parental education and economic status are all controlled. Perceived relative 
earnings (AHS vs. VHS and College vs. AHS) also appear to be important, presenting as blue diamonds 
close to educational aspiration, but they are less trustworthy due to high rates of imputation. 
The graphs also highlight three other popular variables, female, performance, and wealth, with 
RRR reported to displace how the related possibility of choosing an option over AHS changes given a 
one standard deviation move of the variable. Performance falls on the margin of being statistically 
significant for the decision to dropout, and wealth has an ignorable impact on the decision of 
schooling track. Only the gender effect appears to be as evident as the aspiration effect. Still, 
education aspiration seems to be more alterable. This finding is closely connected to the next 
chapter on Lighthouse impact.  
 
6.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings Regarding PCED Determinants 
6.5.1 Summary of Findings Regarding PCED Determinants 
For PCED determinants, the main model presents the following major findings:  




2. Students from an incomplete family (single parent, migrant parent or no parent) are more 
likely to think seriously about their PCED. 
3. Number of siblings is positively associated with the odds of work and VHS relative to AHS. 
4. Higher mean parental education level in class is actually correlated to lower relative odds of 
AHS. Later it is revealed that this negative association applies to disadvantage students, who 
may be discouraged from AHS after realizing the gap between themselves and their peers. A 
homeroom teacher’s education is linked to lower AHS odds, while experience is linked to 
higher AHS odds, but these associations are probably related to the school’s preference for 
teacher assignment. Finally, the school survival rate is clearly associated with higher AHS odds, 
as students continuing to the final grade are those who would like to take the high school 
entrance exam to enter AHS. 
5. As expected, wealth and income are associated with higher relative odds of AHS.          
6. In terms of subjective factors, educational aspiration, expectations of a normal career, 
perceptions towards schooling, courage, curiosity, family’s care for study, and teacher’s 
preference for AHS show the expected influence on PCED. Among them, educational 
aspiration clearly stands out as the strongest determinant. It is worth noting that, with so 
many other variables held constant, the relevance of subjective factors are much more 
evident.  
7. Sickness lowers the relative odds of work since sick students recognize their incapacity for 
low-skill labor work. 
8. Knowledge of relevant policies as well as homeroom teacher’s track preference could affect 
the decision on VHS. 
9. PCED is more sensitive to the expected relative return than the relative cost of different 
options. 
10. Better academic performance clearly promotes the relative odds of AHS. Among the 




urban experience, local entertainment industry, house chore, and teenager love all relate to 
PCED in a predictable direction. It is also worth mentioning that students with lower grades 
have more diverse PCEDs, while many of those promoted to the last grade are pursuing AHS.       
 
There are also variables that are popular in the literature yet show very weak PCED connections 
in the main model, including parental education/identity and the school factors of class size and 
schooling distance. Their effects might be absorbed by other stronger determinants, or become 
more subtle, and perhaps heterogeneous to some student characteristics.  
The main model passes the robustness check. It is true that p values fluctuate across different 
samplings and/or specifications, but these do not bring about large coefficient changes. Nevertheless, 
the unstable statistical significance does question the reliability of some variables (e.g. level of 
ambition), and remind us that some variables (e.g. size of migrant network) may actually be more 
important than the main model suggests if sampling, specification, or missing data is no longer an 
issue. 
In addition to robustness, this chapter also explores heterogeneity. It is not surprising to see 
different variables disproportionally affect students of different gender, wealth, or academic 
performance. Overall, basic characteristics (gender, age and ethnicity) and parental background 
affect more children with advantaged backgrounds (male, richer, high-performance), while sibling 
and peer/teacher/school factors matter more for the disadvantaged group (female, poorer, 
low-performance). Other PCED determinants show mixed heterogeneous effects. These patterns are 
neither easily predictable nor counter-intuitive. The ultimate value of uncovering these 
heterogeneities is to help in targeting interventions for appropriate interventions. For example, we 
certainly want higher-performance students to continue their schooling after compulsory education, 
but low expectations of future careers and heavier household chore burdens both increase the 
relative odds of work for this group (and not for the lower-performance students). Accordingly, it is 




Finally, putting standardized regression outputs in scatter graphs show that PCED does react to 
certain variables with diverse effect size and statistical significance. Among these variables, 
educational aspiration has been one of the most influential and alterable determinants that matters 
for all PCEDs. It connects the discussion of PCED determinants to the impact evaluation of the 
socio-emotional support provided by Lighthouse. 
 
6.5.2 Comparison with the Literature 
In comparison to existing literature, this study has brought new discoveries mainly related to 
gender, parental background, cost and reward, subjective factors, and local factors. 
The literature suggests that gender effect has been declining and becomes more sophisticated, 
as being a girl is more income-, performance-, and cost-elastic than being a boy in PCED (e.g. Brown 
and Park, 2002; Sun, 2004; Song et al., 2006; Hannum and Adams, 2007; Li, 2009; Li and Cheng, 2009; 
Yi et al., 2011). This research, however, finds that the gender effect remains quite straightforward, 
with significant and high RRR for non-AHS options on the dummy variable of being female. Tests of 
heterogeneity show that such gap mainly exists in the richer and high-performance groups. During 
the robustness check, it is interesting to see that RRR on the gender dummy gets smaller when the 
regression only includes variables that are popular in the literature. This leads to the concern that 
the diminishing gender effect actually results from insufficient control in regressions.         
Parental background is another field with findings that “counter” the literature (e.g. Brown, 2006; 
Zhu, 2006; Ding and Li, 2007; Fang, 2007; Liu, 2007; de Brauw and Giles, 2008; Lu, 2012). According 
to the main model, parents’ educations, positions, and political capitals no longer significantly affect 
PCED. This is to some extent a reflection of the completeness of my variable list. After all, parental 
background should affect PCED through mediators, such as more care on children’s study and less 




uncover that students from an incomplete family are more progressive on thinking of their PCED, 
with a preference on AHS. This is a bonus finding that was not touched by previous literature.   
In terms of the effect of monetary cost and reward, literature have a consensus that whether 
choosing a PCED, especially when it involves school track, is discouraged by the expectation of 
relative cost (e.g. Li and Cheng, 2009; Liu et al., 2009; Song et al., 2011) and encouraged by the 
expectation of relative reward (e.g. Sun and Du, 2004; Ding and Li, 2007; Chen, 2009). This study 
takes a further step to find that students probably react more to relative earning than to relative cost 
among different PCEDs, however I have less confidence in this finding due to the missing data in the 
reward and cost variables, and to the different means of construction for these two groups of 
variables76. In fact, the higher expected relative cost of AHS against VHS is associated with lower 
relative odds of VHS, but we cannot say cost proxies quality since that should be captured by the 
relative-earning variables 
With regard to subjective factors, while the literature agrees that personality, attitude, and 
perceptions of or between the PCED stakeholders (students, parents, and teachers) account for PCED 
(e.g. Jiang and Dai, 2005; Wang, 2005; Hannum and Adams, 2007, 2008; Lee and Park, 2010; Zhang, 
2011), this study further confirms that their impacts are quite strong when compared to other 
variables. 12 out of the 15 subjective variables are significantly associated with the relative odds of 
one or several PCEDs in predictable directions. It is worth noting that subjective factors can all be 
treated as mediators. For example, a family’s care for study can be a mediator of parental education, 
and factors like confidence, career expectation, and schooling aspiration can be mediators of 
numerous individual, household, and community factors. Some background factors like parental 
education, ethnicity, or chronic disease are hard or impossible to change, but subjective factors can 
still be altered by socio-emotional interventions.  
Finally, thanks to the Delphi survey, this study also adopts variables that did not receive enough 
attention in the previous literature, and provides some fresh insights into the PCED discussion. Now 
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we confirm that assumptions such as knowledge of VHS policies encourages its enrollment, sufficient 
urban experience makes the students more inclined to AHS, and teenager love increases the risk of 
discontinuing schooling. We also find subtle messages, such as that higher-performance children are 
more sensitive to the outreach of factories, and a thriving local entertainment industry encourages 
richer students to choose VHS instead of AHS. 
Simply speaking, this thorough investigation of PCED determinants has resulted in findings that 
are different to those of the previous literature, that are a further extension of existing arguments, 
and that are totally new to the field. This study does not have the ambition to generalize its findings 
to the whole of rural China, as it only focuses on the rural part of a coastal province. In fact, these 
new findings may be new only because the study includes an area which has not received much 
attention from the previous quantitative research, but this is indeed another contribution of the 
study. With rapid urbanization, vast internet coverage, and the sprawling bullet train network, the 
PCED issues faced by today’s rural students in coastal China may reach their peers in inner China 
tomorrow.     















Chapter 7 Empirical Findings Regarding Lighthouse Impact 
This chapter analyzes the PSM results for Lighthouse impact for the six Lighthouse schools. It 
starts with the determinants of Lighthouse participation for those participating in the latest program 
in summer 2012, and those who have participated in any Lighthouse program. In Section 7.2, 
with-replacement nearest neighborhood (NN) matching results are presented for all five imputations. 
Because the control group was a much larger sample than the treatment group, NN control cases 
could change easily across specifications and imputation. With-replacement NN results tend to have 
larger variance, and therefore NN is the most rigorous PSM method for screening outcomes that are 
really caused by the Lighthouse program. Educational aspiration turns out to be the only consistent 
outcome. Further analyses including adjusted propensity score estimates, other PSM methods, 
by-background analyses, and by-site analyses are conducted for educational aspiration. Following 
these analyses, there is an exploration of causal mechanism based on qualitative findings, which 
suggests the role-model effect could explain why the Lighthouse program mainly affects educational 
aspiration. The chapter ends with a summary of findings and a discussion of the untestable variables 
throughout the PSM process. 
 
7.1 Determinants of Lighthouse Participation 
There are two options to start with in searching for the determinants of Lighthouse participation. 
One is to run a regression of treatment status on the determinants suggested by the Delphi survey 
(plus school and grade dummies), the other, a conservative way, is to run a regression on the Delphi 
list and the PCED determinants together. Table 7-1 presents the probit marginal effect and p values 
for the most recent participation and any participation with these two variable lists. Subjective 
factors are taken out because they could also be treatment effects. It turns out that, for the purpose 




than the conservative list, which means the equation gained from the Delphi list predicts treatment 
propensity with higher precision, and that the conservative variable list has an over-fitting problem. 
If the purpose is to see what factors really matter for treatment status, it does no harm to look at 
the results of both specifications. For the full-list regression, the latest Lighthouse participation is 
positively associated with academic performance, popularity of Lighthouse among classmates (proxy 
to class effect), household attitude to summer camps, migrant network, being female, family size, 
availability of family business, availability of credits from relatives, and sickness, but negatively 
associated with schooling distance, age, and expected future earnings of AHS relative to VHS, both at 
the 5% level. Among these variables, it is hard to explain why sickness increases the possibility of 
Lighthouse participation. Perhaps, sick students have fewer chores or work burdens, and more 
leisure time for camps. It is even harder to explain why higher expected future AHS earnings lowers 
propensity of treatment, however if we look at the regression results for any-participation, the 
marginal effects for these two controversial values are almost zero with reversed signs, with p values 
higher than 0.9. The effects for any participation should have the same direction, so such a change in 
significant levels and directions simply implies that the results are unreliable. There are other 
variables with sizeable changes to significant level when the dependent variable is any participation, 
including gender, father’s education, estimated relative AHS cost, and knowledge of vocational 
education policies. These all remind us of the problem of over-fitting. 
 If we compare the results for Delphi variables only, we see more stable marginal effects and p 
values. Overall, academic performance, schooling distance, household attitudes to summer camp, 
and migrant network are the four treatment determinants that can be claimed with confidence. 
Their effects remain strong and consistent across models and dependent variables. Performance is 
divided into four quantiles, distance and attitudes to camp into six quantiles, and migrant network a 
dummy variable, so, if we check the effect size, distance is certainly the most influential treatment 
determinant. A one unit increase in the distance variable lowers the propensity of the most recent 




popularity of the Lighthouse program among classmates (peertreated) has the strongest marginal 
effects, but it is a mixture of peer effect and class fixed effect. We can conclude that Lighthouse 
reputation among peers is important, but we cannot confidently tell how important it is. Among 
other variables suggested by Delphi, attitudes to household chores and farm work, perceived value 
of schooling and the availability of other summer activities do not have significant impact; and time 
spent on household chore does not have consistent results. It is a disappointment to see that not all 
Delphi-suggested variables are influential, but nevertheless, the Delphi survey does help generate a 
more accurate treatment prediction using a much shorter variable list. 
 
Table 7-1 Probit Outputs for the Determinants of Lighthouse Participation 
 Most Recent Participation Any Participation 
 Full List Delphi List Full List Delphi List 
 dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
Performance 0.010  0.005  0.012  0.000  0.021  0.001  0.018  0.000  
atti_chore_farm -0.001  0.707  -0.001  0.653  -0.001  0.897  -0.001  0.752  
percep_schvalue 0.001  0.686  0.003  0.263  0.006  0.248  0.006  0.196  
other_act 0.000  0.825  0.000  0.901  0.003  0.316  0.004  0.194  
Distance -0.011  0.000  -0.013  0.000  -0.025  0.000  -0.026  0.000  
chore 0.003  0.269  0.005  0.018  -0.005  0.260  -0.003  0.422  
peertreated 0.024  0.000  0.020  0.000  0.076  0.000  0.074  0.000  
Attoncamp 0.009  0.000  0.009  0.000  0.011  0.001  0.010  0.001  
Mignetwork 0.018  0.006  0.018  0.005  0.023  0.044  0.025  0.026  
female 0.034  0.023    0.039  0.118    
f_income -0.014  0.125    -0.016  0.342    
f_performance -0.007  0.503    -0.013  0.423    
f_cost 0.002  0.495    0.005  0.342    
age -0.015  0.026    -0.018  0.125    
minority 0.011  0.737    -0.003  0.964    
single_p 0.012  0.305    0.001  0.979    
migrant_p 0.000  0.989    0.019  0.127    
no_p 0.004  0.617    0.019  0.195    
medu 0.001  0.844    0.006  0.224    
fedu -0.004  0.127    -0.009  0.030    
peasant -0.003  0.652    0.005  0.672    
politicalc 0.009  0.075    0.018  0.052    
parent_leader 0.014  0.332    0.042  0.112    
parentbadhealth -0.019  0.281    0.028  0.245    
sibship -0.002  0.536    0.005  0.264    
witheldersister -0.003  0.700    0.002  0.905    
eldercohort -0.001  0.847    0.004  0.768    
peerpedu -0.005  0.591    -0.002  0.884    
tch_origin 0.003  0.495    0.004  0.509    




tch_admin 0.011  0.473    0.024  0.353    
tch_exp 0.003  0.518    0.007  0.329    
tch_mthgain 0.000  0.929    -0.007  0.065    
tch_paydelayed 0.015  0.068    -0.016  0.245    
subtch_origin -0.007  0.070    -0.008  0.184    
subtch_edu 0.003  0.499    0.000  0.956    
subtch_exp -0.002  0.528    0.002  0.713    
classsize -0.004  0.444    0.009  0.384    
survival -0.015  0.232    0.003  0.885    
school1 — — — — — — — — 
school2 -0.088  0.000  -0.057  0.000  -0.005  0.891  -0.019  0.304  
school3 -0.023  0.523  0.017  0.099  0.060  0.371  0.049  0.009  
school4 -0.029  0.042  -0.002  0.841  0.037  0.122  0.026  0.124  
school5 — — 0.018  0.059  — — 0.001  0.971  
school6 0.061  0.000  0.057  0.000  0.022  0.431  0.001  0.975  
school7 — — — — — — — — 
school8 — — — — — — — — 
wealth -0.004  0.283    0.003  0.618    
housesize 0.007  0.042    0.012  0.037    
income 0.000  0.982    0.002  0.662    
credit_financiali -0.001  0.637    -0.004  0.316    
credit_relative 0.006  0.018    0.011  0.008    
sick 0.019  0.004    -0.001  0.943    
sick_class -0.008  0.189    0.019  0.080    
cost_vocvsjunior -0.002  0.377    -0.007  0.054    
cost_genvsvoc 0.001  0.684    -0.008  0.047    
cost_colvsgen 0.002  0.314    0.007  0.068    
earn_workvsdrop -0.002  0.226    -0.002  0.555    
earn_vocvswork -0.004  0.093    -0.003  0.428    
earn_genvsvoc -0.005  0.032    0.000  0.932    
earn_colvsgen -0.001  0.524    0.002  0.577    
knowvoc 0.004  0.361    0.021  0.007    
business 0.028  0.014    0.026  0.241    
interpersonal 0.003  0.188    -0.004  0.239    
urbanlife -0.003  0.669    0.017  0.137    
outreach_voc -0.005  0.615    -0.001  0.971    
outreach_fac -0.014  0.220    0.003  0.882    
local_negative 0.009  0.379    0.006  0.736    
local_entertain -0.003  0.799    -0.010  0.646    
gambling 0.008  0.484    0.000  0.996    
schatmos — —   — —   
love -0.008  0.447    0.031  0.062    
grade_7 0.007  0.453  0.004  0.663  0.016  0.368  0.025  0.095  
grade_8 0.005  0.620  -0.005  0.522  0.006  0.727  0.003  0.816  
grade_9 — — — — — — — — 
 
AIC 1483.644 1462.963 3540.515 3540.685 
BIC 1931.879 1571.82 3988.75 3649.542 
Note: N=4462. These are probit regression results from imputation_1 with average marginal effects and corresponding p 
values reported. Two non-Lighthouse schools were excluded from the sample. Similar results from other imputations. There 





7.2 Effect of Lighthouse Participation 
Based on the Delphi result (Figure 4-3) and the feasibility of variable construction, I tested 
Lighthouse’s impacts on eight indexes for both the latest participants and the participants of any 
Lighthouse program. Since there are many more untreated students than treated students, any 
change in imputations or variables for propensity score prediction can change the untreated student 
with the nearest propensity score to a certain treated student, making NN matching results the most 
fluctuating ones. If the NN average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) for an outcome index stay 
statistically significant across models and imputations, we are confident that it is a treatment effect, 
and we should explore that index in-depth. 
Common support and balance properties were both tested. Because the control sample largely 
outnumbers the treatment sample, there is a very good overlap of propensity scores between 
non-Lighthouse and Lighthouse students. However, the balancing property is not perfectly satisfied. 
For each imputation, there is an unbalanced grade dummy or school dummy in one of the score 
blocks, which is understandable, as Lighthouse engagement does vary across school and grade. There 
are also other unbalanced variables, but no more than four, in some imputations. Since the balance 
is bad for just a few covariates that are considered necessary treatment determinants, they should be 
kept (Stuart, 2010). Common support and balance property will be further discussed in Section 7.2.3.      
7.2.1 Impact of the Most Recent Participation 
The PSM results for the most recent Lighthouse participation are given in Table 7-2, For each of 
the five imputations and both full and Delphi specifications, the t scores for unmatched difference 
and NN ATT are listed for the eight outcome indexes of confidence, courage, curiosity, ambition, 
extraversion, need of affiliation (affiliationneed), educational aspiration (stu_eduaspiration), and 
whether a normal career in agriculture or manufacturing is expected (expect_norm). The table also 
gives on-support sample sizes for treated and untreated students under each imputation. Since 




with the treatment status. It is therefore not surprising to see a large dip from unmatched to 
matched t scores. If the rigorous NN t scores remain high (close to or larger than 1.96) under most 
imputations, their corresponding index is more likely to be a treatment outcome.   
Only education aspiration survives the t-score screening, with a mean matched t score of 1.62 
under the conservative specification, and 2.09 under the Delphi specification. For all imputations and 
both specifications, educational aspiration has higher unmatched/matched t scores than other 
indexes. Overall, its t scores are higher under the Delphi specification, which is confirmed to be a 
better treatment prediction than the full specification by its lower AIC/BIC. The only scenario in 
which Lighthouse impact on educational aspiration turns to be totally ignorable is in 
imputation_2/full specification, in which the t scores drop from 4.81 unmatched to 0.85 matched, 
however the imputation_2/full specification seems to be unique as the t scores for other indexes 
even drop to around 0. 
Other than educational aspiration, curiosity, extraversion and need for affiliation also produce 
decent t scores, but mostly when they are for the unmatched differences between treated and 
untreated students. As a matter of fact, these three personalities were all mentioned as both 
determinants (Table 4-1) and outcomes (Figure 4-3) of the Lighthouse program. They are now 
recognized as determinants rather than outcomes by comparing unmatched and matched results. 
Apparently, selection bias is a big issue when evaluating the socio-emotional support of voluntary 
participation. Without the matching analyses, people see many benefits that might just represent 
the pre-treatment difference. 
For the other outcome indexes of confidence, courage, ambition and expectation of normal 
career, even the unmatched t scores are low in most imputations. It is a pity that confidence was 
unanimously considered by Delphi experts as the most important and best realized Lighthouse 
impact, lying as a small dot in upper right of Figure 4-3. There could be several explanations for such 
a discrepancy between the Delphi results and PSM results. To begin with, people may have been 







Table 7-2 Nearest Neighborhood Matching Results (t Scores)_ Most Recent Participation as Treatment 
Full Specification 
  Imputation_1 Imputation_2 Imputation_3 Imputation_4 Imputation_5 Mean 
  Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
confidence 0.55 0.08 0.53 -0.19 0.54 1.11 0.56 0.51 0.55 1.46 0.55 0.59 
courage 1.23 0.56 1.2 -0.11 1.2 0.88 1.22 -0.47 1.22 1.06 1.21 0.38 
curiosity 2.2 0.38 2.23 0.05 2.22 2.37 2.2 1.51 2.18 1.08 2.21 1.08 
ambition -0.17 -0.67 -0.18 0.3 -0.15 1.11 -0.15 -0.35 -0.15 0.25 -0.16 0.13 
extraversion 1.83 0.39 1.82 0.26 1.83 0.45 1.83 -0.14 1.83 1.1 1.83 0.41 
affiliationneed 2 0.52 2.2 0.33 1.97 3.32 1.96 1.45 1.95 0.96 2.02 1.32 
stu_eduaspiration 4.81 2.45 4.81 0.85 4.45 1.69 4.78 1.96 4.7 1.15 4.71 1.62 
expect_norm -2.21 -0.12 -1.4 -0.46 -1.3 1.18 -1.46 -0.35 -0.57 -0.34 -1.39 -0.02 
              
Total on support 4179 3941 4249 4209 4322 --- 
On support _Untreated # 3977 3733 4039 4003 4117 --- 
On support _Treated # 202 208 210 206 205 --- 
Delphi Specification 
  Imputation_1 Imputation_2 Imputation_3 Imputation_4 Imputation_5 Mean 
  Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
confidence 0.55 0.03 0.53 0.14 0.54 0 0.56 -0.18 0.55 1.41 0.55 0.28 
courage 1.23 0.27 1.2 0.76 1.2 -0.69 1.22 0.87 1.22 0.86 1.21 0.41 
curiosity 2.2 1.62 2.23 0.68 2.22 1.27 2.2 1.75 2.18 0.62 2.21 1.19 
ambition -0.17 -1.45 -0.18 -0.97 -0.15 -0.24 -0.15 0.19 -0.15 0.72 -0.16 -0.35 
extraversion 1.83 1.42 1.82 0.24 1.83 0.26 1.83 0.8 1.83 2.14 1.83 0.97 
affiliationneed 2 0.89 2.2 0.75 1.97 1.17 1.96 1.4 1.95 1.76 2.02 1.19 
stu_eduaspiration 4.81 2.21 4.81 2.08 4.45 1.55 4.78 2.72 4.7 1.91 4.71 2.09 
expect_norm -2.21 -0.72 -1.4 -0.7 -1.3 0.12 -1.46 -0.57 -0.57 -1.3 -1.39 -0.63 
              
Total on support 4316 4388 4274 4361 4374 --- 
On support _Untreated # 4108 4185 4067 4157 4164 --- 
On support _Treated # 208 203 207 204 210 --- 




more progressive personalities could easily stand out as examples of achievement, and then 
dominate our perception of the overall effect. Lastly, there are over 400 former Lighthouse students 
in the control group, who may also possess very high levels of confidence. The first two reasons 
somewhat involve the disadvantages of qualitative judgment, while the third reason is a technical 
issue that can be resolved in the following section. 
 
7.2.2 Impact of Any Participation 
When measuring the effect of the most recent participation, we actually made a comparison 
between the most recent participants and “non-participants + former participants”. It is possible that 
some Lighthouse impacts need time to manifest. It is also possible that the impact of the most recent 
participation will either diminish or grow over time. These questions could be partially answered by 
looking at the impact of any participation, or in other words, by making a comparison between 
“former + most recent participants” and non-participants. 
The NN matching results are presented in Table 7-3 in exactly the same format as Table 7-2. The 
impact on education aspiration looks strong, but under both specifications it is at the 5% level for 
only two out of the five imputations. Still, its t scores for ATT are relatively large and stable, 
suggesting it is the very index worthy of further investigation. The mean matched t score is 1.86 
under full specification, and 1.88 under Delphi specification. 
With high unmatched and low matched t scores, curiosity is still a strong treatment determinant. 
Courage, ambition and normal career expectations are likely to be irrelevant, being neither 
determinants nor outcomes. 
The most interesting findings lie in the level of confidence and need for affiliation. Having large 
unmatched t scores but small matched t scores, confidence is now confirmed to be a treatment 
determinant. The reason for the small unmatched t scores in the previous section (Table 7-2) is that 




we take the mean ATT scores for the five imputations, we can see that the significant level of 
boosting confidence is second to an increase in aspiration, and therefore it is now understandable 
there could be some outstanding cases making the Delphi experts believe in a Lighthouse impact on 
confidence. The need for affiliation goes in the opposite direction. When testing the impact of the 
most recent participation, its unmatched differences are statistically significant, but when testing the 
impact of any participation, its unmatched differences are basically random, with t scores lower than 
1. The sole explanation for this is that former participants have equal or even lower affiliation needs 
than non-participants. Indeed, the non-imputed mean scores of need-of-affiliation are 2.98, 2.96, 
and 3.2 for non-participant, former participants and recent participants. On the other hand, due to a 
closer sample size, the difference between former participants and the recent participants is actually 
not significant at the 5% level. It is very likely that the change in the gap of sample sizes leads to the 








Table 7-3 Nearest Neighborhood Matching Results (t Scores)_ Any Participation as Treatment 
Full Specification 
  Imputation_1 Imputation_2 Imputation_3 Imputation_4 Imputation_5 Mean 
  Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
confidence 2.13 -0.77 2.09 0.38 2.1 0.87 2.2 1.95 2.14 2.65 2.13 1.02 
courage 0.55 -1.14 0.55 0.25 0.57 0.44 0.6 1.47 0.57 0.84 0.57 0.37 
curiosity 2.58 1.08 2.64 0.97 2.61 0.3 2.57 -0.15 2.54 1 2.59 0.64 
ambition 0.31 -1.4 0.26 -1 0.33 -0.24 0.29 -0.68 0.32 0.1 0.30 -0.64 
extraversion -0.27 -0.42 -0.28 -0.14 -0.27 -0.11 -0.27 0.51 -0.27 0.8 -0.27 0.13 
affiliationneed 0.82 0.11 0.88 0.7 0.78 -0.56 0.77 0.34 0.8 0.11 0.81 0.14 
stu_eduaspiration 5.12 2.92 4.05 1.31 4.14 1.32 3.79 2.34 3.82 1.4 4.18 1.86 
expect_norm -0.43 0.3 -0.13 -1.8 0.22 0.23 0 -0.17 0.31 0.52 -0.01 -0.18 
              
Total on support 4430 4454 4429 4408 4444 --- 
On support _Untreated # 3754 3776 3753 3732 3766 --- 
On support _Treated # 676 678 676 676 678 --- 
Delphi Specification 
  Imputation_1 Imputation_2 Imputation_3 Imputation_4 Imputation_5 Mean 
  Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
confidence 2.13 0.62 2.09 1.6 2.1 1.68 2.2 0.43 2.14 2.46 2.13 1.36 
courage 0.55 0.41 0.55 0.44 0.57 1.28 0.6 -0.39 0.57 2.02 0.57 0.75 
curiosity 2.58 -0.01 2.64 2.09 2.61 1.02 2.57 0.56 2.54 1.17 2.59 0.97 
ambition 0.31 -0.19 0.26 1.37 0.33 0.06 0.29 -0.96 0.32 0.95 0.30 0.25 
extraversion -0.27 -0.04 -0.28 0.2 -0.27 0.78 -0.27 -1.31 -0.27 1.35 -0.27 0.20 
affiliationneed 0.82 0.22 0.88 0.06 0.78 0.57 0.77 0.32 0.8 -0.5 0.81 0.13 
stu_eduaspiration 5.12 3.04 4.05 2.15 4.14 0.99 3.79 1.54 3.82 1.66 4.18 1.88 
expect_norm -0.43 -0.75 -0.13 -0.06 0.22 -0.12 0 0.06 0.31 1.84 -0.01 0.19 
              
Total on support 4432 4429 4432 4434 4424 --- 
On support _Untreated # 3754 3751 3754 3756 3746 --- 
On support _Treated # 678 678 678 678 678 --- 




7.2.3 Educational Aspiration as the Key Outcome 
Education aspiration is confirmed by the preliminary PSM results as a key program outcome. An 
overhaul of propensity score calculation will be the first step for further investigation. When we are 
unsure which outcome matters, it is natural to try the full specification and the Delphi specification, 
but once we know what outcome to be further explored, there is a rule that one should include 
variables related to outcome rather than treatment in order to maintain both high precision and low 
bias (Brookhart et al., 2006). Accordingly, an adjusted specification is generated to include variables 
correlated to educational aspiration (p<0.05) and not totally unrelated to participation (p<0.6), plus 
school and grade dummies. This adjusted variable list is to some extent a compromise between the 
conservative full list and the simplified Delphi list. Corresponding regression and NN matching results 
are available in Appendix F. Table 7-4 uses AIC/BIC to compare the three specifications. Lower 
AIC/BIC means better prediction. When the dependent variable is participation, AIC suggest that the 
adjusted list is the worst for prediction, but BIC suggests the full list as the worst. When the 
dependent variable is educational aspiration, both AIC and BIC confirm the adjusted list to be the 
best combination for prediction. The following analyses will continue with the adjusted list. It is 
worth mentioning that this specification does make the aspiration effect more evident, but not 
erratically away from the effects of the full or Delphi specifications. 
 
Table 7-4 Akaike/Bayesian Information Criteria_ Various Models and Specifications 
 Most Recent Participation Any Participation Educational Aspiration 
 Full Delphi Adjusted Full Delphi Adjusted Full Delphi Adjusted 
AIC 1483.6  1463.0  1522.8  3540.5  3540.7  3673.8  12476.9  12598.1  12442.4  
BIC 1931.9  1571.8  1714.9  3988.8  3649.5  3865.9  12944.3  12726.2  12653.7  
Note: Two schools with no Lighthouse interventions are excluded from the sample. A probit model is run when the 
dependent variable is most recent participation or any participation. An ordered probit model is run when the dependent 
variable is a student’s education aspiration. 
 
As shown in Figure 7-1, the large untreated sample makes it easy to achieve satisfactory common 




treated and untreated groups. More treated students have higher propensity scores, but overall 
there is a very good overlap. This again justifies the use of PSM.    
 
Figure 7-1 Distribution of Propensity Scores_ Adjusted Specification 
 
Note: This is from imputation_3 with adjusted list of treatment determinants. Graphs made from all five imputations are 
almost identical. ‘Treated group’ refers to those participating in any of the Lighthouse programs. 
 
Under the adjusted specification, the balancing property is not well kept if we check it by block 
where the mean propensity scores are no different between the control and treatment groups77, but 
such imbalance is within an acceptable level. Imputations 1, 2 and 5 have one unbalanced school 
dummy, and Imputation 4 has an unbalanced grade dummy, but school and grade dummies should 
be included in the specification even if we know they may cause imbalance. For other variables, a 
subject teacher’s origin is unbalanced for three imputations, teenage love and interpersonal 
relationships for two imputations, and performance, sibling number, and attitude to summer camps 
for one imputation. On average, for each imputation only 3 out of the 29 non-omitted variables 
(Appendix F1) were diagnosed as unbalanced, which is a small proportion. These variables are also 
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unbalanced in either the first or the last score block, where the treatment sample tends to be too 
small to secure statistical power. Particularly in the last block, the sample sizes range from 13 to 21 in 
the five imputations. Thus, despite an imperfect balance, it is acceptable to process the PSM without 
extra adjustment on specification (Stuart, 2010)78.  
As mentioned before, NN matching produces unstable results when the imputed control group is 
much larger than the treatment group. Other matching methods that utilized more control cases 
should generate more stable estimates. Figure 7-2 displays the results of three matching methods in 
one scatter graph, with the y axis for ATT and x axis for t scores. Epanechnikov Kernel matching, 
which makes use of all control cases, and radius matching, which utilizes control cases with close 
propensity scores, both produce much more stable estimates across imputations. It can be seen that 
the more control cases used (Kernel>Radius>NN), the more concentrated the symbols in the scatter 
graph. 
The diminishing impact of Lighthouse is the most important discovery from pooling matching 
results. In Figure 7-2, the blue symbols on the most recent participation are generally closer to the 
upper right than the orange symbols for any participation. The mean of blue symbols shows an ATT 
almost double the mean of the orange symbols with a higher t score. In other words, Lighthouse’s 
short-term impact on educational aspiration is stronger in both magnitude and statistical significance. 
As introduced in Chapter 3, Lighthouse has follow-up services such as short-term visits, student 
organization creation, and communication by letter. These seem to be insufficient for sustaining the 
impact, and it is possible that those follow-ups mainly benefit active students.  
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 Stuart (2010) also suggested Mahalanobis Matching under minor imbalance. I have practiced it. For all imputations, both 
ATTs and corresponding t scores appear to be much larger with Mahalanobis Matching. This study will proceed with the 




Figure 7-2 Propensity Score Matching Results for Educational Aspiration 
 
Note: Five data points for different groups because there are five imputations. Detailed data is in Appendix F4. 
 
It is not rare to have a diminishing effect in program evaluations, so perhaps a more constructive 
angle from which to look at the impact is to see how it sustains or declines for certain groups. It has 
been a key assumption throughout this research that rural students need an “appropriate” schooling 
level more than a “higher” schooling level. This is also why I did not use an order model when 
examining PCED determinants. The Lighthouse leadership has been clear that Lighthouse volunteers 
should help students decide what they should do, not tell them what they should do. If, for example, 
there is a poor low-performance student who happens to be the oldest sibling at home, it is 















































7.3 Heterogeneous Effect, School Engagement and Program Quality 
This section furthers the investigation of Lighthouse impact on education aspiration by testing 
how that impact varies by student characteristics and school. It turns out that the aspiration increase 
mainly applies to those with higher-performance. School comparison has suggested the Lighthouse 
impact could be associated with school engagement and the characteristics of the Lighthouse team.  
7.3.1 Impact by Student Characteristics 
By-background PSM suggests that Lighthouse mainly increases educational aspiration for 
higher-performance students. In Table 7-5, NN matching t scores for both the most recent 
participation and any participation are presented by gender, wealth and academic performance for 
the five imputations. Except for Imputation_2/most recent participation, all t scores are higher than 
1.96 for students with higher performance. Under NN matching with a large control group, these t 
scores are very compelling. In fact, even the Imputation_2/most recent participation score, 1.4, is 
actually the highest figure in its column. This is indeed an encouraging finding, as higher schooling 
level is surely “appropriate” for higher-performance students. 
The aspiration increase may also be heterogeneous to gender. For male students, Imputations 1 
and 2 generate high t scores for the impact of any participation, while Imputations 3 to 5 generate 
high t scores for the impact of the most recent participation. With these mixed results, it is still 
difficult to tell whether the impact on boys can be confirmed once we have a larger sample or less 
missing data. 
Unlike by-gender matching, by-wealth matching gives a clearer message that the increase in 
educational aspiration does not vary by wealth. It is true that the t scores for poorer students are 



















 Imputation_1 Imputation_2 Imputation_3 Imputation_4 Imputation_5 Mean 
 Latest Any latest Any latest Any latest Any latest Any latest Any 
female 0.77 1.65 1.34 1.27 0.65 0.24 1.6 -0.73 1.27 0.89 1.13 0.66 
male 1.58 2.77 0.41 2.12 1.93 1.41 1.94 0.41 2.29 0.72 1.63 1.49 
richer 1.85 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.23 1.06 -0.42 1.11 0.48 
poorer 1.38 1.76 0.69 1.95 2.57 1 1.3 1.7 -0.27 1.24 1.13 1.53 
higher performance 2.11 2 1.4 3.11 2.83 2.1 1.92 3.18 2.94 3.52 2.24 2.78 




7.3.2 Impact by Lighthouse Site 
In impact evaluation, it is a common practice to see how the outcome varies by the receiver’s 
background, but it is a less common practice to look at how the outcome varies by the provider of 
interventions. When an intervention is purely material, such as providing a grant, the quality of 
treatment is supposed to be the same for all treated individuals, but when an intervention involves 
lots of human interaction, it is very likely that factors such as training (if they are not centralized and 
compulsory), site-specific interruptions, and the characteristics of service providers can all make a 
difference. In the case of Lighthouse, diverse groups of volunteers received different levels and 
contents of training, and each volunteer team has a different style and forms its own unique strategy. 
The grouping is never really random. It is therefore important to investigate how the differences in 
these volunteer groups lead to different program outcomes. Since Lighthouse volunteer groups are 
divided by school, the volunteer effect will be interwoven with school effects. This section discusses 
them together. 
Three typical sites of different Lighthouse engagements are selected for comparison. HS school 
had paused their Lighthouse program and then restarted it in 2012 (31 most recent participation, 83 
any participation out of 805 at randomly selected classes); HT school was a first-year Lighthouse 
school, although it also had some transferred former Lighthouse students (75 latest, 94 any out of 
479); and HY school had been a long-time Lighthouse school (56 latest, 225 any out of 1600)79. With 
the proper overlaps of propensity scores, these three schools are also more qualified than other 
Lighthouse schools for PSM. Figure 7-3 shows the results of three matching methods for the three 
schools. There are two immediate findings. The Lighthouse program does not have an impact on HY 
students, and the impact of any participation (Panel B) is rarely statistically significant, implying that 
the previous pooling result may underrate the seriousness of diminishing effect. 
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 Although HY’s Lighthouse programs were sometimes conducted in primary schools, the participants were mainly from 















Note: Nearest Neighborhood, Kernel and Radius PSM results are all presented for the five imputations, so there are 3*5=15 
data points for each site. Detailed data is in Appendix F4. 
 
The reason, this could show a diminishing marginal effect since the Lighthouse style is no longer 
new to local people. If looking at this phenomenon from a positive angle, one cannot rule out the 
possibility of the ripple effect – that Lighthouse students had gradually affected non-Lighthouse 
students, lowering the measurable difference. From the side of Lighthouse, the lack of impact could 
be related to the organization’s policy of sending the best volunteers to new sites. In comparison to 
HY, HS restarted after a break of several years, and HT was totally new. Lighthouse did admit that 
when assigning the volunteers for summer 2012, the best combinations were given to HS and HT. 
Sadly, it is difficult to distinguish between these factors, and the diminishing marginal impact and 
ripple effect would be particularly hard to measure. Thanks to the collection of volunteer information, 
however, it is possible to determine which factors affect program quality. Assuming the same 
program quality, we should find a higher impact on the HT sample in Panel A of Figure 7-3. The 
impact for other Lighthouse schools will be diluted by the larger group of former Lighthouse students 
in the control group, however the reality is, at least in the short term, that there was a higher effect 
size in HS (the blue symbol) with similar statistical significance. This indicates a difference between 
the HS team and the HT team, which could be measured by comparing the volunteer team 




information collected two weeks after the programs started. Detailed findings on volunteer teams 
are available in Appendix G.  
Nineteen volunteers in HS and seventeen volunteers in HT were able to stay from the beginning 
to the end of the summer 2012 program. The major differences in team characteristics between 
these two sites were grades in college and the levels of engagement in pre-program training. There 
are as many as seven freshmen in the HS team, while in HT there are only two. All HT volunteers 
finished the whole process of the first team building (they did not then know which team they would 
be allocated to), while five HS volunteers only joined some parts of it. Three HS volunteers undertook 
no training in teaching skills at all, while all HT volunteers undertook some or all of the training 
courses. Other than this, there was no big difference in the distribution of gender, subject major, 
origin, or volunteering experience. 
Between HS and HT, there were three major differences regarding volunteer perceptions of team 
operation. First of all, HT volunteers perceived much greater support from local people, including 
households, teachers, school and local governors. From 1 to 6, their mean ratings for corresponding 
items were 5.2~5.7, while HS’s are just 4.2~4.8. HS volunteers had much greater confidence in their 
performance. They had an average self-rating of 4.8 for the statement of “we are the best Lighthouse 
team this year”, while HT’s was just 4.1. At the time of survey the volunteers did not really know how 
programs proceeded in other sites, so the rating was a reflection of their belief rather than their real 
performance. Finally, HS volunteers appreciated the Lighthouse instructional framework more than 
HT volunteers, with a mean rating of 4.1 vs. 3.4. It is worth mentioning that all teams gave low 
ratings to the value of teaching training. Taking the mean of all ratings for all items, the two sites 
have very similar figures, as are the corresponding standard deviations. This means members of the 
two groups actually had similar levels of criticism, which makes their ratings comparable. It is 
possible that these simple mean calculations are biased, as members have different levels of team 




those in charge of a class or team function (Appendix G3). The weighted results suggest that HS also 
agreed more on the value of teambuilding (4.8 vs. 4.4), and those unweighted findings persisted.    
Combining team characteristics and volunteer opinions, several arguments can be made for why 
HS had a better outcome than HT, at least in the short term. They may not tell the whole story, but 
they are what the data seems to tell us most clearly. Sometimes passion weighs more than maturity, as 
the HS team is quite young. Participation in training does not matter much, yet the acceptance of the 
content does matter. In other words, it is about quality, not quantity. The quality of teaching training 
is however questionable. Lighthouse training teams should receive more feedback on this session to 
improve the training quality. Although local support is important, a lack of local support is not serious. 
Socio-emotional support is after all about interactions between volunteers and students, not their 
families, teachers, principals or local officers. Last but not least, team spirit is crucial, as maintaining 
a belief of “we are the best” may be transferred to program outcome. The last two arguments 
together also suggest that investing time in the relationship between team members could be more 
rewarding than public relations with local stakeholders. Of course, the latter remains important for 
maintaining a long-term partnership with Lighthouse sites.  
Finally, here are brief notes for the other three Lighthouse sites of HQ, QB and QD. HQ yields 
similar results as HY, while it also has similar size and level of Lighthouse engagements. Here I choose 
HY instead of HQ for elaboration because the latter only allowed me to collect data from one third of 
it students. QB results suggest aspiration boost, but the findings are less valuable due to the small 
number of Lighthouse students (only seven surveyed students participated the summer 2012 
program). QD shows no Lighthouse impact, but, like QB, the sample size is small. Detailed results for 





7.4 Causal Mechanisms 
This study generates two sources of causal interpretation for the Lighthouse impact on 
educational aspiration. One is the document generated from the Delphi survey, the other contains 
information collected in the field, including interviews and student diaries. Delphi was applied before 
the treatment, while interviews/diaries were obtained during or after the treatment.   
7.4.1 Delphi-Based Discussion 
Based on the opinions collected from Delphi experts, if there is an impact on educational 
aspiration, then it is mainly attributable to “the power of role models”. Let’s call this the role-model 
effect—when a student develop trust in a volunteer, they will subconsciously start to copy the 
volunteer’s behavior, including the schooling decisions of that volunteer. One Delphi expert provided 
a more specific theory of direct and indirect effect. Directly, once a student participates in Lighthouse, 
they forgo the chance of summer migrant work, receive the opportunity of talking to volunteers 
about education decisions, and thus have a higher possibility of returning to school after the vacation. 
Indirectly, it is admitted that Lighthouse volunteers who finished the training and went to the sites 
have more optimistic attitude and social responsibility than their peers, which gives local students a 
positive picture of college life, making them want to be one of this group in the future. In the 
internet age, it is quite easy for students to hear about the corrupt college life and job-degree 
mismatch that are reported all over the media. They, and especially those with higher hopes of 
getting into college (higher performers), need real college students in their life to confirm the good 
sides of college life. 
The Delphi responses also touch on educational aspiration from two other angles. Firstly, while 
Lighthouse is not about persuading students to accept additional schooling, it is anti-dropout, and it 
finds channels to financially support those at-risk of dropout. Students are also willing to talk to the 




participants. Secondly, some Delphi experts have suggested that the Lighthouse program may affect 
the household’s perception of college, but they are not confident about how strong this effect could 
be. After all, many parents are either busy with farm work or still working in cities during the 
summer. 
7.4.2 Interview/Diary-Based Discussion 
In summer 2012, three of my research assistants stayed with and talked to volunteers, teachers, 
students, and households. They obtained approval for scanning 99 diaries from eight Lighthouse 
students. It is true that these messages could be subjective, and the students offering their diaries 
might be active students who have a very positive view of Lighthouse, but nevertheless, interviews 
and diaries are better than Delphi documents in terms of giving detailed examples. In addition to 
descriptions of how the students gained confidence through speeches and team games, and how 
they started to love their hometown through the presentation of local goods and going out to clean 
the streets, there are interesting examples of how the volunteers and students became closer to 
each other. One case in point is a discussion about Jay Chou, an iconic pop singer from Taiwan. One 
student said he did not like Jay Chou, so a volunteer began to tell him stories of how Jay Chou grew 
to be a famous singer by overcoming many challenges. That volunteer was the first person from a 
different generation to talk with the student about such a non-school topic in an inspiring way. There 
are also several records describing the student’s gratitude for home visits, as many of these students 
live in remote villages. They felt they were being cared for. Such examples share one feature: that the 
students and volunteers build strong connections outside the class. Personal interactions are good 
for gaining trust.  
The household views are also solid and positive. Some households mentioned that their children 
went home earlier, were not reluctant to do homework anymore, or were more confident, outgoing 
and considerate. Again, we need to be cautious about selection bias and the fact that this could be a 




Since the PSM already discovered that the Lighthouse impact is concentrated on educational 
aspiration, there must be some negative effects to offset the positive outcomes. One RA was 
assigned to collect negative views from interviews, and those negative views belonged to four 
categories. Some students came to Lighthouse just because they wanted to accompany their friends, 
or because their parents need someone to “babysit” their children during the summer. While some 
said they did enjoy the time, some said the participation was just a boring task. Some students felt 
isolated by other students. In one activity, my assistant observed a student crying because her 
suggestion was ignored by her team members. Some students think the program is not intellectual. 
This is particularly evident for higher-grade students, as they sometimes took courses with younger 
students on subjects that were too easy for them. Some students felt they did not get enough care 
from the volunteers. Not all volunteers are capable of treating every student equally. Introverted 
students found it hard to get as much attention as outgoing students, yet these introverted students 
probably needed more help from the volunteers. The coexistence of positive and negative 
experiences explains why quantitative results reject many anticipated Lighthouse impacts.  
 
7.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings Regarding Lighthouse Impact 
7.5.1 Summary of Findings Regarding Lighthouse Impact 
Participation in Lighthouse is determined by several factors, especially higher academic 
performance, shorter schooling distance, affirmative household attitude on summer camp, and 
larger migrant networks. Personality also matters a great deal, although this could also be a 
treatment effect. The rigorous NN matching suggests that educational aspiration is the only 
measurable outcome that is statistically significant. Affiliation need, confidence, curiosity, and 




done. Courage, ambition and career expectation turn out to be neither treatment effects nor 
determinants.  
After confirming educational aspiration as the key outcome, this study considers it further by 
applying a more efficient propensity score calculation and two other matching methods, kernel 
matching and radius matching. After putting all PSM results together, it becomes clear that an 
increase in aspiration can decrease over time. This suggests that more follow-ups are needed to 
maintain the impact. 
By-background analyses show that such aspiration increase mainly applies to students with 
higher academic performance, which is encouraging since it is absolutely right for these students to 
pursue more schooling. The aspiration increase may also be more evident among male students, but 
the current sample does not provide enough statistical support for the finding. It is indisputable that 
the effect does not vary by wealth.  
By-site analyses provide theories of why some sites perform better. The novelty for local people 
may help in greater program effect, although that is hard to measure. The passion, confidence and 
acceptance (not participation) of training content by volunteer teams can be important to program 
quality. It is alarming that no team appreciated much the pre-program teaching training. 
Finally, this chapter relies on the Delphi survey, on-site interviews, and student diaries to 
consider why educational aspiration is the key outcome. The most possible explanation of this 
outcome is that students tried to copy the volunteer schooling decisions after trust was built. 
Lighthouse volunteers have different styles, but they all share the identity of being a college student. 
Student trust of volunteers is easier to build through personal communication. On the other hand, 
individual cases show a mixed picture of how the students reacted to the program for personal 




7.5.2 Untestable Elements across the PSM Implementation 
Despite the attempts to ensure causal findings, it is admitted that, like all other identification 
strategies, PSM still has its weakness. More specially, untestable elements exist in three parts of my 
PSM implementation. 
First of all, since the matching is conducted on observables, there is a risk of missing some 
unobservables that are actually key treatment determinants. With extensive variable exploration in 
the study, I am confident that such risk is minimized, but we can never fully rule it out. Imputed 
datasets are after all not the real datasets. I conducted Rosenbaum Bounds sensitivity analyses for all 
imputated data after NN matchings, which show that on average the presence of unobserved factors 
that would make individuals 17% more likely to be in the “most recent participation” group, or 11% 
more likely to be in the “any participation” group, could invalidate the results80.     
In terms of treatment outcome, it is not easy to discover all possible outcomes. It is true that the 
Delphi survey has identified 25 outcome candidates (Figure 4-3), but we cannot tell if these are all 
possible impacts. More importantly, many of these outcomes are not feasible for variable 
construction (e.g. creativity, management skill), and some are for the community’s long-term benefit 
(e.g. establishment of student organization, teacher support). One way to partially verify the 
completeness is to put a treatment dummy into the model for PCED determinants. If the treatment 
dummy remains significantly associated with the relative odds of a PCED, ceteris paribus, then maybe 
some mediator (treatment outcome) is missing. Under the simplest specification of traditional 
variables in Chapter 6, the coefficients of the treatment dummy are significant at the 1% level for the 
options “work” and “undecided” (see notes for Table 6-10 and 6-11). Once we include the treatment 
dummy in the full-specification model, the coefficient for the “undecided” option is no longer 
significant, but the coefficient for the option “work” remains significant at the 5% level. It is possible 
that I have missed a determinant for working decisions that happens to be a neglected outcome of 
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the Lighthouse program. It is equally possible that Lighthouse’s participation prevents students from 
going out for a summer job, and we know that summer jobs can lead to a choice of work as student’s 
PCED. Having a camp to attend thus has a greater impact, but it is not really a Lighthouse impact. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to test which explanation is more compelling.  
Finally, it is the hardest to measure what really happened during the treatment, especially the 
level of engagement for each participant, and their level of engagement in other similar activities. I 
looked into these issues by collecting detailed participation information from Lighthouse volunteers81, 
and by adding questions on the availability of funding support and other Lighthouse-like programs to 
the student questionnaire (module G), however the collected information turned out to be too 
difficult to organize. In all Lighthouse schools, it is not unusual to see that some students only 
attended half the program because of other duties, but expressed great appreciation for the 
participation, or that a student was requested to attend some other short-term camps organized by 
universities (semi-governmental) because they lived close to the school. To proxy these uncertainties, 
the PSM has to rely on other variables, such as the burden of other household chores/farming/city 
visits or jobs, academic performance, schooling distance, ethnicity, and so forth. 
In short, there are elements for treatment propensity, outcome, and process that are hard to test 
precisely. Although proper actions were taken in response to this concern, we should bear in mind 
that it could still be the source of bias in the PSM results.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
8.1 Summary of Key Findings 
This study reports on substantial findings about PCED determinants as well as the impact of 
social emotional support provided by a GNGO. The two sets of findings are logically connected. 
While the analysis of PCED determinants suggests educational aspiration as a key factor, the impact 
evaluation confirms that the Lighthouse program can help to improve this. 
8.1.1 PCED Determinants 
The findings about PCED determinants in the full-specification MNL can be summarized as the 
following statements. Certain popular factors do have predictable influences on PCED. For example, 
being female, older, with more siblings, poorer, and performing worse in tests all lead to a relatively 
low preference for AHS; students with health issues tend to choose either VHS or AHS, since these 
are the channels towards a career with less physical labor; and a homeroom teacher’s preference 
between AHS and VHS can affect their students’ choice of schooling track. Parental background does 
not turn out to be as important as previous studies have suggested, except for the presence of 
parents— living in an incomplete family actually appears to urge students to think seriously about 
their PCED. The backgrounds of homeroom teachers matter more than those of subject teachers, 
and so do the expectations of relative future earnings by PCED when compared to the relative costs. 
A number of subjective factors (career expectations, school perceptions, personality, family attitudes, 
and teacher PCED preference) show connections to PCED even though numerous other variables are 
held constant. Among the subjective factors, educational aspiration clearly stands out as the 
strongest determinant, and among additional variables proposed by the Delphi survey, knowledge of 
vocational education policy, urban experience, the local entertainment industry, household chores, 
and teenage love are all connected to PCED. It is also worth noting that students with lower grades 




The main regression model passes the robustness test. It is true that p values fluctuate across 
different samples and/or specifications, but these do not bring about large coefficient changes. 
Nevertheless, the unstable statistical significance does bring into question the reliability of some 
variables (e.g. level of ambition in particular), and suggests that some variables may actually be more 
important than the main model suggests if sampling, specification, or missing data are no longer 
issues (e.g. migrant network). 
In addition to robustness, this study also explores the heterogeneity of PCED determinants. It is 
not surprising to see different variables disproportionally affect students of different gender, wealth, 
or academic performance. Overall, basic characteristics (gender, age and ethnicity) and parental 
background have more of an effect on children from advantaged backgrounds (male, richer, 
high-performance), while sibling and peer/teacher/school factors matter more for the disadvantaged 
group (female, poorer, low-performance). Other PCED determinants show mixed effects. These 
patterns are neither easily predictable but nor are they counter-intuitive. The ultimate value in 
uncovering this variation is to help with decisions about targeting interventions.  
Finally, putting the standardized regression output in scatter graph form shows that PCED is 
affected by certain variables with diverse effect size and statistical significance. Among these 
variables, educational aspiration is one of the most influential and alterable determinants that 
matters in all education decisions.  
This thorough investigation of PCED determinants has resulted in findings that challenge existing 
literature on gender and parental background, that further extend our knowledge of monetary 
reward/cost and subjective factors, and that confirm new possible determinants previously 
overlooked. These findings apply to the rural areas of coastal China, a region that has not been well 





8.1.2 Impact of Lighthouse Intervention 
Participation in Lighthouse is determined by several factors, particularly higher academic 
performance, shorter schooling distance, positive household attitudes to summer camp, and larger 
migrant networks. Personality also matters, although it could also be a treatment effect. Rigorous NN 
matching suggests that educational aspiration is the only measurable outcome that is statistically 
significant. It is unfortunate that only one outcome was confirmed, but it is encouraging that this 
outcome happens to be one of the strongest PCED determinants. 
Among the other tested outcomes, need for affiliation, confidence, curiosity, and extraversion 
turn out to be treatment determinants that could be mistakenly identified as impacts. Courage, 
ambition and career expectations are neither treatment effects nor determinants.  
After confirming educational aspiration as the key outcome, this study investigates further by 
applying a more efficient propensity prediction and two other common matching methods: kernel 
matching and radius matching. After putting all the PSM results together, it becomes clear that the 
increase in aspiration fades over time. This suggests the need of follow-up actions to maintain the 
impact. 
Analyses by student background show that such aspiration improvement mainly applies to 
students with higher academic performance, which is encouraging since it is absolutely proper for 
those students to pursue more schooling. The increase in aspiration may also be more evident 
among male students, but the current sample does not provide sufficient statistical support for this 
claim. Finally, it is indisputable that the effect does not vary by wealth.  
Analyses by sites provide theories for why some sites perform better. The novelty of the program 
for local people may increase its effect, although that is hard to measure. The passion, confidence 
and acceptance (not participation) of training content to volunteer teams can be important for 





Based on the Delphi survey, on-site interviews, and student diaries, the most likely explanation 
for the increase in aspiration is that students tried to copy volunteer schooling decisions once trust 
was built. Lighthouse volunteers have different styles, but they are all college students. Student trust 
in the volunteers is easier to build through interactions outside class. On the other hand, individual 
cases show a mixed picture of how the students reacted to the program, whether due to personal 
reasons or the ability of the volunteers. This may explain why only one effect survives the matching. 
It is notable that there are elements for treatment propensity, outcome, and process that are 
hard to test precisely. Although the correct actions were taken in response to this concern, the 
analysis may still miss important treatment determinants, significant treatment outcomes, or parallel 
programs that are not well proxied by the modeling. It should be kept in mind that these untestable 
elements could be the source of bias in the PSM results. 
 
8.2 Significance and Implications 
This study makes three major contributions to the field. It can be translated into comprehensive 
advocacy for education policies related to PCED, such as dropout prevention and the promotion of 
VHS. It may also suggest the value of, or at least the required improvement to, China’s educational 
GNGOs, which are young and remain confined by governmental regulations. Last but not least, this is 
a unique showcase of how qualitative-quantitative sequential mixed-method works better in 
exploratory analyses. 
8.2.1 Education Policy 
This study is a complement to previous literature on education decisions. By looking at the four 
expected PCEDs together, the findings are better connected to the reality of rural education. 
Although expected PCED cannot fully predict actual PCED, my two-school subsample show that 




PCED. By including a comprehensive list of variables in the regression, the findings can be interpreted 
in a much more straightforward way (e.g. we no longer need to worry whether schooling distance is 
a proxy for school quality). And y looking at the rural area of coastal China, not only is the 
geographical gap in literature filled, but light is also shed on issues that may apply to the vast area of 
inner China as the country continues its urbanization. It is also notable that a PCED discussion could 
be relevant to countries other than China. For example, in 2011 India took the initiative to introduce 
vocational education at the secondary school level from Grade 8. It is probably that someday rural 
India will have a PCED distribution similar to that of today’s rural China. This study can therefore 
serve as a reference guide. 
Findings from this study can be translated into substantial policy suggestions. Here are some 
examples, and more detailed ones can be derived from the regression results: 
1. If we want to promote AHS, resources should be mobilized towards girls, older students, 
students with more siblings, relatively disadvantaged students in classes with a higher mean 
of parental education, and poorer students.  
2. As students from incomplete families (single parent, migrant parent or no parents) tend to 
think about their PCED more seriously, community support could be provided for this group 
to help realize their PCED. 
3. Intervention in subjective factors could prevent dropout and discourage early migrant 
workers. In particular, programs can target educational aspirations, career expectations, 
perceptions towards schooling, courage, curiosity, family’s appreciation of study, and teacher 
PCED preferences. 
4. Students with health issues prefer to continue their schooling, either AHS or VHS, so 
assistance should be provided in the fulfillment of their plans, from both the demand (e.g. 
special grant) and the supply sides (e.g. disabled-access-friendly high schools). 
5. If we want to promote VHS, then information about policy incentives should be better 




preference can affect a student’s school track. Of course, the government should also 
supervise the fulfillment of these incentives. For example, in October 2015, the Communist 
Party of China Central Committee announced a gradual elimination of VHS fees, so it will be 
crucial to inform the public and implement a clear time table so the policy can have a real 
impact.  
6. At least in northwest Guangdong, policies designed for encouraging schooling should 
consider local factors such as the communication of vocational education policies, student 
urban experiences, the local entertainment industry, the burden of household chores, and 
the phenomenon of teenage love. 
7. The interventions should not just be made during school semesters— what happens during 
long vacations can easily make students change their minds. 
8. Assuming the government wants to invest more in helping the disadvantaged group of 
female, poorer and low-performance students, then there should be more attention to 
sibling, peer, teacher, and school factors, rather than just basic student characteristics 
(gender, age and ethnicity) and parental background. 
8.2.2 Educational Grassroots NGO 
Other than educational policy advocacies, this study can also inform the Chinese government on 
the value of GNGOs. During the writing of this dissertation, registration has been getting easier for 
GNGOs, but regulations are still strict. This calls for a convincing confirmation of GNGO impact, or at 
least a rigorous evaluation that can provide suggestions for the improvement of GNGOs. My 
evaluation clearly shows that Lighthouse’s socio-emotional support has an impact on educational 
aspirations, so the value of GNGOs is confirmed. More importantly, the findings also imply ways of 
improving impact throughout the life circle of a Lighthouse program. 
1. Lighthouse could design a mechanism that maintains engagement without over-relying on 




by a one year short program for each Lighthouse school. This study demonstrates the 
possibility of diminishing impact from sites of continuing engagement, and that the 
relationship with local stakeholders seems to be less important in terms of ensuring the 
impact on individual participants. When Lighthouse was a young organization with weak 
social outreach, it was understandable that it tried to retain the number of Lighthouse 
schools, but now it may be more efficient to act with flexibility. 
2. During recruitment, Lighthouse should welcome young volunteers (freshmen and 
sophomores), and worry less about universities, majors or where the volunteers grew up. 
Young members have greater passion, less worry about jobs or other commitments, and 
more time to become experienced volunteers. It is true that young volunteers are less 
experienced, but they can be trained. 
3. It may be necessary to overhaul the training on instructional skills, making it more 
learner-friendly and practical for students with no teaching background. 
4. Since increased aspiration mainly affects students with higher academic performance, it is 
advisable to encourage their participation. On the other hand, the matching result also 
implies that volunteers should pay more attention to low-performance students during the 
program. Since there are untested effects, it is unfair to conclude that Lighthouse does not 
affect low-performance students, however, based on the observations of my research team, 
it is true that some students were not good at expressing themselves, and some volunteers 
were not good at helping this type of student. 
5. The volunteer team, especially the sub-group in charge of “public relationships”, should 
focus more on team morale rather than relationships with local school and government. A 
good relationship with local people remains important, but it is less relevant to the impact 
on Lighthouse participants, and it can be addressed by experienced volunteers and staff from 




6. The volunteers should be encouraged to spend time on informal interactions like home visits 
and letter communications, which appear to work well in building the emotional attachment 
between students and the volunteers. 
7. A structural procedure for follow-up services should be established. Different Lighthouse 
sites have their own traditions for follow-up, but there should be minimum standards for all 
sites to follow in order to reduce the diminishing of impact from the Lighthouse. This also 
makes the handover between old and new volunteer teams easier, and links back to my first 
point about designing a mechanism that maintains engagement without over-relying on 
specific sites. 
8.2.3 Sequential Mixed-Methods 
The third contribution of this study is its methodology. The qualitative-quantitative sequential 
mixed-methods approach should have resulted in more accurate answers to my research questions. I 
purposefully designed this research to allow for an examination of different methodological 
combinations: 
1. Purely qualitative. If this study relied only on the Delphi survey to answer the two research 
questions, there would have been two problems. Firstly, some variables would have 
remained overlooked. For example, Delphi suggested 46 PCED determinants, or 57 with 
school and grade dummies counted, but when combining Delphi and the literature there 
were actually 84 variables. Secondly, inaccuracy exists when it comes to measurement. 
Delphi ratings suggested family income, parental attitudes towards different decisions, high 
school cost, and whether parents were migrant workers as the top four PCED determinants, 
but according to regression results only family income may qualify to be “top”, and that is 
when we do not distinguish the concepts of wealth and income. Delphi ratings also 
suggested Lighthouse outcomes that actually turned out to be insignificant, such as need for 




2. Purely quantitative. If this study relied only on MNL and PSM to answer the two research 
questions, there would also be two problems. Firstly, in the same way as purely qualitative 
methods, purely quantitative methods also overlook variables, especially those specific to 
the local context. My list of PCED determinants would have missed factors that do not apply 
much to other rural areas, such as teenage love and the development of the entertainment 
industry. My propensity score calculation and treatment outcome selection would have built 
on intuition, and thus be quite easily challenged. The second problem of being purely 
quantitative is somewhat connected to the first problem— without a solid list of PCED 
determinants, treatment determinants, or an outcome list, the interpretation of quantitative 
results would be full of uncertainties. For example, we would worry about whether some 
subjective factors were just mediators or proxies of other variables, or whether there would 
be difficulties when explaining the causal mechanism of Lighthouse impact due to the lack of 
qualitative documents.    
3. Parallel or quantitative-qualitative mixed-methods. When a sequential design is not feasible 
(often due to time limits), parallel mix-methods can be applied, and the findings can then be 
converged to generate insights; when the focus is on an explanation of certain phenomenon, 
conducting qualitative research after the quantitative models can serve the purpose quite 
well. Both types of mixed-methods are less satisfactory when it comes to exploratory topics. 
There are few studies on which to rely for suggestions about four-option PCED determinants 
in coastal China, and even less information about the enrollment, operation and outcomes of 
GNGO’s socio-emotional support. Parallel and quantitative-qualitative mixed-methods are 
therefore not suitable for my research questions. 
In comparison, the “Delphi- MNL- PSM” model adopted by this study overcomes the weaknesses 
of both pure quantitative and qualitative methods. If I had used non-mixed-methods, I would have 
drawn quite different conclusions that would probably have been biased or incomplete. It is true that 




results when compared to quantitative-qualitative mixed-methods (e.g. a practice of “MNL- PSM- 
Focus group”), but, by providing sufficient insights to guide the questionnaire design, the 
methodological challenges of comprehensive PCED determinants and treatment selection bias are 
directly addressed.  
 
8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Studies 
This study has its limitations in timing, missing data, external validity, implementation of research 
methods and its heavy rely on self-report questionnaires, but they can be largely eliminated by 
conducting further proper studies. 
The timing of data collection (one month after summer vacation) made it difficult to examine 
actual PCED and long-term Lighthouse impact. Ideally, we would like to see both expected and actual 
PCED for all surveyed students, but the reality is that I was only able to collect that data for two small 
schools. Even for those two schools, it is premature to say that the actual PCED were confirmed. 
Since the data were collected one month after the new semester, students may not have fully settled 
down with their PCED. For instance, those who went to AHS may later drop out or switch to VHS. 
Even for students choosing to stay in town (either dropout or work), it will take time to confirm the 
details of their lives, including farming, marriage, and so forth. This study tested the short- and 
mid-term effects of Lighthouse impact, but it can say very little about long-term impacts. Despite this, 
my research team was able to use the best available time window approved by local government.  
A straightforward response to the timing issue is to conduct follow-up studies. More specifically, I 
can test which PCEDs the same group of surveyed students really made, as well as the way their 
measurable outcomes vary from those in other years after the program. There are stories of how the 
earlier generations of Lighthouse students succeeded in their education and career, but they are 





The second limitation of my dissertation study is missing data. Both students and households 
found it challenging when asked about “money” issues, such as income, credit constraints, and 
expected PCED costs and rewards. There was a missing data rate of close to 50% for some of these 
financial variables. Indeed, these factors are hard to estimate in rural China, and needless to say 
people are sometimes reluctant to provide such private information. Multiple imputations are used 
to address the missing-data problem, but imputation can never perfectly replace real data. 
With the current research results, future study could shorten the questionnaire to reduce 
missing data. As long as the data collection takes place in the same towns, questions that were 
shown to be irrelevant in this study can be taken out, simplified, or combined. It is common sense 
that respondents will act more seriously for shorter questionnaires. I can provide multiple choices 
responses for questions about money variables, instead of asking for estimates. The ranges can be 
decided by looking at the distribution of estimates in the current sample. 
The third major limitation is external validity. This issue mainly applies to the impact evaluation 
because those evaluation results may not apply to other educational GNGOs. External validity is not 
a major concern for PCED determinants, and in fact its geographical focus makes it a valuable 
complement to the literature. Despite this, I did act in response to the worry of external validity for 
both research questions. During the first round of Delphi, I asked each panel member to write down 
at least three Chinese provinces or cities with which they are very familiar, which would enable 
separate examination of the ranking of PCED determinants for the group, focusing on surveyed 
towns and the group with a national perspective. I also asked panel members to identify and rate 31 
problems faced by Lighthouse and other educational GNGOs. By doing this, even if the Lighthouse 
impact is a unique case, I can explain why it is unique and what other educational GNGOs could do to 
obtain the same achievements or avoid the same problems. This part of the Delphi research is not 





Consequently, further studies could conduct research into PCED determinant in other regions, 
such as northern Suzhou (the rural part of another coastal province) or rural inner China regions. It 
would also be a good idea to conduct impact evaluations for other educational GNGOs with 
programs similar to Lighthouse, such as EV (mainly Beijing but covers the whole country), Shoulder 
Action (covers Fujian and Guangdong), and Yinghuo (covers Southwestern China).  
The forth limitation is my implementations of Delphi and PSM are imperfect. Ideally, the Delphi 
survey should help experts achieve consensus, but as the example in Figure 4-4 shows, the 
divergence between experts remained evident in the third round. To some extent, this phenomenon 
confirms the fact that qualitative methods are good for providing rough insights rather than giving 
precise measurements. It is also noticeable that the quality of Delphi results also depends on my 
capacity of communication as well as how representative my Delphi experts are, yet these can never 
be perfect. For PSM, there are untested elements for the calculation of treatment propensity, the 
measurement of outcomes, and the proxy of coexisting events, which have been discussed in Section 
7.5.2.  
While it is unrealistic to pursue perfect Delphi or PSM, action could be taken to maximize the 
validity and reliability of research findings. For Delphi, the simple solution is to give up measurement 
and focus instead on generating more messages. For PSM, double-robustness can be achieved by 
combining it with DID (to conduct DID for students with similar propensity scores). It will be a great 
step forwards if I am able to collect pre-treatment data for all surveyed students in future studies. 
Finally, the heavy rely on self-report items on variable construction can lead to either upward or 
downward bias for the answers to both research questions. Duckwork and Yeager (2015) 
summarized the five limitations of self-report questionnaires. First, respondent may read or interpret 
the item in a way that differs from researcher intent. Second, they may not be astute or accurate 
reporters of behaviors or internal states for a variety of reasons. Third, questionnaire scores may not 




standards) used when making judgments may differ across respondents. Last but not least, 
respondents may provide answers that are desirable but not accurate.  
My design of questionnaire did consider the problem of self-report. For example, Lighthouse 
program was mentioned in the end of the questionnaire, so Lighthouse students was not hinted to 
provide positive answer on their socio-emotional status. Yet, many of these problems can hardly be 
fully resolved without more analyses applying different measurement tools and ways of variable 
construction. Self-reports can still provide a useful substitute for objective data even though there 
are systematic errors in reporting related to factors like gender and grade (Crockett et al., 1987). In 
future studies, if we can detect some of the PCED determinants or social-emotional support 
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Appendix A: Lighthouse Intervention: From Volunteer Recruitment to Revisit 




 Application screening 
April 
 Interviews and admission. Usually 1 in 6 ~ 1 in 8 accepted. 
 Introduction of Lighthouse (operation, idea, developmental strategy, etc.). 
May 
 First round of team building. This is a 3-day intensive session. The volunteers will be together for 
more than 12 hours per day. 
 Teaching Training – education ideas 
 Teaching Training – teaching skills and informal instruction 
 Teaching Training – trial lecture 
June 
 Teaching Training – student affairs 
 Optional trainings. In 2011, ten courses were provided by former Lighthouse volunteers, 
professional trainers, or other NGO trainers, including: applied drama, social gender, picture 
book education, creative music, photographing, outdoor living skill, state of rural education, 
Getting-Things-Done (GTD), connected to community, inquiry learning, and communication. 
July 
 Volunteer disciplines and first-aid treatment 
 Second round of team building 
 Specific training held by former volunteers from the same Lighthouse location 
July-August 
 Summer Camp starts, accompanied with simultaneous monitoring and evaluation by former 
volunteers and Lighthouse staff 
September 
 Workshops for each volunteer team 
 Summative meeting 
October 








A2. Sample of the One Month Curriculum 
 
 Curriculum for one of the classes in Yonggu 2011a 
First Week MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY 
   Arrival Recruitment Recruitment Team Building 
 
 MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY 
8:00-8:10  Morning Reading(English pronunciation, news broadcast, story share) 
8:10-8:50 1 Class meeting Local product
b
 1 Local product 4 Local product 7 Local product 10 
9:00-9:40 2 Team game Local product 2 Local product 5 Local product 8 Local product 11 
9:40-10:00  3-minute class-break exercise 
10:00-10:40 3 Silent music Local product 3 Local product 6 Local product 9 Local product 12 
     











Small story, big 
idea Handcraft 
3:40-4:20 6 Standard exercise Standard exercise 
Long Distance Household Visit 
 MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY 
8:00-8:10  Morning Reading(English pronunciation, news broadcast, story share) 
8:10-8:50 1 Class meeting Funny math 
English 
speaking Performing life 
History (Three 
Kingdoms) 
9:00-9:40 2 Drawing Story of a boat Communication About teamwork 
9:40-10:00  3-minute class-break exercise 
10:00-10:40 3 Outdoor drawing Fruit life Logo design Making a mask Social gender 1 
     














The world of 
voice 
Class meeting 
Long Distance Household Visit 
 MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY 
8:00-8:10  Morning Reading(English pronunciation, news broadcast, story share) 
8:10-8:50 1 Class meeting Funny math 
Funny English Life Auction 
Art festival 
9:00-9:40 2 Learn to reject Bird’s moving 
9:40-10:00  3-minute class-break exercise 
10:00-10:40 3 Ads design Geography Cartoon drawing Social gender 3 
           




Marketing practice Water purifier 
Sales 
3:40-4:20 6 Class meeting Summary 
a. The curriculums vary among Lighthouse schools, but follow principals received from the training. 
b. “Local Product” is a series of inquiry learning classes promoting the students care of local development 




Appendix B: Questionnaires (Students/Households/Teachers/Principals/Volunteers) 
B1. Questionnaire for Students 
 
Questionnaire for Students 
 
This survey is for research only 




The data generated from this questionnaire will be used by researchers in economics and 
education to analyze the determinants of post-compulsory education decisions. We hope to hear 
about your real opinions and situation because real information can help us conduct accurate 
analyses. The questionnaire takes approximately 40 minutes. Your support is greatly appreciated! 
 
Haogen Yao, Doctoral Student 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
 
Privacy Protection 
1. This survey collects information related to the post-compulsory education decision. The investigators 
will collect them in right after you finish. Please try your best to answer all the questions 
2. Your answers will be analyzed together with thousands of other student answers, and therefore no 
one can tell your identity from our findings. 
3. We ask for your name and student ID only for the convenience of the follow-up survey. 
4. We will strictly protect your privacy. We will never release your questionnaire to individuals or 
organizations other than the researchers of this project. 
 
Instructions 
Please “√” the figure you choose, or write your answer on“      ”. The multiple-choice questions are 
single-answer unless given specific instruction. 
 
A. Basic Information 
A1. Your name：                   
A2. Your class ID：                   
A3. School name：                                     
A4. Grade：     
A5. Class：      
A6. Home address：                                         
A7. What is your next step? ①Dropout ②Work after graduating ③Continue to vocational high school 




A8. If you chose ① in A7，what exactly is it?  ①Farming ②Local work ③Migrant work ④Other or 
not sure 
A9. If you chose ② in A7，what exactly is it? ①Local work ②Migrant work ③Other or not sure 
A10. If you chose ③ in A7，what exactly is it? ①Technical school ②Specialized school ③Vocational 
school ④Not sure ⑤Does not matter 
A11. Ideally, what is your expected educational level in the future?  ①Lower secondary ②Vocational 
high ③Academic high ④College ⑤Graduate level 
A12. What vocation do you think you might enter in the future (up to 3)?  a. Agriculture  b. Mining  c. 
Manufacturing  d. Production and supply of electricity, gas, and water  e. Construction  f. Geological 
exploration and water management  g. Transportation, storage, and post and telecommunication  h. 
Wholesale, retail, and catering  i. Finance and insurance  j. Real estate  k. Social services  l. Health, 
sport, and social welfare  m. Education, culture/art, and radio/movie/television  n. Research and 
technical service  o. Government, party and social organization  p. Not sure or never think about it 
 
B. Individual Characteristics 
B1. Your birth year：         
B2. Gender： ①Male  ②Female 
B3. Ethnicity：  ①Han  ②Minority 
B4. Graduated from                    elementary school 
B5. Have you been a class leader in middle school? ①Yes  ②No 
B6. Are you a league member? ①Yes  ②No 
B7. Are you a boarding student? ①Yes     ②No 
B8. How long it takes for you to go to the school from home?      mins, by 
   ①foot ②bike ③auto ④other 
B9. Have you suffered these health problems (multiple answer)?①Trachoma/myopia ②Anemia ③Hepatitis 
④Easily tired or dizzy ⑤Easily cold or hurt ⑥Other health problem ⑦Fine 
B10. In the past three months, have you asked for leave because of health problem?  
①No  ②Yes, 1 time  ③2~4 times  ④More than 4 times 
B11. Your usual academic ranking in class：No.__ 
B12. How many hours do you spend on housework (including agricultural work) per day? Total      hours 
B13. How many hours do you spend on study after class? Total     hours 




B15. List your two best friends (can be your relatives) in the same school (if dropped out or transferred, 
specify)：                 ；                  。 
B16. Have you lived or worked in one of the Pearl Delta cities for longer than 1 month?①Yes ②No 
 
C. Family Structure 
C1. How many people in your household？      
C2. The state of your family： 
①Parent divorced  ② One parent passed away ③Both parents passed away  ④Both at home    
⑤Father a migrant worker ⑥Mother a migrant worker ⑦Other 
C3. Number of older brothers (Please also include those from step-parents）：      
C4. Number of older sisters:       
C5. Number of younger brothers:       
C6. Number of younger sisters:       
C7. If you have siblings, how many are in elementary school？       
C8. Including yourself, how many of your siblings are in lower secondary school now？     （1 if only you） 
C9. If you have siblings, how many are in upper secondary school (can be vocational)？      
C10. If you have siblings, how many are in college (can be vocational)？      
C11. If you have siblings, how many are working as a worker or farmer？      
C12. If you have siblings, how many are already married？      
 
D. School and Education 
D1. Please give your answer for the statements below. There is no correct or incorrect answer. Please do not 
spend too much time on a single statement. Please think of your daily life rather than unusual days. 
 








a. If I study hard, the teacher will praise me.   1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. The teacher often pays attention to me in class.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Most teachers like to listen to me talk.   1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. The teaching quality at my school is very good. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e.  The teachers at my school care a lot about the 
students.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. Teachers at our school treat students very fairly. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
g.  Going to school is very important for my future.
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
h.  We believe we can learn our lessons well.   1 2 3 4 5 6 
i. Teachers always assign us a lot of homework.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
j. We usually discuss problems together in class 
animatedly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





l. Most subjects are easy for me.   1 2 3 4 5 6 
m. The teacher encourages us to ask questions.   1 2 3 4 5 6 
n. If I work hard, I can do well in my studies.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
o. I am happy in school.    1 2 3 4 5 6 
p. I often do not want to attend school.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
q. I like to participate 1 2 3 4 5 6 
r. I often feel bored  1 2 3 4 5 6 
s. I often feel lonely 1 2 3 4 5 6 
t. I enjoy learning new things 1 2 3 4 5 6 
u. Teachers like me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
v. What I learn in class is useful 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
D2. Have you had something stolen in the school？ ①Yes     ②No 
D3. Have you played truant？ ①Yes     ②No 
D4. Have you been involved with gambling or illegal lottery？ ①Yes     ②No 
D5. Do you have enough breakfast everyday？  ①Yes      ②No 
D6. Do you have enough lunch everyday？  ①Yes      ②No 
D7. Do you feel hungry or dizzy during class？  ①Usually   ②Sometimes   ③Never 
D8. Do you find it difficult to read the blackboard or do homework because of myopia?①Yes    ②No 
D9. Have these things happened to you before or during this semester？ 
  Never Sometimes Often Very often 
a. Students violate school discipline.  1 2 3 4 
b. During tests students cheat  1 2 3 4 
c. Students copy others’ homework.  1 2 3 4 
d. Some students disrupt the class.  1 2 3 4 
e.  There are in-campus fights.  1 2 3 4 
f. Some students bully other students. 1 2 3 4 
 
D10. The subject taught by your favorite teacher _____________ 
D11. In which subject did you have the best performance? _____________ 
 
E. Description of your Life 
The following statements are a general description of life。Please read each statement carefully and indicate 
the extent to which each statement reflects your life (by specifying totally disagree, disagree, agree, or fully 
agree. There is no correct or incorrect answer, please do not spend too much time on one specific statement. 
 










1 In most ways, my life meets my hopes and 
expectations 




2 I am satisfied with my life 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3 I have gotten a lot of the things I want 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4 I am confident about my future 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5 If I cannot do something I do not continue to 
try to do it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 I always achieve what I most want to do 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 In the future I will be able to live a better life 
than most people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
8 I can prepare myself well for my future life 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9 My future life won’t be very happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 
10 I won’t be able to get what I truly want in the 
future 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
11 My future life will be better than the present 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12 A lot of the things that I do are very important 
and meaningful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
13 I enjoy my current life 1 2 3 4 5 6 
14 I have many things to be proud of about myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 
15 I often feel unhappy 1 2 3 4 5 6 
16 I can always do things well 1 2 3 4 5 6 
17 I often feel lonely 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18 I often win praise from others for the things 
that I do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
19 I often quarrel with others 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20 I often lose my temper with others 1 2 3 4 5 6 
21 I don’t like to let others know about my affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 
22 I like to brag 1 2 3 4 5 6 
23 I can’t concentrate on what I am doing 1 2 3 4 5 6 
24 I often have many different kinds of ideas in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
25 I blush easily 1 2 3 4 5 6 
26 I can’t do anything well unless adults are there 1 2 3 4 5 6 
27 I like to show off my strengths in front of 
others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
28 I am very indifferent to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 
29 I am very shy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
30 I steal things from others or my home 1 2 3 4 5 6 
31 I always want to attract others’ attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 
32 Sometimes I break things on purpose 1 2 3 4 5 6 
33 I am very obedient to my parents 1 2 3 4 5 6 
34 I do not observe school discipline 1 2 3 4 5 6 
35 I get along well with classmates 1 2 3 4 5 6 
36 My classmates often make fun of me 1 2 3 4 5 6 
37 I do not feel sad, even if I have done something 
that I shouldn’t have 




38 I feel unhappy if I see that others are better 
than me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
39 Often, even if I know I am wrong, I do not like 
to listen to others’ advice 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
40 I sometimes worry that I could do something 
bad. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
41 I think I should be good at all things 1 2 3 4 5 6 
42 Sometimes my mood changes suddenly. I 
might be happy one moment and then for some 
unknown reason I suddenly no longer feel 
happy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
43 I think that a lot of people like me 1 2 3 4 5 6 
44 I feel inferior to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 
45 I act impulsively 1 2 3 4 5 6 
46 I feel I am happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 
47 I am often suspicious of others 1 2 3 4 5 6 
48 I don’t like to play with naughty children 1 2 3 4 5 6 
49 I often swear at others and use dirty language 1 2 3 4 5 6 
50 I prefer to be alone 1 2 3 4 5 6 
51 I often make fun of others 1 2 3 4 5 6 
52 I sometimes tell lies 1 2 3 4 5 6 
53 I often feel nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 
54 I am often tired 1 2 3 4 5 6 
55 I often don’t talk when I am with my 
classmates, most of the time I listen to them 
talking 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
56 I lose my temper easily 1 2 3 4 5 6 
57 I am stubborn and don’t listen to others 
opinions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
58 I sometimes threaten and even hurt others 1 2 3 4 5 6 
59 There is always something to worry about 1 2 3 4 5 6 
60 My performance in school is good 1 2 3 4 5 6 
61 I like to do house and farm work 1 2 3 4 5 6 
62 I am curious about everything 1 2 3 4 5 6 
63 I am/was falling in love with someone 1 2 3 4 5 6 
64 I have been losing my patience when 
answering the questions above 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
F. Decision Process and Family Attitude 
F1. Given the scenarios below, what is the monthly after-tax earning you will have at 35. Please give an 
estimate of how much you think you will earn.  
a. drop out and start farming now          RMB 




c. farming after graduating         RMB 
d. work locally after graduating         RMB 
e. work as migrant after graduating         RMB 
f. work after graduating from academic high         RMB 
g. work after graduating from vocational high         RMB 
h. work after graduating from college         RMB          
     
F2. Do you know about policy incentives for vocational education? ①Very much ②Yes ③A little ④No 
 
F3. How do you feel about the local economy? ①bad, no hope ②bad, but getting better ③okay   ④
good, but getting worse ⑤good ⑥not sure 
 
F4. Who is influential in your post-compulsory education decision 
                       Totally disagree   Disagree   Agree a little   Basically agree   Agree   Totally agree     
a. Myself                1             2        3            4           5         6 
b. Elders                1             2        3            4           5         6 
c. Friends               1             2        3            4           5         6 
d. Teachers              1             2        3            4           5         6 
e. Previous graduates    1             2        3            4           5         6 
f. Media                 1             2        3            4           5         6 
g. Other people such     1             2        3            4           5         6 
as volunteers 
 
F5. Please choose 
                               
  Totally 
disagree 






a. My family care about where I will end up 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. My family care about my performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c My family care about my emotional state 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d My family respect my decision and opinion 1 2 3 4 5 6 




G1. How popular are these activities around your school? 
                                Very popular  Somewhat popular   Rare   Not sure 
a. KTV                                 1             2            3         4 
b. Gambling or illegal lottery         1             2            3         4 
c. Job recruitment advertisement       1             2            3         4 
d. Teenagers leaving town for work     1             2            3         4 
e. Internet bar                        1             2            3         4 
f. Vocational school advertisement     1             2            3         4 




                                Very popular  Somewhat popular   Rare   Not sure 
a. KTV                                 1             2            3         4 
b. Gambling or illegal lottery         1             2            3         4 
c. Job recruitment advertisement       1             2            3         4 
d. Teenage leaving town for work       1             2            3         4 
e. Internet bar                        1             2            3         4 
f. Vocational school advertisement     1             2            3         4 
G3. Since September 2009, if you receive donations, the total amount has been：      RMB 
G4. Since September 2009, if you receive non-material educational support，how often has this been?        
G5. Since September 2009, if you have been in the summer Lighthouse Project, how often have you gone?       
G6. Since September 2009, if you have been in the winter Lighthouse Project, how often have you gone?       
G7. In the past two years, if you have received services that are similar to Lighthouse and lasted longer than 10 
days, how many times has this happened?      Please specify the service                      
G8. What was your total score for your last final?               
G9. Did you participate in Lighthouse in the past summer?  ①Yes  ②No 
 
 



























B2. Questionnaire for Households 
 
Questionnaire for Households 
 
This survey is for research only 




Greetings. The data generated from this questionnaire will be used by researchers in 
economics and education to analyze the determinants of post-compulsory education decisions. 
We hope to hear about your real opinions and situation because real information can help us 
conduct accurate analyses. The questionnaire takes approximately 30 minutes. Your support is 
greatly appreciated! 
 
Haogen Yao, Doctoral Student 




1. This survey collects information related to the post-compulsory education decision. Please try your 
best to answer all the questions. 
2. Your answers will be analyzed together with answers from thousands of other households, and 
therefore no one can identify you from our findings. 
3. We will strictly protect your privacy. We will never release your questionnaire to individuals or 




Please “√” the figure you choose, or write your answer on“      ”. The multiple-choice questions are 
single-answer unless given specific instruction. We understand that some students might not be able to 
go home until the weekend, or that both parents could be out at work, and therefore we allow a weekend 
for answering the questions by parents or the guardian.  
 
 
H. Students Basic Information 
A1. The student’s name：                   
A2. Class ID：                   
A3. School name：                                     
A4. Grade：     





H. (Birth) Parental Basic Information 
H1. Mother’s education：①no schooling ②elementary unfinished ③elementary ④lower secondary 
unfinished  ⑤lower secondary ⑥upper secondary unfinished ⑦vocational high school ⑧
academic high school ⑨college or above 
H2. Mother’s occupation：  ①local off-farm worker ②migrant worker ③farmer ④cadre              
⑤self-employment ⑥unemployed ⑦other         
H3. Mother’s political status： ①Communist Party member ②Communist Youth League member ③
other 
H4. What next mother wants the student to do?①no need to finish lower secondary ②work after finishing 
it ③continue to vocational high school ④continue to academic high school ⑤other 
H5. The highest schooling level the mother wants them to get： ①lower secondary ②vocational high ③
academic high ④college ⑤graduate education ⑥not sure or whatever 
H6. How many living siblings does the mother have (including herself)?         
H7. During the past year, how many months has the mother been home?      month 
H8. Last year, mother’s post-tax income (wage, welfare, subsidy, cash value of the farm product, 
investment) was about      RMB 
H9. Mother’s health status：①healthy ②can ensure normal life and work ③cannot ensure normal life or 
work ④hard to tell 
H10. Mother’s age：a)     years old； Mother’s age at first marriage：b)     years old 
H11. Father’s education：①no schooling ②elementary unfinished ③elementary ④lower secondary 
unfinished  ⑤lower secondary ⑥upper secondary unfinished ⑦vocational high school ⑧
academic high school ⑨college or above 
H12. Father’s occupation：①local off-farm worker ②migrant worker ③farmer ④cadre              
⑤self-employment ⑥unemployed ⑦other         
H13. Father’s political status： ①Communist Party member ②Communist Youth League member 
    ③other 
H14. What father wants the student to do next? 
①no need to finish lower secondary ②work after finishing it ③continue to vocational high school 
④continue to academic high school ⑤other 
H15. Based on student’s capacity and the household’s situation, what is the highest schooling level the 
father wants them to get? ①lower secondary ②vocational high ③academic high ④college ⑤
graduate education ⑥not sure or whatever 




H17. During the past year, how many months has the father been at home?      month 
H18. Last year, father’s post-tax income (wage, welfare, subsidy, cash value of the farm product, 
investment) was about      RMB 
H19. Father’s health status：①healthy ②can ensure normal life and work ③cannot ensure normal life or 
work ④hard to tell 
H20. Father’s age：a)     years old； Father’s age at first marriage：b)     years old 
 
 
I. Household (under the same Hukou) information 
I1. How many people under your Hukou? ______ 
I2. Last year, the total income of the household was about         RMB 
I3. Last year, how much was paid for the schooling of all children in the household?         RMB 
I4. If the household is in urgent need of money, what is the maximum you can get from the local credit 
association?           RMB 
I5. If the household is in urgent need of money, how much in total do you think you can get from 
relatives/friends?        RMB 
I6. How many types of magazine or newspaper does the household have?       
I7. Does the household have books (Yes/No). If so, how many (magazine, newspaper, and textbook 
excluded)?       
 
I8. In the last three month, has any household 





I9. Durable consumer goods # 
a lasting disease such as hepatitis, trachoma  a sewing machine  
b hereditary disease  b radio  
c physical disability that can influence work 
capacity 
 c recorder  







I10. The house you are living in is  
①Mud brick building    ②Cement building 
e bicycle  
f camera  
g watch  
h washer  
i refrigerator  
j fan  
k motorcycle  
l jewel  
m mattress  
n table/chair/sofa  
o cabinet  
p office desk  




r desk phone  
s cell phone  
t VCD or DVD player  
u music center  
v desktop  
w laptop  
x internet  
y family car. Year____  




J1. This questionnaire was mainly completed by ①the student ②sibling ③parent ④grand parent ⑤
other 
J2. Do you think you care about 








a. where the student will end up with 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. their academic performance      1 2 3 4 5 6 
c their emotional status    1 2 3 4 5 6 
d helping with their study 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e chatting and listening to their thoughts 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
J3. About the student’s summer arrangements 








a. Let them decide; Respect their decision 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Need them to share the burden of 
house/farm work      
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c let them go (come) to the city to work or 
live for a while    
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d let them participate local activities, such 
as free summer camp 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
J4. Given the scenarios below, what is the month after-tax earning the student can get at their 35. Please 
answer based on your own perception. Do not worry about how accurate they are.  
i. drop out and start farming now          RMB 
j. dropout and work          RMB 
k. farming after graduate         RMB 
l. work locally after graduate         RMB 
m. work as migrant after graduate         RMB 
n. work after graduating from academic high         RMB 
o. work after graduating from vocational high         RMB 





J5. Given the scenarios below, answer based on your perception 
a. Each year the household needs to spend         RMB more to support a student in lower 
secondary school 
b. Each year the household needs to spend         RMB more to support a student in academic 
high school 
c. Each year the household needs to spend         RMB more to support a student in vocational 
high school 
d. Each year the household needs to spend         RMB more to support a student in college 
 
J6. Do you know about policy incentives for vocational education? ①very much ②yes ③a little ④no 
 
J7. How you feel about the local economy? ①bad, no hope ②bad, but getting better ③so so ④good, 
but getting worse ⑤good ⑥not sure 
 
 



























B3. Questionnaire for Homeroom Teachers 
 
Questionnaire for Homeroom Teachers 
 
This survey is for research only 
We protect your privacy 
 
 
Please “√” the figure you choose, or write down your answer on“      ”. The 
multiple-choice questions are single-answer unless given specific instructions. We will strictly 
protect your privacy. We will never release your questionnaire to individuals or organizations 
other than the researchers of this project. 
 
Haogen Yao, Doctoral Student 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
 
 
K. Teacher information 
K1. You are the homeroom teacher of grade      class      . You are teaching           , there are     
students in your class. 
K2. Gender： ①Male  ②Female 
K3. Ethnic：  ①Han  ②Minority 
K4. Age：          
K5. Educational level：①high school or below ②non-teacher specialized college ③teacher training college 
④non-teacher academic college ⑤normal academic college ⑥master’s or above 
K6. Political status：①Communist Party member (including probationary member) ②Communist League 
member ③Democratic Party member ④general public 
K7. You are from： ①the town ②other town in the county ③other city in the county ④Other 
Cantonese city ⑤Other province 
K8. How many years have you been a fulltime teacher (not include time as a substitute teacher or intern)?         
K9. How many years have you been a fulltime teacher in your current school (not including time as a 
substitute teacher or intern)?        
K10. How many years have you been a substitute teacher or intern?        
K11. How many years have you been a substitute teacher or intern in your current school?        
K12. Do you have a leadership position in your current school? ①Yes  ②No 




K14. For the last year, your monthly average bonus/subsidies:       RMB 
K15. Other income per month (RMB) ①None ②0~200  ③200~500  ④500~1000  ⑤Over 1000 
K16. During the past 6 months, have you received payments on time? ①Yes  ②No 
 
L. Other 
L1. Based on your experience, what is you recommendation for an average student when they are 
approaching the end of compulsory education? 1 for strongly disagree and 10 for strongly recommend. 
a) Farming    ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
b) Local job     ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
c) Migrant job   ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
d) Academic high      ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
e) Technical high   ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
f) Specialized high  ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
g) middle vocational  ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
 
Please choose 








L2. You frequently inform students of information 
related to the above choices during class.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 
L3. You frequently inform students of information 
related to the above choices in private 
conversation  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
L4. Your students will talk to you about this  1 2 3 4 5 6 
L5. You are satisfied with your current job 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
L6. Please complete the basic information about the Chinese teacher for your class  
a. From： ①the town ②other town in the county ③other city in the county ④other Cantonese city    
⑤other province 
b. Educational level：①high school or below ②non-teacher specialized college ③teacher training college 
④non-teacher academic college ⑤normal academic college ⑥master’s or above 
c. years as a fulltime teacher (not including time as a substitute teacher or intern):         
 
L7. Please complete the basic information for the math teacher for your class  





b. Educational level：①high school or below ②non-teacher specialized college ③teacher training college 
④non-teacher academic college ⑤normal academic college ⑥master’s or above 
c. years as a fulltime teacher (not including time as a substitute teacher or intern):         
 
L8. Please complete the basic information for the English teacher for your class  
a. From： ①the town ②other town in the county ③other city in the county ④other Cantonese city ⑤
other province 
b. Educational level：①high school or below ②non-teacher specialized college ③teacher training college 
④non-teacher academic college ⑤normal academic college ⑥master’s or above 
c. years as a fulltime teacher (not including time as a substitute teacher or intern):         
 
 





























B4. Questionnaire for Principals 
Questionnaire for Principals 
 
This survey is for research only 




The data generated from this questionnaire will be used by researchers in economics and 
education to analyze the determinants of post-compulsory education decisions. We hope to hear 
about your real opinions and situation because real information can help us conduct accurate 
analyses. You may ask others to fill this in on your behalf. Your support is greatly appreciated! 
 
Haogen Yao, Doctoral Student 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
 
Privacy Protection 
1. This survey collects information related to the post-compulsory education decision. The investigators 
will collect them right after you have finished. Please try your best to answer all the questions. 
2. Your answers will be analyzed together with other principals’ answers, and therefore no one can tell 
your identification from our findings. 
3. We will strictly protect your privacy. We will never release your questionnaire to individuals or 
organizations other than the researchers of this project. 
 
Instructions 
Please “√” the figure you choose, or write your answer on“      ”. The multiple-choice questions are 
single-answer unless given specific instructions. 
 
Other than answering the questions, we also ask for information on: 
(1) The mid-term exam scores of all students in Chinese, math, and English 
(2) A list of where the Grade 9 cohort ended up last year 
(3) Student scores in this summer’s High School Entrance Exam 
 
M. Basic Information 
M1. You are from： ①the town ②other town in the county ③other city in the county ④other 
Cantonese city ⑤other province 
M2. Your educational level：①high school or below ②non-teacher specialized college ③teacher training 
college ④non-teacher academic college ⑤normal academic college ⑥master’s or above 
M3. How many years have you been a fulltime teacher (not including time as a substitute teacher or 




M4. How many years have you been a principal?        
M5. How many years have you been a vice-principal?        
M6. How many years have you been a principal at your current school?       
 
N. Teachers and Students 
Item Number 
N1. teachers/staff  
N2. fulltime teachers  
N3. substitute/intern teachers  
 
Teacher’s educational level 
(equivalent education level counts) 
N4. specialized high school  
N5. specialized college  
N6. academic college  
N7. Master’s/doctorate  
 
In recent 2 years, the teachers 
N8. transfer out  
N9. resign  
N10. transfer in  
N11. newly allocated  
N12. 2009 newly enrolled students  
N13. 2010 newly enrolled students  
N14. 2011 newly enrolled students  
N15. current Grade 7 students  
N16. current Grade 8 students  
N17. current Grade 9 students  
 
 
Graduates last year 
N18. total  
N19. participated the HSEE  
N20. pass the HSEE cutoff of 
nearby academic high schools 
 
N21. enrolled in academic high 
schools 
 




O. School Revenue and Expenditure 
Revenue related 
a. Funds allocated from the government                   RMB 
b. From students (school uniform, accommodation, books, etc.)                   RMB 
c. Social donations                   RMB 
d. Other                   RMB 




                                                                                              
Expenditure related 
f. Funds assigned for teacher salary                  RMB 
g. Funds assigned for other staff salary                  RMB 
h. Administrative expenses, including those for public relationship and reception               RMB 
i. Funds used as incentives/staff development (bonus, training, welfare, tour)                RMB 
j. Funds used as grants and aid for students                  RMB 
k. Funds for student activities                  RMB 
l. Investment of fixed assets (facilities, building, car, library, etc.)           RMB 
m. Maintenance of fixed assets (facilities, building, car, library, etc.)           RMB 
n. Other                  RMB 
 
P. Other 
P1. Does the school offer free lunches or lunch subsidies？ ①Yes  ②No 
P2. If yes for P1, how much per person?     RMB 
P3. Does the school offer a school bus？ ①Yes  ②No 
P4. Based on your experience, what is your recommendation for the average student when they are 
approaching the end of compulsory education? 1 for strongly disagree and 10 for strongly recommend. 
h) Farming    ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
i) Local job     ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
j) Migrant job   ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
k) Academic high      ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
l) Technical high   ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
m) Specialized high  ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
n) Middle vocational  ①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦  ⑧  ⑨  ⑩ 
P5. Please list the four most popular high schools your students go to, including vocational schools 
                                                                                      










B5. Questionnaire for Volunteers 
Volunteers Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire will be distributed and collected by the leaders of each team in the 
middle of the Lighthouse summer program, which is in early August. It can be matched 
with the data from other questionnaires. 
 
v1. Which Lighthouse school are you in? 
v2. Gender： 
v3. Age： 
v4. Where did you live before college（specific to county or district）? 
v5. Which college are you from? 
v6. Major： 
v7. Grade： 
v8. Are you an “old” Lighthouse volunteer? 
v9. Did you have similar service experience (last for more than two weeks)? 
v10. What is your role in the team? 
v11. Did you participate in the first round of team building? ①the whole process ②part ③no 
v12. Did you participate in the teaching training? ①the whole process ②part ③no 
v13. Did you participate in the second round of team building? ①the whole process ②part ③no 
 
v13. Please give your answers for the statements below. There is no correct or incorrect 
answer. Please do not spend too much time on a single statement. Please think of your 
daily life rather than unusual days. 
 








a Team members stay with each other well 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b Team runs efficiently 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c Students are supportive 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d Households are supportive 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e Teachers are supportive 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f Schools and local government are 
supportive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
g What we are doing is meaningful for 
students 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
h We are the best Lighthouse team this year 1 2 3 4 5 6 
i Teaching training is quite helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 
j Team building is quite helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 
k Lighthouse instructional framework is 
supportive 




Appendix C: Delphi Ratings for Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 
C1. Ratings of Importance and Realization of Possible Lighthouse Impacts (for Figure 4-3) 
 Importance Realization 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Ability of life planning 7.6  2.3  4.8  2.3  
Ambition 8.0  2.1  5.7  2.8  
Better learning habits 7.8  2.3  4.7  2.1  
Better learning methods 7.8  2.0  5.2  1.7  
Clear interest 6.7  2.8  5.1  1.9  
Communicative Competence 8.7  1.6  7.1  1.4  
Confidence 9.4  1.1  7.8  1.4  
Courage 8.2  1.5  7.2  1.7  
Creativity and imagination 8.2  1.9  6.8  1.9  
Curiosity 7.9  2.0  7.2  1.4  
Educational aspiration 7.6  2.2  5.8  2.0  
Getting someone to rely on 7.5  2.1  6.9  1.9  
Interpersonal relationship 8.2  1.6  7.1  1.2  
Management skills 6.3  1.9  5.9  1.7  
Practice ability 8.0  1.6  6.6  2.3  
Problem solving 8.1  1.7  6.3  1.4  
Reproducible pattern of voluntary teaching 7.3  2.5  5.3  3.2  
School utilization of social resources 9.3  0.9  5.7  2.2  
Scope of knowledge 8.4  1.8  7.5  1.4  
Sense of social responsibility 7.9  1.6  5.4  1.8  
Student organizational establishment 7.2  2.7  5.1  2.3  
Supplement to the formal curriculum 9.1  1.1  6.0  3.0  
Support for teachers 9.2  1.3  4.6  2.8  
Team spirit 8.4  2.2  7.9  1.9  

















C2. Ratings of Work Determinants in 2nd and 3rd Rounds (for Figure 4-4) 
 2nd round 3rd round 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Agricultural income 7.1  1.5  7.3  1.9  
Health status of household member 5.9  2.5  7.2  1.7  
Friends' PCED 6.2  2.0  6.9  1.6  
Perception of earning by PCED in the community 6.9  2.5  6.6  2.3  
Historical PCED distribution in the school 5.9  2.2  6.5  1.9  
Mother's migrant status 6.9  2.1  6.4  2.0  
Teacher's care for students 5.9  2.5  6.3  2.3  
Teacher's attitude towards each PCED 4.8  3.1  6.2  2.5  
Cost of high school 7.4  2.1  6.1  2.2  
Urban life experience 6.0  2.8  6.0  2.2  
Birth order 5.4  2.4  5.9  2.3  
Teacher's sense of responsibility 6.1  2.9  5.9  2.2  
Connection between curriculum and real life 6.3  2.4  5.9  2.2  
Rate of admission to colleges in nearby AHS 5.6  2.3  5.9  1.9  
Teacher experience 5.6  2.5  5.9  2.3  
Availability of family business for inheriting 6.6  2.7  5.8  2.7  
Number of siblings 5.8  2.7  5.7  2.6  
Perception of AHS-VHS gap 4.8  3.0  5.6  2.2  
Gender 5.6  2.6  5.4  1.8  
Governmental investment 5.9  2.4  5.0  2.2  
interpersonal relationship in the school 5.4  2.9  4.9  1.9  
Rate of admission to colleges in nearby VHS 4.2  2.6  4.8  2.3  
Teacher education level 5.3  2.4  4.6  2.1  






















Appendix D: Summary Statistics for the Six Lighthouse School Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
female 4462 0.62  0.49  0 1 
f_income 4462 0.43  0.49  0 1 
f_performance 4462 0.34  0.47  0 1 
f_cost 4462 2.10  2.05  0 6 
age 4462 0.33  0.47  0 1 
minority 4462 0.09  0.28  0 1 
single_p 3634 0.07  0.26  0 1 
migrant_p 4289 0.54  0.50  0 1 
no_p 4277 0.22  0.42  0 1 
medu 3530 2.28  1.16  1 6 
fedu 3326 3.62  1.39  1 6 
peasant 3741 0.33  0.47  0 1 
politicalc 4143 1.21  0.55  1 3 
parent_leader 3741 0.03  0.17  0 1 
parentbadhealth 2857 0.04  0.19  0 1 
sibship 4462 3.25  1.55  1 6 
witheldersister 4462 0.61  0.49  0 1 
eldercohort 4462 0.29  0.46  0 1 
mignetwork 4462 0.33  0.47  0 1 
peerpedu 4462 2.00  0.43  1 3 
tch_origin 4462 1.92  1.10  1 4 
tch_edu 4462 0.51  0.50  0 1 
tch_admin 4462 0.07  0.25  0 1 
tch_exp 4462 2.43  1.15  1 4 
tch_mthgain 4462 3.57  1.76  1 6 
tch_paydelayed 4462 0.31  0.46  0 1 
subtch_origin 4462 3.05  1.10  1 4 
subtch_edu 4462 2.65  1.21  1 4 
subtch_exp 4462 2.38  1.03  1 4 
classsize 4462 2.45  1.01  1 4 
distance 4224 3.06  1.71  1 6 
survival 4462 0.47  0.50  0 1 
school1 4462 0.00  0.00  0 0 
school2 4462 0.10  0.30  0 1 
school3 4462 0.08  0.27  0 1 
school4 4462 0.17  0.37  0 1 
school5 4462 0.18  0.38  0 1 
school6 4462 0.11  0.31  0 1 
school7 4462 0.36  0.48  0 1 
school8 4462 0.00  0.00  0 0 
wealth 4462 2.05  0.94  1 4 
housesize 3727 2.31  1.13  1 4 
income 2794 3.45  1.67  1 6 
credit_financiali 2059 3.23  1.67  1 6 




stu_eduaspiration 3519 3.20  1.33  1 5 
expect_norm 3287 0.23  0.42  0 1 
expect_advanced 3287 0.36  0.48  0 1 
percep_schquality 4379 3.41  1.63  1 6 
percep_schaffiliation 4393 3.47  1.70  1 6 
percep_schvalue 4368 2.37  1.15  1 4 
percep_scheffort 4368 2.14  0.98  1 4 
confidence 4442 3.32  1.69  1 6 
courage 4439 3.29  1.73  1 6 
curiosity 4442 3.01  1.74  1 6 
ambition 4432 3.11  1.71  1 6 
familyonstudy 4249 2.96  1.48  1 5 
familyonemo 4252 3.32  1.73  1 6 
tchr_contvsstop 4302 2.85  1.09  1 4 
tchr_genvsvoc 4462 1.98  1.26  1 4 
sick 3908 0.39  0.49  0 1 
sick_class 4408 0.48  0.50  0 1 
cost_vocvsjunior 2050 3.51  1.70  1 6 
cost_genvsvoc 2039 3.27  1.78  1 6 
cost_colvsgen 2018 3.47  1.71  1 6 
earn_workvsdrop 2869 3.43  1.68  1 6 
earn_vocvswork 2831 3.51  1.69  1 6 
earn_genvsvoc 2827 3.36  1.65  1 6 
earn_colvsgen 2817 3.31  1.64  1 6 
knowvoc 4042 1.63  0.66  1 4 
performance 3090 2.52  1.12  1 4 
business 3741 0.06  0.23  0 1 
interpersonal 4459 3.55  1.69  1 6 
urbanlife 3922 0.32  0.47  0 1 
outreach_voc 4103 0.13  0.34  0 1 
outreach_fac 4126 0.11  0.32  0 1 
local_negative 4144 0.08  0.28  0 1 
local_entertain 4173 0.07  0.26  0 1 
gambling 4296 0.09  0.28  0 1 
schatmos 4462 0.56  0.50  0 1 
chore 3844 2.23  1.31  1 4 
love 4411 0.10  0.30  0 1 
grade_7 4462 0.38  0.49  0 1 
grade_8 4462 0.34  0.47  0 1 
grade_9 4462 0.28  0.45  0 1 
extraversion 4459 3.38  1.70  1 6 
affiliationneed 4409 2.99  1.54  1 6 
atti_chore_farm 4406 3.62  1.28  1 6 
other_act 3531 3.06  1.57  1 6 
peertreated 4462 3.08  0.83  1 4 
attoncamp 3622 2.83  1.65  1 6 






Appendix E: Output for Multinomial Logit with Multiple Imputations 
E1. Main Model (full sample/full variable list) 
 
1: dropout Coef. Std.Err z P>z     
 
RRR 
female 1.11 0.49 2.24 0.03 
 
3.03** 
f_income -0.1 0.36 -0.29 0.78 
 
0.9 
f_performance -0.06 0.41 -0.14 0.89 
 
0.94 
f_cost -0.06 0.14 -0.43 0.68 
 
0.94 
age 0.34 0.36 0.94 0.37 
 
1.4 
minority -1.4 2.15 -0.65 0.54 
 
0.25 
single_p -0.94 0.51 -1.85 0.08 
 
0.39* 
migrant_p -0.1 0.34 -0.29 0.77 
 
0.9 
no_p 0.13 0.37 0.34 0.74 
 
1.13 
medu -0.11 0.12 -0.9 0.38 
 
0.9 
fedu 0.06 0.15 0.38 0.71 
 
1.06 
peasant -0.33 0.35 -0.93 0.37 
 
0.72 
politicalc 0.32 0.29 1.11 0.29 
 
1.38 
parent_leader 0.48 0.66 0.74 0.47 
 
1.62 
parentbadhealth 1.16 0.79 1.47 0.19 
 
3.19 
sibship 0.18 0.11 1.64 0.12 
 
1.2 
witheldersister -0.2 0.38 -0.51 0.62 
 
0.82 
eldercohort -0.15 0.37 -0.41 0.69 
 
0.86 
mignetwork -0.09 0.29 -0.3 0.77 
 
0.92 
peerpedu 0.65 0.36 1.78 0.08 
 
1.91* 
tch_origin 0.1 0.15 0.65 0.52 
 
1.11 
tch_edu 0.12 0.35 0.36 0.72 
 
1.13 
tch_admin 0 0.61 0 1 
 
1 
tch_exp -0.34 0.17 -2.02 0.06 
 
0.71* 
tch_mthgain 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.96 
 
1.01 
tch_paydelayed -0.34 0.34 -1.01 0.33 
 
0.71 
subtch_origin -0.09 0.13 -0.67 0.5 
 
0.92 
subtch_edu -0.02 0.16 -0.1 0.92 
 
0.98 
subtch_exp 0.12 0.13 0.9 0.37 
 
1.12 
classsize 0.05 0.28 0.18 0.86 
 
1.05 
distance 0.18 0.09 2.05 0.06 
 
1.2* 
survival -1.39 1.16 -1.2 0.26 
 
0.25 
school1 -0.9 0.63 -1.43 0.16 
 
0.41 
school2 -0.76 1.04 -0.73 0.48 
 
0.47 
school3 0.35 2.84 0.12 0.91 
 
1.41 
school4 -0.95 1.04 -0.91 0.39 
 
0.39 
school5 0 (omitted) 
  
 
school6 0.28 0.86 0.32 0.75 
 
1.32 
school7 1.7 0.96 1.77 0.1 
 
5.5* 
school8 0 (omitted) 
  
 
wealth -0.47 0.14 -3.41 0 
 
0.62*** 
housesize -0.05 0.12 -0.47 0.64 
 
0.95 
income -0.12 0.13 -0.87 0.41 
 
0.89 
credit_financiali 0.05 0.15 0.34 0.75 
 
1.05 
credit_relative 0.07 0.13 0.51 0.62 
 
1.07 
stu_eduaspiration -0.77 0.1 -7.73 0 
 
0.46*** 
expect_norm 0.54 0.29 1.84 0.08 
 
1.72* 
expect_advanced -0.3 0.58 -0.52 0.62 
 
0.74 
percep_schquality -0.02 0.13 -0.16 0.88 
 
0.98 
percep_schaffiliation -0.24 0.1 -2.37 0.03 
 
0.79** 
percep_schvalue -0.25 0.18 -1.41 0.19 
 
0.78 






confidence 0.14 0.09 1.47 0.15 
 
1.15 
courage -0.21 0.07 -2.99 0 
 
0.81*** 
curiosity -0.14 0.1 -1.45 0.17 
 
0.87 
ambition 0.17 0.07 2.34 0.02 
 
1.18** 
familyonstudy -0.18 0.11 -1.66 0.12 
 
0.83 
familyonemo 0.08 0.1 0.86 0.41 
 
1.09 
tchr_contvsstop -0.05 0.14 -0.38 0.7 
 
0.95 
tchr_genvsvoc -0.19 0.11 -1.76 0.08 
 
0.82* 
sick -0.58 0.39 -1.48 0.17 
 
0.56 
sick_class 0.17 0.26 0.67 0.51 
 
1.19 
cost_vocvsjunior 0 0.15 0.01 0.99 
 
1 
cost_genvsvoc -0.08 0.13 -0.63 0.55 
 
0.92 
cost_colvsgen -0.05 0.11 -0.51 0.62 
 
0.95 
earn_workvsdrop 0.1 0.1 1 0.34 
 
1.11 
earn_vocvswork -0.17 0.13 -1.35 0.21 
 
0.84 
earn_genvsvoc -0.43 0.11 -3.91 0 
 
0.65*** 
earn_colvsgen -0.4 0.09 -4.33 0 
 
0.67*** 
knowvoc 0.04 0.23 0.17 0.87 
 
1.04 
performance -0.32 0.19 -1.72 0.11 
 
0.73 
business -0.97 0.83 -1.16 0.26 
 
0.38 
interpersonal 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.94 
 
1.01 
urbanlife -0.31 0.31 -1 0.33 
 
0.73 
outreach_voc -0.31 0.38 -0.82 0.41 
 
0.73 
outreach_fac -0.12 0.47 -0.25 0.81 
 
0.89 
local_negative -0.42 0.57 -0.73 0.48 
 
0.66 
local_entertain 0.31 0.5 0.62 0.54 
 
1.37 
gambling 0.3 0.45 0.66 0.52 
 
1.34 
chore 0.14 0.13 1.11 0.3 
 
1.15 
love 1.28 0.36 3.56 0 
 
3.59*** 
grade_7 1.14 0.38 3.01 0 
 
3.11*** 
grade_8 0.59 0.52 1.13 0.27 
 
1.8 
grade_9 0 (omitted) 
  
 
      
 
2: work Coef. Std.Err z P>z     
 
RRR 
female 0.66 0.29 2.25 0.03 
 
1.93** 
f_income 0.05 0.2 0.23 0.82 
 
1.05 
f_performance 0.08 0.2 0.39 0.7 
 
1.08 
f_cost -0.07 0.08 -0.9 0.39 
 
0.93 
age 0.28 0.13 2.19 0.03 
 
1.32** 
minority 0.02 0.81 0.03 0.98 
 
1.02 
single_p -0.25 0.22 -1.12 0.27 
 
0.78 
migrant_p -0.03 0.15 -0.18 0.86 
 
0.97 
no_p 0.04 0.22 0.19 0.86 
 
1.04 
medu -0.08 0.05 -1.4 0.17 
 
0.93 
fedu -0.09 0.05 -1.89 0.07 
 
0.91* 
peasant -0.15 0.13 -1.12 0.27 
 
0.86 
politicalc -0.01 0.13 -0.07 0.95 
 
0.99 
parent_leader -0.07 0.37 -0.2 0.85 
 
0.93 
parentbadhealth 0.13 0.29 0.44 0.67 
 
1.13 
sibship 0.15 0.05 2.97 0.01 
 
1.16*** 
witheldersister -0.25 0.15 -1.71 0.09 
 
0.78* 
eldercohort 0 0.14 0.02 0.98 
 
1 
mignetwork -0.15 0.12 -1.27 0.21 
 
0.86 
peerpedu 0.43 0.16 2.66 0.01 
 
1.53*** 
tch_origin -0.12 0.07 -1.84 0.07 
 
0.88* 
tch_edu 0.35 0.17 2.11 0.04 
 
1.42** 
tch_admin -0.05 0.27 -0.19 0.85 
 
0.95 
tch_exp -0.16 0.07 -2.42 0.02 
 
0.85** 






tch_paydelayed 0.09 0.16 0.59 0.57 
 
1.1 
subtch_origin 0.08 0.06 1.23 0.22 
 
1.08 
subtch_edu -0.07 0.07 -0.98 0.33 
 
0.93 
subtch_exp -0.07 0.07 -0.91 0.37 
 
0.94 
classsize 0.07 0.09 0.79 0.43 
 
1.07 
distance 0.03 0.04 0.67 0.51 
 
1.03 
survival -0.53 0.35 -1.51 0.13 
 
0.59 
school1 -0.56 0.32 -1.76 0.09 
 
0.57* 
school2 -1.52 0.37 -4.06 0 
 
0.22*** 
school3 -0.01 0.86 -0.01 0.99 
 
0.99 
school4 -0.27 0.3 -0.91 0.37 
 
0.76 
school5 0 (omitted) 
  
 
school6 0.12 0.33 0.36 0.72 
 
1.13 
school7 0.08 0.31 0.25 0.81 
 
1.08 
school8 0 (omitted) 
  
 
wealth -0.19 0.07 -2.71 0.01 
 
0.83*** 
housesize 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.9 
 
1.01 
income -0.12 0.06 -2.17 0.05 
 
0.88* 
credit_financiali 0.07 0.04 1.57 0.12 
 
1.07 
credit_relative -0.03 0.05 -0.55 0.59 
 
0.97 
stu_eduaspiration -0.93 0.06 -15.58 0 
 
0.39*** 
expect_norm 0.41 0.13 3.11 0 
 
1.51*** 
expect_advanced -0.49 0.12 -3.98 0 
 
0.62*** 
percep_schquality 0.05 0.04 1.17 0.25 
 
1.05 
percep_schaffiliation -0.13 0.04 -2.96 0 
 
0.88*** 
percep_schvalue 0.01 0.06 0.15 0.88 
 
1.01 
percep_scheffort -0.15 0.08 -1.98 0.06 
 
0.86* 
confidence 0.01 0.04 0.32 0.75 
 
1.01 
courage -0.05 0.04 -1.45 0.15 
 
0.95 
curiosity -0.04 0.03 -1.28 0.2 
 
0.96 
ambition 0.1 0.04 2.25 0.03 
 
1.1** 
familyonstudy -0.12 0.05 -2.57 0.01 
 
0.89** 
familyonemo -0.04 0.05 -0.94 0.36 
 
0.96 
tchr_contvsstop -0.11 0.07 -1.56 0.12 
 
0.9 
tchr_genvsvoc -0.17 0.06 -2.83 0.01 
 
0.85*** 
sick -0.34 0.13 -2.73 0.01 
 
0.71*** 
sick_class 0.14 0.11 1.25 0.21 
 
1.15 
cost_vocvsjunior 0.03 0.06 0.48 0.64 
 
1.03 
cost_genvsvoc -0.14 0.07 -2 0.08 
 
0.87* 
cost_colvsgen -0.11 0.08 -1.34 0.22 
 
0.9 
earn_workvsdrop 0.05 0.05 1.09 0.3 
 
1.05 
earn_vocvswork -0.01 0.04 -0.22 0.83 
 
0.99 
earn_genvsvoc -0.2 0.05 -3.69 0 
 
0.82*** 
earn_colvsgen -0.18 0.04 -4.09 0 
 
0.84*** 
knowvoc 0.16 0.1 1.55 0.14 
 
1.18 
performance -0.39 0.06 -6.09 0 
 
0.68*** 
business -0.65 0.36 -1.81 0.09 
 
0.52* 
interpersonal -0.07 0.04 -1.81 0.07 
 
0.94* 
urbanlife -0.32 0.12 -2.56 0.01 
 
0.73** 
outreach_voc -0.01 0.18 -0.06 0.95 
 
0.99 
outreach_fac 0.3 0.19 1.6 0.11 
 
1.35 
local_negative 0.39 0.21 1.86 0.07 
 
1.47* 
local_entertain 0.04 0.23 0.17 0.86 
 
1.04 
gambling -0.09 0.26 -0.35 0.73 
 
0.91 
chore 0.15 0.04 3.59 0 
 
1.16*** 
love 0.54 0.2 2.73 0.01 
 
1.71*** 
grade_7 0.62 0.18 3.51 0 
 
1.85*** 
grade_8 0.52 0.18 2.87 0.01 
 
1.68*** 






      
 
3: VHS Coef. Std.Err z P>z     
 
RRR 
female 0.61 0.24 2.56 0.01 
 
1.85** 
f_income 0.08 0.15 0.56 0.58 
 
1.08 
f_performance 0.19 0.15 1.28 0.2 
 
1.21 
f_cost -0.05 0.05 -1.13 0.26 
 
0.95 
age 0.06 0.09 0.69 0.49 
 
1.07 
minority -0.64 0.68 -0.93 0.36 
 
0.53 
single_p -0.32 0.17 -1.82 0.07 
 
0.73* 
migrant_p 0.03 0.1 0.26 0.79 
 
1.03 
no_p -0.13 0.14 -0.94 0.36 
 
0.88 
medu 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.86 
 
1.01 
fedu 0.01 0.03 0.2 0.84 
 
1.01 
peasant -0.07 0.11 -0.62 0.54 
 
0.93 
politicalc 0.06 0.09 0.74 0.47 
 
1.06 
parent_leader -0.3 0.27 -1.11 0.28 
 
0.74 
parentbadhealth 0.15 0.21 0.72 0.48 
 
1.17 
sibship 0.08 0.04 2.11 0.04 
 
1.09** 
witheldersister -0.03 0.12 -0.28 0.78 
 
0.97 
eldercohort 0.1 0.1 0.94 0.35 
 
1.1 
mignetwork -0.05 0.09 -0.59 0.55 
 
0.95 
peerpedu 0.2 0.12 1.72 0.09 
 
1.22* 
tch_origin 0 0.06 0 1 
 
1 
tch_edu 0.28 0.12 2.33 0.02 
 
1.32** 
tch_admin -0.03 0.2 -0.16 0.87 
 
0.97 
tch_exp -0.14 0.05 -3 0 
 
0.87*** 
tch_mthgain 0.06 0.03 1.9 0.06 
 
1.06* 
tch_paydelayed 0.02 0.1 0.21 0.83 
 
1.02 
subtch_origin 0.02 0.05 0.35 0.72 
 
1.02 
subtch_edu -0.05 0.06 -0.99 0.32 
 
0.95 
subtch_exp 0.03 0.05 0.56 0.58 
 
1.03 
classsize 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.86 
 
1.01 
distance 0.02 0.03 0.7 0.48 
 
1.02 
survival -0.87 0.27 -3.26 0 
 
0.42*** 
school1 -0.91 0.23 -3.91 0 
 
0.4*** 
school2 -1.46 0.29 -5.08 0 
 
0.23*** 
school3 -0.57 0.77 -0.74 0.46 
 
0.57 
school4 -0.56 0.23 -2.41 0.02 
 
0.57** 
school5 0 (omitted) 
  
 
school6 0.04 0.23 0.19 0.85 
 
1.04 
school7 0.52 0.23 2.28 0.02 
 
1.67** 
school8 0 (omitted) 
  
 
wealth -0.04 0.05 -0.79 0.44 
 
0.96 
housesize -0.06 0.05 -1.26 0.21 
 
0.94 
income -0.11 0.03 -3.6 0 
 
0.89*** 
credit_financiali 0.03 0.05 0.74 0.48 
 
1.03 
credit_relative -0.04 0.04 -1.16 0.25 
 
0.96 
stu_eduaspiration -0.29 0.04 -7.21 0 
 
0.75*** 
expect_norm -0.01 0.1 -0.11 0.91 
 
0.99 
expect_advanced 0.02 0.11 0.22 0.83 
 
1.02 
percep_schquality 0.04 0.03 1.28 0.2 
 
1.04 
percep_schaffiliation -0.04 0.03 -1.3 0.2 
 
0.96 
percep_schvalue 0.1 0.04 2.41 0.02 
 
1.11** 
percep_scheffort -0.08 0.05 -1.48 0.14 
 
0.92 
confidence 0.07 0.03 2.39 0.02 
 
1.08** 
courage -0.08 0.03 -2.95 0 
 
0.93*** 
curiosity -0.06 0.03 -2.3 0.02 
 
0.94** 
ambition 0.06 0.03 2.32 0.02 
 
1.07** 






familyonemo -0.01 0.04 -0.38 0.71 
 
0.99 
tchr_contvsstop 0.02 0.06 0.27 0.79 
 
1.02 
tchr_genvsvoc -0.15 0.04 -3.37 0 
 
0.86*** 
sick -0.04 0.1 -0.44 0.66 
 
0.96 
sick_class 0.02 0.09 0.27 0.79 
 
1.02 
cost_vocvsjunior 0 0.05 -0.03 0.97 
 
1 
cost_genvsvoc -0.16 0.04 -3.88 0 
 
0.86*** 
cost_colvsgen -0.04 0.04 -0.99 0.33 
 
0.96 
earn_workvsdrop 0.05 0.04 1.48 0.16 
 
1.05 
earn_vocvswork -0.04 0.03 -1.23 0.23 
 
0.96 
earn_genvsvoc -0.28 0.04 -7.79 0 
 
0.76*** 
earn_colvsgen -0.14 0.03 -4.8 0 
 
0.87*** 
knowvoc 0.25 0.08 3.18 0 
 
1.28*** 
performance -0.17 0.05 -3.41 0 
 
0.84*** 
business -0.08 0.18 -0.43 0.67 
 
0.93 
interpersonal 0.05 0.03 1.7 0.09 
 
1.05* 
urbanlife -0.1 0.1 -1.09 0.28 
 
0.9 
outreach_voc -0.04 0.15 -0.24 0.81 
 
0.96 
outreach_fac 0.16 0.15 1.11 0.27 
 
1.18 
local_negative 0.29 0.18 1.62 0.11 
 
1.34 
local_entertain 0.37 0.18 2.05 0.04 
 
1.44** 
gambling 0.04 0.16 0.28 0.78 
 
1.05 
chore 0.04 0.03 1.15 0.25 
 
1.04 
love 0.17 0.16 1.04 0.3 
 
1.18 
grade_7 0.34 0.14 2.42 0.02 
 
1.41** 
grade_8 0.5 0.14 3.69 0 
 
1.65*** 
grade_9 0 (omitted) 
  
 
      
 
5: undecided Coef. Std.Err z P>z     
 
RRR 
female 0.75 0.26 2.93 0.01 
 
2.12*** 
f_income 0.08 0.17 0.49 0.63 
 
1.08 
f_performance 0.06 0.17 0.35 0.73 
 
1.06 
f_cost -0.1 0.05 -1.84 0.07 
 
0.91* 
age 0.21 0.11 1.98 0.05 
 
1.24** 
minority 0.42 0.6 0.7 0.49 
 
1.52 
single_p -0.42 0.18 -2.32 0.02 
 
0.66** 
migrant_p -0.34 0.11 -3.01 0 
 
0.71*** 
no_p -0.43 0.14 -3.14 0 
 
0.65*** 
medu -0.07 0.05 -1.51 0.14 
 
0.93 
fedu -0.02 0.04 -0.48 0.63 
 
0.98 
peasant -0.09 0.12 -0.73 0.47 
 
0.92 
politicalc -0.07 0.1 -0.71 0.48 
 
0.93 
parent_leader 0.08 0.29 0.27 0.79 
 
1.08 
parentbadhealth -0.11 0.3 -0.37 0.71 
 
0.89 
sibship 0.07 0.04 1.64 0.1 
 
1.07 
witheldersister -0.04 0.12 -0.36 0.72 
 
0.96 
eldercohort 0.2 0.11 1.71 0.09 
 
1.22* 
mignetwork -0.19 0.11 -1.77 0.08 
 
0.83* 
peerpedu 0.42 0.15 2.76 0.01 
 
1.51*** 
tch_origin 0 0.06 -0.03 0.98 
 
1 
tch_edu 0.14 0.13 1.06 0.29 
 
1.15 
tch_admin 0.27 0.22 1.23 0.22 
 
1.31 
tch_exp -0.12 0.05 -2.21 0.03 
 
0.89** 
tch_mthgain 0.07 0.03 1.94 0.05 
 
1.07* 
tch_paydelayed 0.14 0.11 1.29 0.2 
 
1.15 
subtch_origin 0.13 0.06 2.16 0.03 
 
1.14** 
subtch_edu 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.91 
 
1.01 
subtch_exp 0.04 0.06 0.74 0.46 
 
1.04 






distance -0.01 0.03 -0.15 0.88 
 
0.99 
survival -1 0.3 -3.3 0 
 
0.37*** 
school1 -0.91 0.25 -3.69 0 
 
0.4*** 
school2 -0.59 0.33 -1.76 0.09 
 
0.56* 
school3 -1.6 0.66 -2.42 0.02 
 
0.2** 
school4 -0.45 0.27 -1.64 0.11 
 
0.64 
school5 0 (omitted) 
  
 
school6 0.57 0.27 2.13 0.04 
 
1.77** 
school7 0.73 0.27 2.74 0.01 
 
2.07*** 
school8 0 (omitted) 
  
 
wealth -0.16 0.06 -2.88 0.01 
 
0.85*** 
housesize 0.02 0.06 0.25 0.8 
 
1.02 
income -0.12 0.05 -2.68 0.02 
 
0.88** 
credit_financiali 0.08 0.06 1.34 0.22 
 
1.08 
credit_relative -0.03 0.05 -0.73 0.48 
 
0.97 
stu_eduaspiration -0.42 0.05 -7.86 0 
 
0.66*** 
expect_norm 0.26 0.12 2.23 0.03 
 
1.3** 
expect_advanced -0.26 0.13 -1.95 0.07 
 
0.77* 
percep_schquality 0.04 0.04 1.11 0.28 
 
1.05 
percep_schaffiliation -0.1 0.04 -2.65 0.01 
 
0.91*** 
percep_schvalue -0.04 0.05 -0.81 0.42 
 
0.96 
percep_scheffort -0.12 0.05 -2.27 0.02 
 
0.88** 
confidence 0.05 0.03 1.36 0.17 
 
1.05 
courage -0.1 0.03 -3.19 0 
 
0.91*** 
curiosity -0.08 0.03 -2.98 0 
 
0.92*** 
ambition 0.01 0.03 0.34 0.74 
 
1.01 
familyonstudy -0.11 0.04 -2.76 0.01 
 
0.9*** 
familyonemo 0.01 0.04 0.25 0.81 
 
1.01 
tchr_contvsstop 0.03 0.07 0.39 0.7 
 
1.03 
tchr_genvsvoc -0.19 0.05 -4.12 0 
 
0.83*** 
sick -0.14 0.11 -1.29 0.2 
 
0.87 
sick_class 0.04 0.1 0.44 0.66 
 
1.04 
cost_vocvsjunior 0.04 0.04 0.85 0.41 
 
1.04 
cost_genvsvoc -0.05 0.05 -0.95 0.36 
 
0.95 
cost_colvsgen -0.05 0.04 -1.42 0.16 
 
0.95 
earn_workvsdrop 0.09 0.03 2.74 0.01 
 
1.1** 
earn_vocvswork -0.1 0.05 -2.08 0.06 
 
0.91* 
earn_genvsvoc -0.24 0.04 -6.37 0 
 
0.79*** 
earn_colvsgen -0.16 0.03 -4.75 0 
 
0.85*** 
knowvoc -0.1 0.09 -1.15 0.26 
 
0.9 
performance -0.34 0.06 -5.91 0 
 
0.71*** 
business -0.33 0.21 -1.55 0.12 
 
0.72 
interpersonal 0.02 0.03 0.51 0.61 
 
1.02 
urbanlife -0.26 0.12 -2.21 0.03 
 
0.77** 
outreach_voc -0.09 0.16 -0.57 0.57 
 
0.91 
outreach_fac 0.27 0.16 1.64 0.1 
 
1.3 
local_negative 0.06 0.17 0.34 0.73 
 
1.06 
local_entertain 0.09 0.2 0.46 0.65 
 
1.09 
gambling 0.12 0.17 0.72 0.48 
 
1.13 
chore 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.75 
 
1.01 
love 0.44 0.17 2.57 0.01 
 
1.56** 
grade_7 0.55 0.15 3.65 0 
 
1.73*** 
grade_8 0.74 0.17 4.48 0 
 
2.1*** 









E2. Regression by Group (RRR reported) 
 
Gender Wealth Test Performance 
1: Dropout Female Male Richer Poorer Higher Lower 
female 
  
25.19* 2.31 1.73 2.86 
f_income 
  




  f_cost 
  
1.02 0.94 1.05 0.92 
age 1.39 1.53 1.57 1.37 1.31 1.63 
minority 0.24 0.17 0 0.36 0.79 0.16 
single_p 0.4 0.33 0.01 0.42 0.79 0.16** 
migrant_p 0.99 0.86 0.61 1 0.56 1.01 
no_p 1.35 0.86 0.77 1.39 0.79 1.23 
medu 0.8 1.01 0.87 0.9 0.86 0.95 
fedu 1.1 1.04 1.09 1.07 1.05 1.02 
peasant 0.68 0.7 0.83 0.69 0.62 0.8 
politicalc 1.46 1.5 2.06 1.44 1.93 1.05 
parent_leader 1.15 2.7 6.72 1.33 1.85 1.4 
parentbadhealth 3 4.6 0.96 4.47 2.62 3.82 
sibship 1.15 1.28 1.08 1.22 1.14 1.23 
witheldersister 0.94 0.69 0.26 0.99 0.52 1.22 
eldercohort 0.98 0.61 0.34 1.04 0.56 1.2 
mignetwork 0.88 0.93 0.62 1.01 0.91 1.11 
peerpedu 2.26 1.69 0.67 2.17** 1.92 2.45 
tch_origin 1.21 1.06 0.89 1.12 0.89 1.17 
tch_edu 1.39 0.67 3.65 1.08 2.51 0.78 
tch_admin 1.17 0.52 0.11 1.42 1.73 0.26 
tch_exp 0.67* 0.74 0.51 0.73 0.7 0.65* 
tch_mthgain 0.99 1.03 0.89 0.98 1.01 1.08 
tch_paydelayed 0.71 0.62 1.14 0.57 0.51 0.83 
subtch_origin 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.91 1 0.86 
subtch_edu 0.95 1.08 0.69 1 0.95 1.03 
subtch_exp 1.37* 0.87 1.75 1.04 1.21 1.08 
classsize 1.14 0.87 0.47 1.23 1.45 0.9 
distance 1.24** 1.23 1.51* 1.18 1.1 1.25** 
survival 0.18 0.25 0.01 0.41 0.44 0.1 
school1 0.26 0.48 0.13 0.49 0.45 0.2 
school2 0.22 0.97 0.06 0.83 0.11 0.81 
school3 1.41 1.73 4.5E+08 1.81 0.3 1.32 
school4 0.51 0.18 0.04 0.52 0.8 0.16 
school5 
      school6 1.28 1.31 0 1.54 0.28 2.6 
school7 10.98 3.2 29.11 4.5 2.05 13.17 
school8 
      wealth 0.69** 0.52*** 
  
0.51*** 0.65* 
housesize 0.97 0.86 0.81 0.96 1 0.91 
income 0.82 0.99 1 0.86 0.81 0.9 
credit_financiali 1.1 0.96 0.67 1.14 1.08 1.03 
credit_relative 1.1 1.05 1.64 1.01 1.13 1.08 
stu_eduaspiration 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.3*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 
expect_norm 1.8 1.78 1.87 1.63 2.06 1.4 
expect_advanced 0.72 0.82 0.67 0.68 0.56 0.68 
percep_schquality 0.99 0.95 0.71 1.01 1.08 0.9 
percep_schaffiliation 0.79* 0.75 0.9 0.73* 0.75 0.77** 
percep_schvalue 0.82 0.65 0.88 0.75 0.68 0.84 
percep_scheffort 0.85 0.9 0.93 0.79 0.95 0.75 
confidence 1.19 1.09 1.59 1.09 1.22 1.1 
courage 0.82** 0.76** 0.74 0.82** 0.81 0.81* 
curiosity 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.79 0.9 
ambition 1.2** 1.18 1.01 1.21** 1.28 1.15 




familyonemo 1.05 1.26 1.13 1.05 1.08 1.18 
tchr_contvsstop 0.97 0.99 1.3 0.92 0.67 1.06 
tchr_genvsvoc 0.83 0.77 0.81 0.8* 0.98 0.69** 
sick 0.65 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.72 0.53 
sick_class 1.16 1.14 3.61 1.01 1.3 1 
cost_vocvsjunior 1.02 0.95 1.04 1 1.06 0.92 
cost_genvsvoc 0.93 0.86 1.19 0.89 0.99 0.88 
cost_colvsgen 0.97 0.87 1.32 0.91 0.99 0.93 
earn_workvsdrop 1.13 1.03 1.04 1.14 1.05 1.14 
earn_vocvswork 0.78* 0.94 0.69 0.83 0.81 0.87 
earn_genvsvoc 0.66*** 0.6** 0.5*** 0.65*** 0.63** 0.67*** 
earn_colvsgen 0.65*** 0.65** 0.6** 0.67*** 0.71** 0.62*** 
knowvoc 0.87 1.24 1.42 1.01 1.49 0.89 
performance 0.74 0.67* 0.85 0.71 
  business 0.29 0.5 2 0 0.46 0.34 
interpersonal 1 0.97 0.89 1.01 0.91 1.08 
urbanlife 0.72 0.73 0.37 0.79 0.78 0.73 
outreach_voc 0.93 0.48 1.03 0.79 0.17 1.34 
outreach_fac 0.96 0.67 1.95 0.68 0.86 0.62 
local_negative 0.69 0.57 0.58 0.51 0 0.94 
local_entertain 0.79 2.31 0.64 1.43 1.11 1.52 
gambling 1.4 1.22 1.65 1.37 1.21 1.31 
chore 1.2 1.08 1.39 1.13 1.5** 0.98 
love 3.26* 4.52** 8.49 3.91** 3.52** 5.36** 
grade_7 3.94** 2.15 29.95 2.88** 4.2** 2.34 
grade_8 2.02 1.49 9.52 1.62 1.02 2.28 
grade_9 
      
 
Gender Wealth Test Performance 
2: Work Female Male Richer Poorer Higher Lower 
female 
  
2.16 1.79 3.44*** 0.98 
f_income 
  




  f_cost 
  
0.86 0.98 0.88 1.03 
age 1.4* 1.17 1.48* 1.24 1.22 1.49** 
minority 1.26 0.82 0.57 1.1 1.1 0.71 
single_p 0.82 0.73 1.02 0.73 0.76 0.67 
migrant_p 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.98 1.05 0.92 
no_p 1.01 1.05 0.87 1.22 1.13 0.98 
medu 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.84** 1.01 
fedu 0.94 0.88 0.87* 0.93 0.93 0.87* 
peasant 0.81 1 0.8 0.86 0.96 0.83 
politicalc 1.11 0.84 0.86 1.1 1.01 0.87 
parent_leader 0.87 0.98 0.39 1.39 1.12 0.87 
parentbadhealth 1.33 0.88 0.75 1.36 1.05 1.3 
sibship 1.2*** 1.12 1.15* 1.17** 1.16** 1.17** 
witheldersister 0.67** 0.99 0.85 0.74 0.57*** 1.11 
eldercohort 0.93 1.16 0.88 1.07 0.82 1.39 
mignetwork 0.8 1.01 0.91 0.85 0.79 1.11 
peerpedu 1.69** 1.27 0.98 1.76*** 1.41 1.6* 
tch_origin 0.95 0.81 1.01 0.82** 0.91 0.82** 
tch_edu 1.71** 1.02 1.37 1.54* 1.47* 1.63* 
tch_admin 1.06 0.73 0.64 1.32 0.63 0.79 
tch_exp 0.8** 0.9 0.88 0.83** 0.92 0.79** 
tch_mthgain 1.04 1.11* 1.04 1.05 0.93 1.2*** 
tch_paydelayed 1.24 0.88 1.04 1.14 0.95 1.24 
subtch_origin 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.09 
subtch_edu 0.89 1.03 0.84 0.99 0.92 0.86 
subtch_exp 1.07 0.8* 1.14 0.85* 1.04 0.89 
classsize 1.08 1.05 0.96 1.16 1.07 1.03 




survival 0.43* 0.72 0.71 0.59 0.99 0.25** 
school1 0.45* 0.7 1.01 0.44** 0.85 0.33*** 
school2 0.23** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.32*** 0.15*** 0.24*** 
school3 1.1 0.66 1.86 1.18 0.83 0.89 
school4 0.79 0.62 0.8 0.75 0.84 0.56 
school5 
      school6 1.1 1.09 1.11 1.17 0.71 2 
school7 1.89 0.56 1.31 0.9 0.77 1.8 
school8 
      wealth 0.81** 0.86 
  
0.84* 0.81** 
housesize 1.04 0.97 1.02 1 1.05 0.94 
income 0.87*** 0.89 0.92 0.86 0.89 0.87* 
credit_financiali 1.07 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.04 
credit_relative 0.96 0.99 0.9 1.01 0.98 0.99 
stu_eduaspiration 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 
expect_norm 1.48** 1.57** 1.42* 1.59 1.63*** 1.31 
expect_advanced 0.73* 0.49*** 0.76 0.53*** 0.7* 0.52*** 
percep_schquality 1.07 1.04 1.01 1.07 1.07 1.04 
percep_schaffiliation 0.87** 0.89* 0.91 0.85*** 0.86** 0.89* 
percep_schvalue 1.02 1.02 0.99 1.04 0.99 1.03 
percep_scheffort 0.92 0.75** 0.89 0.82** 0.85 0.81** 
confidence 0.94 1.12 0.97 1.02 1.02 0.97 
courage 1 0.89** 0.92 0.97 0.93 0.98 
curiosity 0.93 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 
ambition 1.07 1.16* 1.14* 1.09* 1.14** 1.11* 
familyonstudy 0.89* 0.87* 0.81** 0.92 0.92 0.87** 
familyonemo 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.92 1.02 
tchr_contvsstop 0.88 0.92 0.9 0.91 1 0.83* 
tchr_genvsvoc 0.84** 0.81** 0.81** 0.84** 0.9 0.79** 
sick 0.72** 0.66* 0.61** 0.74* 0.62** 0.77 
sick_class 1.02 1.36 1.14 1.21 1.36 0.95 
cost_vocvsjunior 1.04 0.97 1.06 1.03 1.05 0.98 
cost_genvsvoc 0.89* 0.8** 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.84* 
cost_colvsgen 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.9 0.9 0.88 
earn_workvsdrop 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.05 
earn_vocvswork 0.93 1.09 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.02 
earn_genvsvoc 0.8** 0.85* 0.77*** 0.84** 0.81*** 0.85** 
earn_colvsgen 0.82*** 0.85** 0.79*** 0.85*** 0.87** 0.81*** 
knowvoc 1.1 1.3* 1.01 1.27* 1.1 1.26* 
performance 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 
  business 0.44* 0.64 0.52 0.48 0.32** 0.71 
interpersonal 0.93 0.93 0.88* 0.96 0.9* 0.97 
urbanlife 0.73** 0.72* 0.8 0.69** 0.64*** 0.82 
outreach_voc 0.96 1.06 0.76 1.22 0.82 1.26 
outreach_fac 1.42 1.08 1.36 1.25 1.78* 0.86 
local_negative 1.67 1.33 2.18** 1.2 1.28 1.89* 
local_entertain 0.98 1.08 0.97 1 0.87 1.16 
gambling 0.62 1.04 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.85 
chore 1.22*** 1.06 1.21** 1.14** 1.32*** 1.03 
love 1.26 2.08*** 1.51 1.94** 1.76** 1.9** 
grade_7 1.63** 1.98** 1.59 2.06*** 2.47*** 1.78* 
grade_8 1.42 2.03** 1.39 1.83*** 1.52* 2.07** 
grade_9 
      
 
Gender Wealth Test Performance 
3: VHS Female Male Richer Poorer Higher Lower 
female 
  
2.84*** 1.44 3.19*** 1.03 
f_income 
  




  f_cost 
  
0.86** 1.01 0.9* 1.06 




minority 0.64 0.24 1.31 0.37 1.06 0.23 
single_p 0.75 0.63 0.72 0.72 0.81 0.59* 
migrant_p 1.06 0.99 0.99 1.02 1.08 0.97 
no_p 0.93 0.76 0.69* 1.04 0.94 0.83 
medu 1 1.02 1.01 1.01 1 1.04 
fedu 1.07 0.92 1.02 1 1.02 0.98 
peasant 0.9 1.03 1.04 0.84 0.93 0.94 
politicalc 1.09 1.06 0.96 1.2 1.04 1.02 
parent_leader 0.78 0.68 0.63 0.88 0.78 0.66 
parentbadhealth 1.1 1.4 0.93 1.32 1.18 1.24 
sibship 1.11** 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.04 1.13** 
witheldersister 0.86 1.16 1.02 0.95 0.91 1.11 
eldercohort 1 1.35* 1.03 1.17 0.95 1.49** 
mignetwork 0.89 1.04 0.98 0.95 0.89 1.15 
peerpedu 1.26 1.28 1.13 1.24 1.13 1.22 
tch_origin 1.05 0.95 1.06 0.96 1.03 0.94 
tch_edu 1.5*** 0.98 1.4* 1.35** 1.19 1.57** 
tch_admin 1.25 0.49** 0.8 1.16 1.26 0.56* 
tch_exp 0.87** 0.8** 0.89 0.86** 0.84*** 0.91 
tch_mthgain 1.05 1.13** 1.1* 1.03 1.02 1.13** 
tch_paydelayed 1.19 0.77 1.04 1 0.99 1.1 
subtch_origin 0.97 1.06 1.11 0.96 1.09 0.96 
subtch_edu 0.92 0.98 0.84* 1.02 0.97 0.89 
subtch_exp 1.09 0.98 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.05 
classsize 1.03 0.91 1.01 1.02 1.03 0.96 
distance 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.99 
survival 0.45** 0.19*** 0.51 0.39*** 0.51* 0.25*** 
school1 0.4*** 0.31*** 0.58 0.3*** 0.5* 0.28*** 
school2 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.27*** 0.2*** 0.23*** 
school3 0.56 0.67 0.21 0.74 0.3 0.67 
school4 0.65 0.37*** 0.59 0.57* 0.64 0.37** 
school5 
      school6 0.8 1.67 0.76 1.35 0.97 1.39 
school7 1.97** 2.46** 1.34 1.8* 1.44 2.03* 
school8 
      wealth 0.95 0.97 
  
0.94 0.97 
housesize 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.87 
income 0.9*** 0.89*** 0.91 0.88** 0.9** 0.88** 
credit_financiali 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.02 
credit_relative 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.99 
stu_eduaspiration 0.74*** 0.76*** 0.79*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.77*** 
expect_norm 0.96 1.09 1.14 0.91 1.02 0.89 
expect_advanced 1.03 1.1 1.22 0.92 1.16 0.86 
percep_schquality 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.03 1.05 1.03 
percep_schaffiliation 0.93 1 0.99 0.94 0.95 0.98 
percep_schvalue 1.11* 1.12 1 1.2*** 1.14** 1.09 
percep_scheffort 1 0.79*** 1 0.87** 0.91 0.9 
confidence 1.04 1.13** 1.13** 1.04 1.16*** 0.96 
courage 0.93* 0.91** 0.89*** 0.94 0.9*** 0.97 
curiosity 0.93** 0.97 0.93* 0.95 0.93** 0.96 
ambition 1.08** 1.05 1.03 1.09** 1.03 1.13*** 
familyonstudy 0.97 0.98 0.93 1.01 0.98 0.99 
familyonemo 1 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.95 1.05 
tchr_contvsstop 0.98 1.07 1.07 0.98 1.03 1 
tchr_genvsvoc 0.87** 0.81*** 0.95 0.8*** 0.91 0.79*** 
sick 1 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.9 1 
sick_class 0.95 1.14 0.99 1.05 1.09 0.92 
cost_vocvsjunior 0.98 0.99 1 1 1.02 0.93 
cost_genvsvoc 0.85*** 0.82** 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.86*** 0.82** 




earn_workvsdrop 1.05 1.07 1.03 1.07 1.04 1.07 
earn_vocvswork 0.93** 1.02 0.97 0.95 0.93* 0.99 
earn_genvsvoc 0.76*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.77*** 
earn_colvsgen 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.9** 0.85*** 
knowvoc 1.32*** 1.24 1.17 1.33*** 1.27** 1.3** 
performance 0.9* 0.81*** 0.86* 0.83*** 
  business 0.72 1.32 1.17 0.74 0.88 0.97 
interpersonal 1.03 1.09* 1.04 1.06 1.01 1.11** 
urbanlife 0.91 0.93 0.84 0.93 0.84 1.02 
outreach_voc 0.93 1.05 0.77 1.18 0.83 1.21 
outreach_fac 1.15 1.14 1.25 1.06 1.66** 0.71 
local_negative 1.46 1.31 1.54 1.22 1.11 1.82* 
local_entertain 1.46 1.39 1.74** 1.24 1.42 1.47 
gambling 0.62 1.3 1.03 1.1 1.11 0.91 
chore 1.05 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.07* 1 
love 0.88 1.51* 1.14 1.22 1.12 1.35 
grade_7 1.41** 1.44* 1.22 1.53** 1.78*** 1.04 
grade_8 1.61*** 1.87*** 1.45* 1.7*** 1.53*** 1.85** 
grade_9 
      
 
Gender Wealth Test Performance 
5: Undecided Female Male Richer Poorer Higher Lower 
female 
  
2.66** 1.85* 2.96*** 1.27 
f_income 
  




  f_cost 
  
0.86 0.95 0.88* 0.98 
age 1.29* 1.13 1.54** 1.11 1.28* 1.29 
minority 1.81 1.05 1.41 1.64 3.43 0.82 
single_p 0.64* 0.62 0.59 0.68 0.68* 0.54* 
migrant_p 0.73** 0.68** 0.67** 0.7** 0.68** 0.71* 
no_p 0.68** 0.58** 0.53*** 0.73* 0.66** 0.67** 
medu 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.88** 1.01 
fedu 1.02 0.92 0.95 1 1 0.94 
peasant 0.86 1.01 0.83 0.93 0.89 0.97 
politicalc 1.01 0.83 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.85 
parent_leader 1.18 0.96 1.03 1.23 1.01 1.19 
parentbadhealth 0.87 1 0.89 0.92 1 0.92 
sibship 1.09 1.06 1.1 1.06 0.97 1.16** 
witheldersister 0.86 1.14 1.02 0.93 0.8 1.2 
eldercohort 1.11 1.47* 1.2 1.27 1.03 1.67** 
mignetwork 0.76** 0.94 0.75 0.88 0.72** 1.1 
peerpedu 1.74*** 1.2 1.7** 1.46** 1.43* 1.49* 
tch_origin 1.11 0.88 1.04 0.97 1.03 0.93 
tch_edu 1.14 1.18 1.23 1.18 1.12 1.3 
tch_admin 1.57 0.86 0.9 1.85* 1.41 0.96 
tch_exp 0.87** 0.89 0.89 0.89* 0.92 0.87* 
tch_mthgain 1.07 1.1* 1.04 1.07 1.02 1.15** 
tch_paydelayed 1.32* 0.93 1 1.23 1.27 1.12 
subtch_origin 1.08 1.2 1.14 1.14* 1.23** 1.08 
subtch_edu 0.99 1.01 0.93 1.06 0.98 0.97 
subtch_exp 1.15* 0.95 1.06 1.04 1.01 1.1 
classsize 0.94 0.95 1 0.93 0.97 0.89 
distance 1.02 0.97 0.96 1.01 1.02 0.96 
survival 0.29*** 0.39* 0.38** 0.36** 0.44* 0.21*** 
school1 0.35*** 0.47** 0.37** 0.37*** 0.51* 0.28*** 
school2 0.54 0.43* 0.59 0.61 0.42** 0.59 
school3 0.17** 0.23 0.22 0.19** 0.08*** 0.24 
school4 0.66 0.55 0.71 0.63 0.64 0.53 
school5 
      school6 1.35 2.47* 1.29 2.28** 1.46 2.79** 





      wealth 0.83** 0.88 
  
0.81*** 0.85* 
housesize 0.98 1.06 0.97 1.04 1.05 0.95 
income 0.87** 0.9 0.87* 0.88* 0.86** 0.9* 
credit_financiali 1.08 1.09 1.05 1.11 1.08 1.07 
credit_relative 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99 
stu_eduaspiration 0.66*** 0.64*** 0.7*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.67*** 
expect_norm 1.43* 1.19 1.51** 1.22 1.43* 1.12 
expect_advanced 0.84 0.69* 0.83 0.74** 0.86 0.66** 
percep_schquality 1.04 1.07 1 1.06 1.06 1.03 
percep_schaffiliation 0.9** 0.92 1 0.86*** 0.91* 0.91 
percep_schvalue 0.98 0.93 0.91 1 0.98 0.95 
percep_scheffort 0.99 0.73*** 0.87 0.88* 0.97 0.77** 
confidence 1 1.13** 1.04 1.05 1.06 0.99 
courage 0.92** 0.88** 0.87*** 0.93* 0.89*** 0.92 
curiosity 0.92** 0.93 0.93 0.92** 0.95 0.9** 
ambition 1.01 1.03 1 1.03 0.98 1.06 
familyonstudy 0.88** 0.91 0.85** 0.94 0.89* 0.91* 
familyonemo 1.03 0.98 1.08 0.97 0.96 1.08 
tchr_contvsstop 1.04 0.99 1.06 1.01 1.05 1 
tchr_genvsvoc 0.84*** 0.78*** 0.94 0.77*** 0.9 0.75*** 
sick 0.92 0.78 0.96 0.84 0.77* 0.93 
sick_class 1.07 0.98 0.93 1.1 1.15 0.91 
cost_vocvsjunior 1.01 1 1.03 1.04 1.05 1 
cost_genvsvoc 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.92 
cost_colvsgen 0.92* 0.94 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.91 
earn_workvsdrop 1.09* 1.1** 1.1 1.1** 1.1* 1.1* 
earn_vocvswork 0.9* 0.91 0.97 0.87*** 0.88* 0.94 
earn_genvsvoc 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.83*** 
earn_colvsgen 0.84*** 0.86* 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.88** 0.83*** 
knowvoc 0.9 0.93 0.86 0.93 0.85 0.98 
performance 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.7*** 0.72*** 
  business 0.68 0.68 0.77 0.64 0.66 0.77 
interpersonal 1.03 1 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.03 
urbanlife 0.8 0.75 0.7* 0.81 0.79 0.78 
outreach_voc 0.89 0.99 0.84 1.01 0.86 1.05 
outreach_fac 1.37 1.07 1.61* 1.13 1.94*** 0.75 
local_negative 1.12 1.05 1.59 0.85 0.96 1.25 
local_entertain 1.17 0.93 0.9 1.12 1.34 0.97 
gambling 0.57* 1.43* 1.06 1.19 0.98 1.1 
chore 1.01 1.01 1 1.02 1.05 0.95 
love 1.24 1.83** 1.27 1.73** 1.55* 1.78** 
grade_7 1.84*** 1.61** 1.53* 1.88*** 2.51*** 1.4 
grade_8 2.16*** 2.01*** 1.77** 2.3*** 2.27*** 2.17*** 
grade_9 
       
Note: Option AHS is the base outcome. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Wealth=1 & 2 for poorer, 3 & 4 for richer; 
Performance (1
st
 imputation) =1 & 2 for lower, 3 & 4 for higher. By-performance regression is based on the first imputation 












E3. Standard Deviations under Multiple Imputations (for Standardized Coefficients)  
   
Here full-sample (N=6298) MI standard deviations (SD) for independent variables are calculated 
with Rubin's combination rules. The X-standardized coefficients in Figure 6-1 are calculated as 
coefficient * SD, and the corresponding RRR are calculated as exp(coefficient * SD).   
Variables SD  Variables SD  Variables SD 
female 0.49  classsize 1.06  tchr_contvsstop 1.07 
f_income 0.49 distance 1.73 tchr_genvsvoc 1.29 
f_performance 0.48 survival 0.50 sick 0.48 
f_cost 2.04 school1 0.35 sick_class 0.50 
age 0.47 school2 0.26 cost_vocvsjunior 1.70 
minority 0.24 school3 0.23 cost_genvsvoc 1.79 
single_p 0.27 school4 0.32 cost_colvsgen 1.71 
migrant_p 0.50 school5 0.33 earn_workvsdrop 1.69 
no_p 0.42 school6 0.27 earn_vocvswork 1.70 
medu 1.26 school7 0.44 earn_genvsvoc 1.65 
fedu 1.38 school8 0.36 earn_colvsgen 1.68 
peasant 0.47 wealth 0.94 knowvoc 0.66 
politicalc 0.55 housesize 1.13 performance 1.12 
parent_leader 0.18 income 1.68 business 0.23 
parentbadhealth 0.23 credit_financiali 1.68 interpersonal 1.69 
sibship 1.57 credit_relative 1.65 urbanlife 0.46 
witheldersister 0.49 stu_eduaspiration 1.34 outreach_voc 0.34 
eldercohort 0.46 expect_norm 0.42 outreach_fac 0.32 
mignetwork 0.47 expect_advanced 0.48 local_negative 0.26 
peerpedu 0.56 percep_schquality 1.65 local_entertain 0.26 
tch_origin 1.07 percep_schaffiliation 1.70 gambling 0.27 
tch_edu 0.50 percep_schvalue 1.16 chore 1.31 
tch_admin 0.25 percep_scheffort 0.99 love 0.30 
tch_exp 1.12 confidence 1.68 grade_7 0.49 
tch_mthgain 1.72 courage 1.74 grade_8 0.47 
tch_paydelayed 0.48 curiosity 1.74 grade_9 0.45 
subtch_origin 1.14 ambition 1.71   
subtch_edu 1.19 familyonstudy 1.48   




Appendix F: Propensity Score Matching with Adjusted Specification 
F1. Regression Results with Adjusted Variable List 
 Most Recent 
Participation 
Any Participation Educational Aspiration 
 dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
performance 0.007  0.044  0.014  0.017  -0.037  0.000  
atti_chore_farm -0.003  0.299  -0.002  0.619  0.014  0.000  
percep_schvalue 0.002  0.581  0.008  0.105  -0.027  0.000  
chore 0.002  0.316  -0.007  0.095  -0.009  0.001  
attoncamp 0.010  0.000  0.013  0.000  -0.012  0.000  
mignetwork 0.019  0.003  0.029  0.010  -0.033  0.000  
f_performance 0.014  0.058  0.014  0.294  -0.034  0.000  
fedu -0.001  0.710  -0.002  0.553  -0.017  0.000  
sibship 0.002  0.499  0.011  0.010  0.007  0.015  
witheldersister -0.008  0.242  -0.007  0.558  -0.021  0.017  
tch_origin -0.003  0.467  -0.015  0.013  0.008  0.044  
subtch_origin -0.003  0.416  -0.005  0.359  -0.012  0.002  
survival -0.003  0.768  0.030  0.084  -0.075  0.000  
school1       
school2 -0.036  0.025  0.108  0.000  -0.033  0.030  
school3 0.022  0.084  0.145  0.000  -0.015  0.359  
school4 -0.027  0.029  0.020  0.303  -0.051  0.000  
school5       
school6 0.072  0.000  0.064  0.002  0.037  0.015  
school7       
school8       
sick 0.018  0.008  0.002  0.891  -0.024  0.003  
sick_class -0.007  0.263  0.019  0.081  0.016  0.038  
cost_colvsgen 0.002  0.298  0.011  0.000  -0.007  0.001  
earn_workvsdrop -0.003  0.145  -0.003  0.412  -0.006  0.004  
earn_vocvswork -0.004  0.092  -0.004  0.236  -0.006  0.031  
earn_genvsvoc -0.005  0.047  -0.001  0.871  -0.007  0.016  
earn_colvsgen -0.002  0.429  0.002  0.609  -0.009  0.001  
interpersonal 0.002  0.213  -0.004  0.264  -0.009  0.000  
urbanlife 0.001  0.896  0.031  0.006  -0.043  0.000  
love -0.010  0.351  0.031  0.069  0.040  0.001  
grade_7 -0.007  0.398  -0.014  0.340  -0.021  0.037  
grade_8 -0.017  0.038  -0.031  0.023  0.027  0.005  
grade_9       
 
AIC 1522.8 3673.8 12442.4 
BIC 1714.9 3865.9 12653.7 
Note: Average marginal effects and corresponding p values reported. Two schools with no Lighthouse interventions were 
excluded from the sample. Probit model is run when the dependent variable is the most recent participation or any 











F2.Nearest Neighborhood Matching Results with Adjusted Variable List (t Scores)_ Most Recent Participation 
  Imputation_1 Imputation_2 Imputation_3 Imputation_4 Imputation_5 
  Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
confidence 0.55 -0.05 0.53 -0.24 0.54 0.42 0.56 0.18 0.55 2.3 
courage 1.23 0.03 1.2 -0.7 1.2 0.29 1.22 0.18 1.22 0.9 
curiosity 2.2 0.46 2.23 0.72 2.22 2.46 2.2 1.14 2.18 0.93 
ambition -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.59 -0.15 -0.72 -0.15 -0.26 -0.15 0.45 
extraversion 1.83 0.14 1.82 -1.18 1.83 -0.05 1.83 -0.42 1.83 0.7 
affiliationneed 2 1.88 2.2 1.06 1.97 0.68 1.96 0.89 1.95 1.76 
stu_eduaspiration 4.81 3.01 4.81 2.19 4.45 2.56 4.78 1.09 4.7 2.35 
expect_norm -2.21 -1.66 -1.4 -0.24 -1.3 -1.01 -1.46 -0.33 -0.57 0 
            
Total on support 4290 4404 4368 4388 4201 
On support _Untreated # 4085 4200 4160 4180 3992 
On support _Treated # 205 204 208 208 209 
Note: t scores for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) reported. 
 
F3. Nearest Neighborhood Matching Results with Adjusted Variable List (t Scores)_ Any Participation 
  Imputation_1 Imputation_2 Imputation_3 Imputation_4 Imputation_5 
  Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
confidence 2.13 1.72 2.09 1.63 2.1 1.15 2.2 1.34 2.14 1.23 
courage 0.55 0.48 0.55 1.88 0.57 1.84 0.6 0.72 0.57 1.06 
curiosity 2.58 0.56 2.64 0.87 2.61 0.69 2.57 0.29 2.54 0.54 
ambition 0.31 -0.29 0.26 1.01 0.33 -0.19 0.29 -0.33 0.32 0.19 
extraversion -0.27 0.04 -0.28 1.36 -0.27 0.81 -0.27 -0.07 -0.27 0.82 
affiliationneed 0.82 0.44 0.88 0.24 0.78 -0.38 0.77 -0.25 0.8 0.25 
stu_eduaspiration 5.12 3.02 4.05 2.13 4.14 0.72 3.79 2.98 3.82 1.51 
expect_norm -0.43 -0.77 -0.13 -0.83 0.22 0.89 0 -0.41 0.31 -0.41 
            
Total on support 4421 4425 4419 4419 4426 
On support _Untreated # 3743 3747 3742 3742 3748 
On support _Treated # 678 678 677 677 678 




F4. Results from Various Matching Methods and Samples (for Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3) 







ATT t score  ATT t score 
Nearest Neighborhood 0.39  3.01   0.24  3.02  
 
0.28  2.19   0.17  2.13  
 
0.34  2.56   0.06  0.72  
 
0.14  1.09   0.24  2.98  
 
0.31  2.35   0.12  1.51  
Kernel 0.25  2.82   0.20  3.59  
 
0.23  2.69   0.14  2.41  
 
0.20  2.26   0.14  2.45  
 
0.25  2.77   0.13  2.31  
 
0.26  2.80   0.13  2.32  
Radius 0.29  3.42   0.21  3.87  
 
0.30  3.59   0.15  2.74  
 
0.25  2.95   0.15  2.76  
 
0.32  3.85   0.14  2.48  
 








ATT t score  ATT t score 
Nearest Neighborhood 0.48  1.45   -0.28  -1.19  
 
0.34  0.94   0.02  0.10  
 
0.35  1.04   0.11  0.46  
 
0.27  0.76   -0.10  -0.43  
 
0.03  0.09   0.16  0.68  
Kernel 0.55  2.27   0.11  0.66  
 
0.44  1.76   0.12  0.70  
 
0.55  2.29   0.20  1.17  
 
0.50  1.97   0.11  0.66  
 
0.43  1.66   0.07  0.44  
Radius 0.58  2.46   0.18  1.07  
 
0.53  2.14   0.10  0.64  
 
0.56  2.38   0.13  0.82  
 
0.56  2.24   0.16  0.97  
 








ATT t score  ATT t score 
Nearest Neighborhood 0.46  2.05   0.25  1.00  
 
0.40  1.79   0.39  1.69  
 
-0.03  -0.12   0.11  0.47  
 
0.01  0.06   -0.17  -0.77  
 




Kernel 0.42  2.48   0.22  1.24  
 
0.31  1.82   0.16  0.90  
 
0.17  0.95   0.12  0.64  
 
0.27  1.46   -0.04  -0.22  
 
0.32  1.73   0.24  1.33  
Radius 0.47  2.96   0.26  1.56  
 
0.32  2.08   0.23  1.35  
 
0.23  1.38   0.16  0.90  
 
0.27  1.64   0.03  0.20  
 








ATT t score  ATT t score 
Nearest Neighborhood -0.20  -0.99   0.10  0.78  
 
0.02  0.07   0.07  0.56  
 
-0.09  -0.40   -0.06  -0.48  
 
-0.25  -1.22   0.05  0.43  
 
0.34  1.35   0.22  1.56  
Kernel -0.02  -0.16   0.12  1.31  
 
-0.08  -0.44   0.03  0.27  
 
-0.01  -0.08   0.01  0.13  
 
0.06  0.42   0.06  0.60  
 
0.05  0.30   0.05  0.56  
Radius 0.04  0.27   0.13  1.47  
 
0.05  0.28   0.03  0.35  
 
0.06  0.37   0.04  0.44  
 
0.11  0.76   0.07  0.76  
 

















Appendix G: Statistics for Lighthouse Teams 
G1. Number of Members by Team Characteristics 
 
 QB QD HQ HS HT HX HY 
Gender 
Female 10 15 11 13 12 10 10 
Male 3 5 7 6 5 6 3 
Grade 
Freshman 1 6 3 7 2 5 3 
Sophomore 11 11 13 12 13 7 8 
Junior 2 3 2 0 2 4 2 
Pre-college living location 
Guangzhou or Shenzhen 3 1 1 5 3 6 3 
Elsewhere in province 8 17 14 13 11 5 5 
Other provinces 3 2 1 0 2 3 2 
Zhaoqing or Qingyuan 0 0 2 1 1 2 3 
Major 
Education 2 3 2 2 4 2 3 
Natural science 2 3 6 7 6 5 3 
Non-edu social science 6 8 8 7 6 5 7 
Non-edu humanities 4 6 2 3 1 4 0 
Experienced (former Lighthouse volunteer or similar experience for over 
two weeks) 
Yes 0 3 4 0 1 3 1 
No 14 17 14 19 16 13 12 
Participation in first team building 
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Part of 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 
Whole process 14 15 17 14 17 16 12 
Participation in teaching training 
No 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 
Part of 6 6 2 3 3 4 1 
Whole process 8 13 16 13 14 11 12 
Participation in second team building 
No 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Part of 0 3 0 4 2 1 2 
Whole process 14 17 18 15 14 15 11 
Note: HX is a primary school, so it is not included in this study. There is other information such as university, detailed major, 
detailed pre-college location, role in the team, and detailed trainings participated, which is omitted here because of the 







G2. Perceptions regarding Team Operation (Unweighted) 
Unweighted QB QD HQ HS HT HX HY 
 Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Team members stay with each other well 4.6  0.5  4.5  1.1  5.4  0.6  5.0  0.6  5.1  0.7  5.0  0.6  4.9  0.8  
Team runs efficiently 4.5  0.7  3.8  0.8  4.5  0.7  4.7  0.8  4.7  0.7  4.4  0.7  4.5  0.8  
Students are supportive 4.5  0.5  4.8  1.0  4.7  0.6  4.9  0.8  5.0  0.6  4.8  0.9  5.2  0.7  
Households are supportive 4.4  0.9  4.5  1.0  5.1  0.6  4.8  0.9  5.2  0.6  4.7  0.9  5.0  0.7  
Teachers are supportive 4.6  0.8  4.3  0.9  4.7  0.8  4.2  1.1  5.7  0.6  4.3  0.9  5.1  0.8  
Schools and local government are supportive 4.5  1.2  4.4  0.8  5.0  0.7  4.3  0.6  5.6  0.7  4.7  0.9  4.8  1.1  
What we are doing is meaningful for students 4.9  0.7  4.8  0.9  4.8  0.5  4.6  0.5  4.8  0.8  5.1  0.9  4.6  1.0  
We are the best Lighthouse team this year 4.4  0.9  3.8  1.2  5.1  0.6  4.8  0.9  4.1  0.9  4.0  0.8  4.2  0.7  
Teaching training is quite helpful 4.2  1.1  3.5  0.9  4.1  0.9  3.8  0.9  4.0  1.5  4.6  1.1  3.8  1.1  
Team building is quite helpful 4.9  0.7  4.8  0.8  4.8  0.7  4.7  0.7  4.5  0.9  4.8  0.9  4.5  1.1  
Lighthouse instructional framework is supportive 3.6  1.0  3.4  1.1  4.0  0.8  4.1  0.7  3.4  1.1  3.8  0.9  4.2  1.2  
Former volunteers are supportive 5.3  0.6  4.2  0.9  5.7  0.6  4.8  0.8  4.6  0.9  4.9  0.6  4.6  1.0  
Note: 1 to 6 for totally disagree to totally agree. HX is a primary school, so it is not included in this study. 
G3. Perceptions regarding Team Operation (Weighted by Leadership) 
Weighted by Leadership QB QD HQ HS HT HX HY 
 Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Team members stay with each other well 4.7  0.5  4.4  1.0  5.4  0.6  5.0  0.6  5.1  0.7  4.9  0.6  5.0  0.8  
Team runs efficiently 4.6  0.7  3.7  0.8  4.4  0.7  4.7  0.7  4.6  0.8  4.3  0.7  4.5  0.9  
Students are supportive 4.6  0.5  4.7  1.0  4.6  0.6  4.9  0.8  4.9  0.6  4.8  1.0  5.1  0.6  
Households are supportive 4.5  0.9  4.4  0.9  5.2  0.6  4.9  0.9  5.2  0.5  4.6  1.0  5.0  0.7  
Teachers are supportive 4.8  0.9  4.2  0.9  4.7  0.9  4.3  1.1  5.7  0.6  4.1  0.9  5.1  0.7  
Schools and local government are supportive 4.5  1.1  4.4  0.7  5.0  0.7  4.3  0.6  5.6  0.8  4.6  0.8  4.7  1.0  
What we are doing is meaningful for students 5.1  0.8  4.8  0.9  4.8  0.5  4.6  0.5  4.8  0.8  5.0  0.9  4.5  1.2  
We are the best Lighthouse team this year 4.5  0.9  3.7  1.3  5.1  0.6  4.8  0.9  4.0  0.9  3.9  0.8  4.3  0.7  
Teaching training is quite helpful 4.3  0.9  3.4  0.9  4.0  0.8  3.8  0.9  3.7  1.5  4.7  1.1  3.7  1.1  
Team building is quite helpful 5.0  0.6  4.7  0.9  4.8  0.6  4.8  0.7  4.4  0.9  4.7  0.9  4.4  1.1  
Lighthouse instructional framework is supportive 3.6  0.8  3.5  1.1  3.9  0.7  4.1  0.7  3.3  1.0  3.7  0.8  4.1  1.2  
Former volunteers are supportive 5.3  0.6  4.1  1.0  5.7  0.6  4.8  0.7  4.6  0.9  4.9  0.7  4.5  1.0  
Note: 1 to 6 for totally disagree to totally agree. HX is a primary school, so it is not included by this study. The calculation assigns a weight of 3 to team leaders, 2 to those in charge of a class or 
team function, and 1 to other volunteers.   
